



UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



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· DINO ·
· COMPAGNI ·

BORN
cir 1257
DIED
1324

· CHRONICLE ·
· WRITTEN · IN ·
· 1312 ·
· FIRST PRINTED ·
· IN · 1726 ·

**THE
TEMPLE
CLASSICS**



**THE
CHRONICLE
OF
DINO COMPAGNI**



*The Baptistery at Florence.
(Church of S. Giovanni)*

Minari.

PRELIMINARY NOTE

THOUGH Dino Compagni calls his work a Chronicle, it is not (like Giovanni Villani's, for example) a Chronicle in the sense in which the term is now used to express a particular kind of narration distinguished from a history; the terms "chronicle" and "history" being in Dino's time interchangeable. Dino's book is in form the history of a particular fact, namely, the division of the Guelf party in Florence into the White and the Black Guelfs, with its attendant circumstances, its causes, and its results: but under this form is unfolded at the same time the history of the steps by which the wealthy traders of Florence (*popolani*, *popolani grassi*, and collectively *popolo grasso*) organised in the greater guilds (see Appendix II.) acquired and retained the control of the machinery of government in the city and its outlying territory (*contado*), excluding (practically) from all participation therein on the one hand the Magnates (*i.e.* the old feudal nobility, and other persons more recently ennobled by knighthood or by marriage), and on the other hand the smaller traders and the populace (*popolo minuto*).

The first book, starting (after a brief preface and two introductory chapters) with the peace of

Cardinal Latino in 1280, describes the causes which led to the schism in the Guelf party, its outbreak, and the initial triumph of the White Guelfs (1301).

The second book describes the overthrow of the government of the Whites by the Blacks, with the assistance of Pope Boniface VIII. and Charles of Valois (autumn of 1301), the expulsion of the Whites from Florence, and their first attempts to return by force of arms (1302, 1303): the conclusion of this stage of the narrative being marked by the death of Boniface VIII. (11th Oct. 1303).

The third book describes the fruitless attempts of the new Pope, Benedict XI., to make peace between the two parties (1303, 1304), the last struggles and ultimate dispersion of the White exiles (1304-1307), the attempt of Corso Donati and the Magnates to wrest the government out of the hands of the Popolani, the election to the imperial throne of Henry of Luxemburg, and his progress through Italy down to his coronation at Rome (June 29, 1312); concluding with a solemn denunciation of the punishment which (as the historian believed and confidently hoped) Henry would inflict on the wicked citizens of Florence, for their rebellion against his supreme authority. At the head of every chapter is given a Summary of its contents. For an account of Dino Compagni, and the literary history of the Chronicle, see Appendix I., and for a Summary of the principal features of the Florentine constitution after 1282, see Appendix II.

Most of the passages from G. Villani's Chronicle

that are referred to in the notes will be found in Selfe and Wicksteed's "Selections from the first Nine Books of the Croniche Fiorentine of G. Villani," published by Constable. Translations of all the works of Dante referred to in the notes have been published in the Temple Classics. Where quotations from Dante's works are followed by the letter *n*, it is to be understood that the notes in the Temple Classics Edition are referred to. Professor Villari's "The Two First Centuries of Florentine History" (published by Fisher Unwin) is cited as "Villari." It is a translation from the original Italian. Del Lungo's work, "Dino Compagni e la sua Cronica," is cited simply as "Del Lungo." (See Translators' Note below, p. 272.)

THE CHRONICLE OF
DINO COMPAGNI
OF THE EVENTS HAPPENING IN HIS
TIME

PREFACE

The subject of the work and the author's motive
in writing it.

THE remembrance of the ancient histories has long stirred my mind to write of the events, fraught with danger and ill-fitted to bring prosperity (1), which the noble city, the daughter of Rome (2), has for many years undergone, and especially at the time of the Jubilee of the year 1300. However, for many years I excused myself from writing on the ground of my own incompetence, and in the belief that another would write: but at last, the perils having so multiplied, and the outlook (3) having become so significant that silence might no longer be kept concerning them, I determined to write for the advantage of those who shall inherit the prosperous years (4), to the end that they may acknowledge that their benefits are

2 CHRONICLE OF DINO COMPAGNI

from God, who rules and governs throughout all ages.

1. *I.e.* the division of the Guelf party in Florence into the Whites and Blacks.

2. *Cf.* Dante, *Conv.* I. 3, 22.

3. The "perils" and "significant outlook" refer to the threatened overthrow of the supremacy of the Black Guelfs at Florence by the Emperor Henry VII. (*cf.* Preliminary Note).

4. *I.e.* the prosperous years that may be expected to follow the pacification of Italy by the Emperor, which Dino, writing during the course of the Emperor's expedition into Italy, hoped and confidently expected would be brought to pass.

BOOK I

CHAPTER I

The author's method of writing. Description of Florence.

WHEN I began, I purposed writing the truth concerning those things of which I was certain, through having seen and heard them, because they were things noteworthy, which in their beginnings no one saw so clearly as I ; and those things I did not clearly see, I purposed writing according to hearsay. But since many, because of their corrupt wills, err in their speech, and corrupt the truth, I purposed to write according to the most authentic report. And in order that strangers may be the better able to understand the things that happened, I will describe the fashion of the noble city which is in the province of Tuscany and under the protection of the sign of Mars (1). It is enriched by a copious imperial river (2) of sweet water, which divides it almost in half. The climate is equable, and the city is sheltered from hurtful winds ; its territory is scanty in extent, but abounds in good produce. The citizens are valiant in arms, proud, and quarrelsome. The city is enriched by unlawful gains (3), and, on account of its power, is distrusted and feared, rather

than loved, by the neighbouring towns. Pisa is 40 miles (4) distant from Florence, Lucca 40 miles, Pistoja 20 miles, Bologna 58 miles, Arezzo 40 miles, Siena 30 miles, San Miniato 20 miles towards Pisa, Prato 10 miles towards Pistoja, Monte Accenico 22 miles towards Bologna, Fighine 16 miles towards Arezzo, Poggibonsi 16 miles towards Siena. As to all the aforesaid towns, with many other fortresses and villages—and in all the directions aforesaid, there are many nobles—counts and captains (5)—who love rather to see the city in discord than in peace, and who obey her more from fear than love.

The said city of Florence is very well populated, and the good air promotes generation. The citizens are very courteous, and the women very handsome and well attired. The large houses are very beautiful, and better supplied with comforts and conveniences than those in the other cities of Italy. On this account many people come from distant lands to visit the city, not from necessity, but by reason of her flourishing industries, and for the sake of her beauty and adornment.

1. See *Inferno*, xiii. 143-150 n.

2. The Arno is called an "imperial" river, as being a main stream and not a mere tributary.

3. The "unlawful gains" here spoken of correspond to the "sudden gains" reprobated by Dante, *Inferno*, xvi. 73.

4. The Tuscan mile was equal to about 1800 yards.

5. The "counts" stand for the feudal nobles, who held their fiefs immediately of the Empire; the "captains," for the vassals of the "counts." The aim of Florence and the other city-states of Italy was to bring the feudal nobility of the surrounding districts under the city government. Cf. III. 34, n. 5.

CHAPTER II

Traditional account of the introduction of the names of Guelf and Ghibelline into Florence (1215).

LET her citizens, then, weep for themselves and their children, since by their arrogance, wickedness, and struggles for office they have undone so noble a city, have outraged the laws, and in a short time have bartered away the privileges which their forefathers won by much labour through long years; and let them await the justice of God, which by many tokens is threatening to bring evil upon them, as upon guilty persons who were free to avoid the possibility of its overwhelming them (1).

After much hurt had been received in ancient times through the quarrels of the citizens, there arose in the said city one quarrel which caused such division among them that the two parties gave, one to the other, the two new hostile names of Guelfs and Ghibellines (2). And the cause of this, in Florence, was as follows: A young citizen of noble birth, named Buondelmonte de' Buondelmonti, had promised to marry a daughter of Messer (3) Oderigo Giantruffetti. One day afterwards, as he was passing the houses of the Donati, a lady, by name Madonna Aldruda, wife of M. Forteguerria Donati, who had two very beautiful daughters, saw him from the balcony of her palace as he was passing, called him, and showed him one of her daughters. Then she said to him, "Whom hast thou promised to marry? I was keeping this my daughter for thee." When

Buondelmonte looked at the girl, she pleased him well; but he answered, "I cannot do otherwise now." But the lady Aldruda said, "Yes, thou canst, since I will pay the penalty for thee;" and Buondelmonte answered, "Then I will have her." So he was affianced to her, forsaking the other to whom he had plighted his troth. Wherefore M. Oderigo complained of this to his kinsmen and friends, and they determined to be revenged, and to beat Buondelmonte and do him shame. But when the Uberti, a very noble and powerful family, kinsmen of M. Oderigo, heard this, they said they wished Buondelmonte to be killed, "for" (said they) "the hatred caused by his being killed will be no greater than that caused by his being wounded; a thing done cannot be undone" (4). So they arranged to slay him on the day he should bring home his bride; and so they did. There was therefore a division amongst the citizens on account of this murder, and the friends and kinsmen of each party banded themselves so closely together, that the division was never healed, whence arose many dissensions, murders, and fights between the citizens. But since it is not my intention to write of things long past, because sometimes the truth about them cannot be ascertained, I will leave them alone. But I have begun thus in order to open the way to understand the origin in Florence of the accursed parties of the Guelfs and Ghibellines.

And now we will return to the events of our own time.

1. In this paragraph Dino alludes to the misgovernment of the Black Guelfs, with special reference to their intrigues with Boniface VIII. and Charles of Valois (see below, II.

2 ff.) ; and the "evil" which he predicts will fall on them is their subjugation by the Emperor Henry VII. (See Preface, n. 3.)

2. "New," that is, as to Florence. "The names '*Guelfo*,' '*Ghibellino*,' are Italianised forms of the German names *Welf* and *Weiblingen*. Of these the former was the name of an illustrious family, several members of which had successively been Dukes of Bavaria in the tenth and eleventh centuries. . . . *Weiblingen* was the name of a castle in Franconia, whence Conrad the Salic (Emperor, 1024-1039) came, the progenitor, through the female line of the Swabian Emperors. . . . The accession of Conrad III. of Swabia (Emperor, 1138-1152) to the imperial throne, and the rebellion of Henry the Proud, the Welf Duke of Bavaria, gave rise to a bloody struggle between the two houses ; and at the battle of Weinsberg (1140) the names Welf and Weiblingen were for the first time adopted as war-cries" (Toynbee, "Dante Dict.," s.v. *Ghibellini*), and subsequently Italianised as above. In Italy the Guelfs were (nominally) the supporters of the Pope, as protector of the rights of the Italian city-states. The Ghibellines were (nominally) the supporters of the Emperor, as protector of the feudal nobility. But this distinction had but little bearing on practical politics. "Guelfs and Ghibellines are local parties which fight for local reasons, independent of the struggle between papacy and empire. To liberty, independence, Italian unity, the rights of Pope or Emperor, they do not even give a thought. *The only aim that preoccupies them is the control of the commonwealth, from which they alternately try to exclude one another.* They call themselves Guelfs or Ghibellines, according as they hope to be helped in their policy by the Pope or by the Emperor" (Salvemini, *Magnati e Popolani in Firenze*, p. 2).

3. Messer or Messere (abbreviated as M.) was a title regularly prefixed to the names of knights and doctors of law. It was also given to cardinals and princes.

4. Mosca was the name of the man who gave this advice. (See *Inferno*, xxviii. 106-108 ; *Par.* xvi. 136 ff.)

CHAPTER III

A summary account of the peace between the Guelfs and Ghibellines effected by the mediation of Cardinal Latino, 1279-1280.

IN the year of the Incarnation of Christ 1280, the Guelf party bearing rule in Florence, and the Ghibellines having been driven out, there issued from a small source a great stream, namely, from a small discord amongst the Guelf party a great concord with the Ghibelline party (1). For, inasmuch as the Guelfs were suspicious of one another, and angry words were passing in their assemblies and councils, the more prudent began to fear what might come of this, and already to see signs of what they dreaded (2). (For together with other nobles a certain noble citizen, a knight called M. Buonaccorso degli Adimari, a Guelf, powerful on account of his connections and rich in estates, had increased in arrogance, and, heedless of his party's blame, had married his son—a knight named M. Forese—to a daughter of the Ghibelline leader, Count Guido Novello of the house of the Counts Guidi.) For this cause the Guelfs, after holding many councils of the party, decided to make peace with the exiled Ghibellines; and they wisely agreed to come to terms with them under the yoke of the Church, in order that the bonds of the agreement might be maintained by the Church's power. They secretly contrived also that the Pope should act as mediator in their discord; and at their request he sent M. the Friar

Latino, a Cardinal (3), to Florence to exhort both parties to peace. When the Cardinal had arrived, he asked each party to appoint delegates who should refer the matter to his award; and this they did. And by virtue of this reference he decreed that the Ghibellines should return to Florence under many conditions, and in a certain manner, and he assigned to them the offices outside the city; while for the government of the city itself he appointed fourteen citizens (4), namely, eight Guelfs and six Ghibellines; and he settled many other matters, imposing fines on both parties [in case of the award being contravened], and binding them to give account to the Church of Rome. And these laws, stipulations and promises he caused to be written among the municipal laws of the city. He gave sentence that the powerful and proud family of the Uberti, with others of their party, should remain under bounds (5) for a while, and should enjoy their possessions like the rest in the places where their families might be (6); furthermore, that to those who should be suffering the burden of being set under bounds the Commonwealth should give a certain sum of money a day, as compensation for their exile; but less to those who were not knights than to those who were.

1. Dino follows the Florentine calendar, in which the year began on Lady-day. Therefore he makes his starting point subsequent to all the events related in this chapter; for the "great peace" was concluded on Jan. 13, 1280, which, of course, fell in the year 1279 according to Dino's computation. Throughout these notes dates are given according to the ordinary calendar.

2. In this sentence and in the two following Dino glances at the period from 1267 to 1280, during the whole of which the Ghibellines had been in exile, their downfall dating from

the defeat and death of Manfred at the battle of Benevento (1266), which made Charles of Anjou master of Naples and Sicily, and proved an irreparable disaster to the Ghibelline cause at Florence (see Villani, vii. 13-15). The dissensions in the Guelf party belong to the time immediately preceding the autumn of 1279 (see Villani, vii. 56); but the marriage of Forese degli Adimari to the daughter of Count Guido Novello took place in 1267, and was one of a series of matrimonial alliances between Guelf and Ghibelline houses arranged in the early days of the Guelf supremacy. The project however failed, owing to the opposition of the popular element in the Guelf party to the alliance of their nobles with the Ghibellines, and its only result was to bring about the expulsion of the Ghibellines (see Villani, vii. 15), and to foster dissension between the aristocratic and the popular members of the Guelf party, as Dino intimates. Finally, Dino returns to the closing months of 1279.

The "assemblies" and "councils" alluded to are not those of the Commonwealth, but those of the Guelf party in the narrower sense of the word, viz. an organisation set up originally to administer the property confiscated from the Ghibellines in 1267 and following years (see Villani, vii. 17; Villari, p. 230). Throughout the period covered by Dino's narrative this organisation remained under the control of the Magnates.

3. "Messer the Friar Latino" was Latino Malabranca, Bishop of Ostia and Velletri, son of the sister of the reigning Pope, Nicholas III. (Orsini). He had entered the Dominican order after taking the degree of doctor in canon law at Paris. He died in 1294.

4. The fourteen citizens were styled *Buonuomini* (good men).

5. *I.e.* they were banished with fixed limits of residence (*confinati*).

6. *I.e.* their confiscated estates were restored to them, and they were at liberty to enjoy the income from them at their place of exile, just as those who were allowed to return enjoyed it at home.

CHAPTER IV

The violation of the settlement of 1280 by the Guelf nobility, and the consequent institution of the office of Priors of the Trade-Guilds, or "Arts," in 1282.

WHILE both parties were in the city together enjoying the benefits of the peace, the more powerful among the Guelfs began to infringe its terms from day to day. First they deprived the exiles of their pay, then they set about electing the officials without observing the regulations of the peace: they proclaimed the exiles rebels (1); and their arrogance rose to such a height that they entirely deprived the Ghibellines of public office and of their private rights. Hence the dissension between them increased. Wherefore certain men, thinking of what might come of this, went to some of the leaders of the people (2) and begged them to remedy this evil, that the State might not be brought to ruin. For this cause certain men of the people, approving the words that had been spoken, called together six of the *popolani*, among whom I, Dino Compagni, was one. Owing to my youth I was not aware of the serious import of the measures [proposed], but only of my singleness of purpose and of the cause of the city's becoming unsettled. I spoke on this subject; and we succeeded so well in persuading the citizens, that three of them were elected Heads of the Guilds to help the merchants and craftsmen in case of need (3). These were Bartolo di (4) M. Jacopo de' Bardi, Salvi del Chiaro Girolami, and

Rosso Bacherelli; and they met in the church of S. Procolo. The boldness of the *popolani* was so much increased when they saw that the three officers of their appointing were not opposed; and the outspoken language of the citizens who talked of their liberty and of the wrongs they had suffered, so stirred up the three that they were emboldened to make ordinances and laws which it would be hard to evade. Other great things they did not achieve, but, considering their small beginning, what they did was much.

This office was created for two months, beginning on the 15th of June 1282; and at the end of the term six citizens were appointed, one for each *sestiero* (5), for two months, which began on the 15th of August 1282. They were called Priors of the Guilds, and they lived shut up in the Torre della Castagna (6), close to the Badia, so that they might not fear the menaces of the nobles. They might carry arms at all times, and other privileges were granted them; and they were given six servants and six serjeants.

1. This was in effect a sentence of outlawry such as would have been incurred by the exiles in case of their transgressing their limits of residence. See I. 3, n. 5; I. 23 (at the beginning).

2. By the "people" Dino here (and usually elsewhere) means the traders of the greater guilds (see Appendix II.), also known as *popolani*, *popolani grassi*, and collectively as *popolo grasso*.

3. The Priors, now first appointed as Heads of the Guilds in general, presently became the supreme authority in the state. See Appendix II.; cf. Villani's account (vii. 79). The fourteen *Buonumini* (I. 3, n. 4) continued to hold office together with the newly created Priors, but without effective power, and at last disappeared.

4. The preposition *di* (of) in proper names means "son of."

5. Florence was divided into six districts called *Sesti* or *Sestieri*, viz. Oltrarno (*i.e.* that part of the city on the left bank of the Arno), S. Pancrazio, S. Piero Scheraggio, Borgo, Porta del Duomo, and Por (=Porta) S. Piero. Each *sesto* had, in civil actions, its own court and judge of first instance, with an appeal to the Judge of Appeals (always a foreign doctor of law); and in the event of the decision of the court of the *sesto* being reversed, a further appeal to the court of the Podestà (see Appendix II.).

6. This tower is still standing in the Piazza di S. Martino. The Abbey (*Badia*) of Florence belonged to the Benedictines, and was founded in the tenth century by the Countess Willa, mother of Hugh, Margrave of Tuscany (see II. 12, *n.* 2).

CHAPTER V

The beginning of the Priors' administration is marked by judicial corruption and financial malversation in the interest of the Guelf nobility and their connections among the Popolani.

THE laws imposed on the Priors were in effect to safeguard the property of the Commonwealth, to provide that the judicial authorities should do right to every one, and to prevent the small and helpless from being oppressed by the great and powerful. And had the Priors acted on these principles it would have been of great benefit to the people. But soon there came a change, for the citizens who entered on this office sought not to observe the laws but to corrupt them. If a friend or kinsman of theirs incurred a penalty, they connived with the magistrates (1) and officials to hide his guilt, so that he might go unpunished. Nor did they pro-

tect the property of the Commonwealth, but sought means how best they might rob it, and so they drew much money from the treasury of the Commonwealth on the pretext of rewarding the men who had served it. The helpless were not helped, but were oppressed by the nobles and by the wealthy traders who held office and were connected with the nobles by marriage: and many were shielded by bribery from the penalties due to the Commonwealth which they had incurred. Therefore the good citizens among the *popolani* were discontented, and blamed the Priors' office because the Guelf nobles controlled the government.

1. Lit. "lordships" (*signorie*). By the "lordships" are meant the Podestà and the Captain (see Appendix II.).

CHAPTER VI

In this and the following four chapters Dino touches on the origin and progress of the war between Florence and Arezzo in 1288-1289, which, as its result was the strengthening of the Guelf party in Tuscany, has a bearing on the subsequent division of the party in Florence, the main subject of the work.

AT that time the government of Arezzo was shared equally by the Guelf and Ghibelline nobles, who had sworn a lasting peace with one another. Wherefore the people (1) rose and put at their head a citizen of Lucca, with the title of Prior. He led the people very prosperously, and compelled the nobles to obey the laws. But they

conspired together and upset the popular government; and seized the Prior and thrust him into a cistern; and there he died. The Guelfs of Arezzo [had been] urged on by the Guelf party of Florence to try to seize the government, but whether because they knew not how to do it, or because they could not do it, the Ghibellines perceived their design and drove them out. They came to Florence to complain of their adversaries: those who had counselled them [to revolt] received them, and undertook to help them. But the Ghibellines, unmoved either by embassies or by threats from Florence, did not receive them back, but summoned (2) the Uberti, the Pazzi of Valdarno, the Ubertini, and the Bishop (who was one of the Pazzi) (3), a proud and ambitious man, who understood the business of war better than that of the Church. A dispute had previously arisen between him and the Sieneſe on account of one of his fortresses (4) which they had taken from him, and the dispute had been referred for ſettlement to the Guelf party at Florence; and as that party deſired to aid the Sieneſe and the exiles from Arezzo by falling out with the Biſhop, great diſcord was produced between the Florentines and the Biſhop with the Ghibellines. Hence enſued in 1289 the third war of the Florentines in Tuscany (5).

1. By the people are to be underſtood the wealthier traders, as above, c. 4, where ſee note (2). The term popular government (*popolo*) juſt below is to be taken in a ſimilarly limited ſenſe. The trade of Arezzo was comparatively unimportant; the feudal nobility were ſtill powerful, and hence the city was on the whole Ghibelline (ſee above, c. 2, n. 2).

2. The word uſed (*richiedere*) implies a ſummons to ſend troops.

3. The Bishop of Arezzo, whose name was Guglielmino, belonged to the Ubertini family, though he was also connected with the Pazzi.

4. The name of the fortress was Poggio S. Cecilia; and the Bishop of Arezzo had caused it to rebel against the Sienese, to whom it belonged (see G. Villani, vii. 110).

5. Dino means, not that Florence had only had to wage war twice in Tuscany, for she had been engaged in many previous wars, but that Arezzo was the third of the chief cities in Tuscany (the other two being Pisa and Siena) against which war had been declared by the Commonwealth of Florence. The war with Arezzo began in the spring of 1288; it was renewed and terminated by the campaign of 1289. As Dino is more concerned to unfold its consequences than to describe it minutely, he passes over its earlier stages, for details of which see G. Villani, vii. 120, 124, 127.

CHAPTER VII

Preparations for war on both sides, 1289.

THE powerful Florentine Guelfs had a great desire to attack Arezzo; but to many others—*popolani*—this did not seem fitting, both because they considered the enterprise was not just, and because of the indignation they felt against them (the nobles) with regard to office (1). Nevertheless they (2) hired a captain, called M. Valdovino of Soppino, with 400 horsemen; but the Pope detained him, and therefore he did not come (3).

The Aretines summoned many noble and powerful Ghibellines from Romagna, from the March [of Ancona] and from Orvieto; they displayed great boldness in desiring battle, and prepared to defend their city and to seize the most advantageous positions on the enemy's line of march. The Florentines summoned the Pistoians, the Lucchese, the

Bolognese, the Sienese, the Sanminiatese (4), and Mainardo of Susinana (5), a famous captain, who had taken to wife one of the Tosinghi. At that time King Charles of Sicily came to Florence on his way to Rome (6), and was in honourable fashion presented with gifts by the Commonwealth, and entertained with races and tilting (7). The Guelfs requested him to grant them a captain, together with his royal standard (8); and he [accordingly] left them one of his barons and noblemen, M. Amerigo of Narbonne, who was young and very handsome, but inexperienced in deeds of arms. His tutor, however, an aged knight (9), remained with him, besides many other knights tried and expert in war, who had high pay and ample provision.

1. It will be remembered that the Guelf nobles and their connections among the *popolani* had, as we should say, "captured" the machinery of the government, and were working the newly-established Priorate against the bulk of the *popolani* (I. 5).

2. "They" stands for the Florentine Guelfs, both nobles and *popolani*—the Florentine government, in short.

3. The Pope was Nicholas IV. (1288-1292). He had been Minister-General of the Franciscan order, and was a supporter of the Ghibellines (see Villani, vii. 119). This need cause no surprise, for the connection between the Papacy and the Guelfs was not an affair of principle, or even of sentiment, but sprang merely from the fact that their interests had happened to coincide. During the long struggle of the Emperor Frederick II. (1220-1250) to make himself master of Northern and Central Italy, it had been of vital importance to the development of the Guelf city-states to shake off the feudal yoke of the Emperor, and of equally vital importance to the Papacy that Frederick, already established in Naples and Sicily (the Norman kingdom he had inherited from his mother), should not likewise be predominant in Northern and Central Italy. But in 1289 the situation was entirely changed. The kingdom of Naples

had passed into the hands of Charles II. of Anjou (see note 6 to this chapter), as the successor of his father, Charles I., who had conquered it from the descendants of Frederick II., the last of whom, Conradin, he had beheaded in 1268. Florence was now the most powerful state in Tuscany, a region which, since the famous bequest of the Countess Matilda, the Popes had (to say the least) considered to be within their sphere of influence: and Florence, which had been in the closest connection with Charles I., was about to welcome Charles II. within her walls. It is therefore easy to see why Pope Nicholas did not wish Florence to be too strong. Baldovino of Soppino (or Supino) was one of the barons of the Campagna of Rome, and therefore a subject of the Pope.

4. The Sanminiatese were the people of S. Miniato al Tedesco, a fortress in the lower valley of the Arno between Empoli and Pisa. It had been, during the reign of Frederick II., the residence of the imperial vicar in Tuscany.

5. Mainardo, or Maghinardo Pagani of Susinana (a mountain fortress on the borders of Tuscany and Romagna), was a great Ghibelline potentate, but aided the Commonwealth of Florence out of gratitude for their protection of him during his minority, he having been entrusted to their guardianship by his father. His valour earned him the nickname of the "devil." (See *Purg.* xiv. 118; *Inf.* xxvii. 50; and G. Villani, vii. 149.) He died at Imola in 1302. The family of the Tosighi, or della Tosa, here first mentioned, will come prominently before us later.

6. This was Charles II. of Anjou (known as "the lame"), son of Charles I. by Beatrice of Provence. He was born in 1243. At the time of his father's death (1285) he was a prisoner in Spain, having been defeated and captured in an action with the fleet of Peter III. of Aragon in 1284 (see *Purg.* xx. 79), when on his way from Provence to help his father to recover Sicily, which had revolted in consequence of the "Sicilian Vespers" in 1282. In 1288 he was released from captivity through the intervention of Edward I. of England, and was now going to his coronation, which took place at Rieti, at the hands of the Pope, on June 19. He styled himself King of Sicily and Apulia (*i.e.* the "Two Sicilies," over which his father had ruled), but the island had now passed under the rule of the House of Aragon.

7. The word translated "races" is *palio*, which, strictly speaking, meant a piece of velvet or brocade given as a prize to the winner, and was then by extension used of the race itself. The word translated tilting (*armeggerie*) refers

to a kind of trick-riding by young nobles in gay uniforms (*armeggiatori*), who were armed with lances, and tilted at a wooden image of a Saracen.

8. After the return of the Guelfs to Florence in 1267 the lordship of the city was conferred on Charles I. of Anjou for ten years, and during this time they fought under his royal standard. Charles II. now confirmed this privilege, and the royal standard of the Angevins was ever afterwards used as the principal ensign of the army of the Commonwealth. (Villani, vii. 124.)

9. The name of the "aged knight" was William of Durfort. He was killed in the battle, as stated below (I. 10), and his tomb is still to be seen in the cloister of the church of the SS. Annunziata in Florence. (See Del Lungo, *Dante nei tempi di Dante*, pp. 135 ff.)

CHAPTER VIII

The Bishop of Arezzo attempts to make his own terms with Florence, but his design is frustrated by the Aretines (1289).

THE Bishop of Arezzo, considering, like a wise man, what the consequences of the war might be to him, sought to bargain with the Florentines and to quit Arezzo with all his family, assigning to them his episcopal fortresses as pledges (1); and as compensation for the revenues and the feudal services of the vassals he wanted 3000 florins a year, to be guaranteed by M. Vieri de' Cerchi, a very wealthy citizen. But the Priors who were in office at the time—from the 15th of April to the 15th of June, 1289—were at great variance with one another. They were M. Ruggieri of Cuona, doctor of law (2); M. Jacopo of Certaldo, doctor of law; Bernardo di M. Manfredi Adimari, Pagno Bordoni, Dino Compagni, the author of this Chronicle; and Dino di Giovanni, surnamed

Pecora. The cause of the disagreement was that some of them wanted to get the Bishop's fortresses, and especially Bibbiena, which was a fine fortress and strongly built, while others did not; and they (3) were averse to the war, considering the evil consequences which war involves. At length, however, they all consented to take over the fortresses, but not in order to dismantle them (4); and they agreed to empower Dino Compagni, because he was a good and wise man (5), to act in the matter as he might think fit. He sent for M. Durazzo, who had recently been knighted by the bishop (6), and charged him to make the best terms with the bishop that he could. In the meantime the Bishop of Arezzo had reflected that if he were to consent to the agreement he would be a traitor; and therefore he assembled the chiefs of his party and urged *them* to come to terms with the Florentines, affirming that for his part he did not wish Bibbiena to be lost, but rather that it should be strengthened and defended: if they refused, he should come to terms with them himself. The Aretines, enraged at his words, for all their scheme was frustrated (7), determined to have him slain; but Guglielmo de' Pazzi, a kinsman of the bishop, who was present at the council, said that he would have been well satisfied if they had done it without his knowledge, but as he had been asked to do it, he would not consent, for he would not be a murderer of his own blood. They then decided to take Bibbiena themselves, and, like desperate men, prepared to do so without further deliberation.

1. He proposed to make over the lordship and revenues of the fortresses to the Florentines for a stated

time to be retained by them as a pledge that he would not make war against them ; and he further proposed to leave Arezzo with all his kindred, and thus deprive that city and the Ghibelline party of a considerable part of their strength (*cf.* G. Villani, vii. 131).

2. *Giudice*. "Judge" is not an apt rendering of this word, for there was nothing at Florence like our judicial bench, whose members are entirely separated from the rest of the profession. The *giudici* were doctors of law, and answered to our barristers. They might indeed hold judicial or quasi-judicial appointments, but only for brief and limited periods. The judges of the courts of the Sesti (*see* I. 4, n. 5) for instance were changed every six months. Similarly the *giudici*, who were employed as a kind of assessors in the Court of the Podestà and Captain, only held office during the six months' term of those magistrates (*see* Appendix II.).

3. It was those who wanted to secure the fortresses who disapproved of the war, against the danger of which they conceived that the possession of the fortresses would be a protection.

4. There were, therefore, as Del Lungo points out, three alternatives advocated : (*a*) to get the fortresses and maintain them as such ; (*b*) to get the fortresses and dismantle them ; (*c*) to refuse to deal with the bishop, and go on with the war.

5. *Buono e savio*. These epithets must not be pushed too far ; they form part of the conventional phraseology of the time. "Good," for instance, is frequently used by Dino as pretty nearly equivalent to "of good standing or position," "substantial," or the like, with little or no reference to morality (*see* III. 15, n. 10, and *cf.* I. 3, n. 4).

6. M. Durazzo was the son of M. Guidalotto de' Vecchi-etti. Knighthood might be conferred (*a*) by knights ; (*b*) by kings, princes, or great barons, even though not knights (*as in this case*) ; (*c*) by Commonwealths and Republics, who appointed some knight to confer the honour on their behalf.

7. It seems, says Del Lungo, that the Aretines would have allowed the fortresses in question to be taken by the Florentine army, perhaps with the idea of wearing them out by a succession of sieges, and so avoiding a pitched battle in which they would have been outnumbered.

CHAPTER IX

The Florentines decide to set out against the Aretines by way of the Casentino. Arrival of the allied troops at Florence.

WHEN their decision was known among the Florentines, the captains and those that had control of the war held a council in the church of S. Giovanni, to consider the best way to go, so that the army might be supplied with what was necessary. Some recommended the way by Valdarno, inasmuch as if they went by another, the Aretines might raid this district and burn the large houses of the Contado (1). Others recommended the way through the Casentino (2), saying it was a better route, and assigning many reasons for preferring it. A wise old man named Orlando of Chiusi, and Sasso of Murlo (3), who were great feudal lords, being anxious about their weak fortresses, gave as their advice that this way should be taken, fearing lest, if another were taken, these might be destroyed by the Aretines, for they were in their territory; and M. Rinaldo de' Bostoli, one of the Aretine exiles, agreed with them. There were many speakers; the secret ballot was taken; the route by Casentino gained the majority, and notwithstanding it was the more doubtful and dangerous way, it turned out for the best.

Having come to this decision the Florentines welcomed their allies, who were the Bolognese with 200 horsemen, the Lucchese with 200, the Pistoians with 200, over whom M. Corso Donati,

a Florentine knight (4), was captain; Mainardo of Susinana with 20 horsemen and 300 foot soldiers, M. Malpiglio Ciccioni with 25, and M. Barone Mangiadori of Sanminiato; the Squarcialupi, the Colligiani (5) and others from fortresses in Valdelsa, so that the number was 1300 horsemen and a great many foot-soldiers.

1. A considerable part of the Contado, or outlying territory of Florence, lay in this direction. (See next note.)

2. The Arno rises in Falterona, a peak in the Apennines (*Purg.* xiv. 17), at a latitude somewhat to the N. of that of Florence, and flows S.E. through the narrow valley of the Casentino to a point within a few miles of Arezzo, when it turns abruptly to the N.W., flowing in this direction as far as Pontassieve, where the Sieve falls into it. This part of its course is what is referred to as Valdarno, and it is parallel to the Casentino, from which it is separated by the lofty range of Pratomagno. The choice of the Casentino route involved the crossing of the northern part of this range (*cf.* beginning of the next chapter).

3. Chiusi was a village in the Casentino, not to be confounded with the better known Chiusi in the Val di Chiana, midway between Florence and Rome. Murlo was a stronghold some four miles from Arezzo.

4. M. Corso Donati, later on one of the principal characters in Dino's history, was at this time Podestà of Pistoja. The words "over whom" refer to the Bolognese and Lucchese as well as the Pistoians.

5. *I.e.* the citizens of Colle di Valdelsa, which was about ten miles N.W. of Siena.

CHAPTER X

Battle of Campaldino. The Florentines fail to take full advantage of their victory (1289).

On the day appointed the Florentine army set out to invade the enemy's territory, and passed through Casentino along bad roads, where, if they had

found the enemy, they would have received great hurt. But God did not permit this. And arriving near Bibbiena, at a place called Campaldino, where the enemy was, they halted there and set themselves in battle array. The captains of the war (1) placed the picked cavalry (2) in front of the main body, and those armed with large shields bearing the red lily on a white ground (3) were drawn up to support them. Then the Bishop, who was short-sighted, asked, "What walls are those?" and received the answer, "The enemy's shields."

M. Barone de' Mangiadori of Saminiato, a bold knight and experienced in deeds of arms, assembled the men-at-arms (4) and addressed them thus: "Sirs, the wars in Tuscany were wont to be won by attacking well, and they did not last long, and few men lost their lives in them, since it was not the custom to slay them. Now the manner is changed, and victory comes by standing steady. I therefore counsel you to stand firm and to leave the attack to them." This they prepared to do. The Aretines attacked the army so vigorously and with such force that the main body of the Florentines fell back some distance. The battle was very fierce and stubborn. New knights had been made on both sides. M. Corso Donati, with the troop of Pistojans, assailed the enemy's flank; arrows fell like rain; the Aretines had few of these, and were taken in flank, where they were uncovered (5). The sky was covered with clouds, and the dust was very great. The Aretine foot-soldiers crawled, knife in hand, under the bellies of the horses and disembowelled them; and some of their picked cavalry rushed forward so eagerly, that many of

both sides were slain in the midst of the [Florentine] main body. Many who hitherto had been esteemed for their prowess proved cowards that day, and many distinguished themselves of whom formerly no mention had been made. Great praise was won by the captain's tutor (6), who was slain there. M. Bindo del Baschiera Tosinghi was wounded, and therefore returned to Florence, but died within a few days. On the enemy's side there were slain the Bishop, and M. Guglielmo de' Pazzi, a bold knight, Buonconte (7), and Luccio of Montefeltri, and other brave men. Count Guido did not await the end, but departed without striking a blow. M. Vieri de' Cerchi, with one of his sons, a knight, at his side, acquitted himself right well. The Aretines were defeated, not owing to cowardice or want of valour, but by the overwhelming number of their enemies, who put them to flight, and slew them in the pursuit. The Florentine mercenaries, who were accustomed to carnage, massacred them, and the auxiliaries (8) had no pity.

M. Talano Adimari and his followers hastened home (9). Many of the Florentine mounted citizens remained inactive (10); many knew nothing until the enemy were defeated.

They did not rush to Arezzo in the full tide of victory; for they expected to secure the place with little trouble. The Captain and the young knights, who were in need of rest, thought they had done enough by winning the battle, without pursuing the enemy (11).

They captured many flags from the enemy and many prisoners; and they slew many of them, which brought loss on all Tuscany.

The said defeat was on the 11th of June, S. Barnabas' Day, at a place called Campaldino, near Poppi (12). After the said victory, however, all the Guelfs did not return to Arezzo; but some ventured to do so, and they were told that if they wished to remain there, they might do as they pleased. Peace was not made between the Florentines and the Aretines; but the Florentines kept the fortresses they had taken, namely, Castiglione, Laterina, Civitella, Rondine, and several others; and some of them they destroyed. A short time after, the Florentines sent back troops to Arezzo, and encamped against it; and two of the Priors went there. And on S. John's Day they caused a race to be run there; and they attacked the town, and burned what they found in the outlying territory. After that they went to Bibbiena, took the place and destroyed the walls.

Those two (I mean the two Priors) were much blamed for having gone to join the army, because it was not their business, but that of nobles accustomed to war. After this the Florentines returned home, having gained little advantage, for the expedition had involved heavy expenditure, together with personal hardships (13).

1. "Captains of the war" was the title given to certain citizens who were appointed to superintend the conduct of the war, both at Florence, where some of them remained, and at the front, whither the others proceeded. The latter were under the orders of the "Captain-General of the War," or, as we should say, the Commander-in-Chief (in this case M. Amerigo of Narbonne (above, c. 7)), and of the Podestà (see Appendix II.), in this case M. Ugolino Rossi of Parma. Failing them the "Captains of the War" would take their place.

2. The "picked cavalry" (*feditori*, or *feritori*) consisted of nobles, and their duty was to begin the fight. On this occasion twenty new-made knights were among them. (See below, and Villani, vii. 131.)

3. The shields (*palvesi*, or *pavesi*) were made of light wood or wickerwork covered with leather, and were large enough almost entirely to cover the bearer (*palvesaro*). The "red lily on a white ground" was the arms of the Commonwealth (see *Par.* xvi. 154; Villani, vi. 43), but the reference here is to the devices borne by the *palvesari*, some of whom bore the white lily on a red ground. (See Villani, vi. 40.)

4. "Men-at-arms" was the name of a body of nobles on horseback. Dante, who in all probability was present at this battle, is believed to have served in this particular force.

5. Through the misbehaviour of Guido Novello, of the Counts Guidi (see below in this chapter).

6. See I. 7, n. 9.

7. Son of the famous Ghibelline captain, Guido of Montefeltro. (See *Purg.* v. 88 ff.)

8. *I villani*. Irregular troops from the towns and villages of Tuscany. (Cf. I. 21, n. 8.)

9. *I.e.* to Florence in order to join the army; but the campaign was already over. In this sentence Dino means to indicate the extreme rapidity of the march of events. The Adimari were one of the chief Guelf families.

10. Because they had not had time to get their horses ready. The phrase rendered "mounted citizens" means literally "citizens liable to the *cavallata*," *i.e.* bound to furnish one or more horses (*cavalli*) for the service of the state. Those liable to this service received a yearly salary which varied in amount. (See III. 2, n. 13.)

11. The pursuit was apparently left to the mercenaries and irregular troops.

12. The site of the battle is rather less than half-way down the Casentino.

13. The statement that the Florentines "gained little advantage" applies to the operations subsequent to the battle of Campaldino. But in spite of the inefficient conduct of the siege of Arezzo (see Villani, vii. 132), the victory of Campaldino proved a deadly blow to the Ghibelline cause, and, as we shall see, produced most important effects on the course of affairs in Florence.

CHAPTER XI

The nobles, elated by the part they had taken in the battle of Campaldino, commit outrages against the *Popolani*. The latter, under the leadership of Giano della Bella, enact the Ordinances of Justice (1293). Statement of the leading provisions of the Ordinances.

AFTER the return of the citizens to Florence, the Commonwealth maintained itself for some years in power and prosperity. But the nobles and magnates of the city waxed arrogant, and did many wrongs to the *popolani* by beating them and putting other insults upon them. Wherefore many worthy citizens among the *popolani* and merchants strengthened the popular government (1). Among these was a prominent and influential citizen named Giano della Bella, a wise, good, and worthy man, of high spirit and of good family, who resented the outrages committed by the nobles. He having recently been chosen as one of the Priors, who entered on their office on February 15, 1292 (2), had constituted himself head and leader of the movement, and was supported by the *popolani* and by his colleagues. And the Priors added one to their number, to hold equal authority with the rest, whom they called Gonfalonier of Justice (he was Baldo Ruffoli, for the Sesto of Porta di Duomo (3)), to whom was to be committed a standard with the arms of the people (4)—that is the red cross on a white ground—and a thousand foot-soldiers, all armed and bearing the said ensign or device, who were to be ready at

every call of the said Gonfalonier in any open place in the city, or wherever need might require (5). And they made laws, which were called Ordinances of Justice, against those Magnates who should commit outrages against the *popolani*; and it was enacted that one kinsman should be answerable for another (6), and that the crimes might be proved by public report, established by two witnesses (7). They decided, moreover, that all the members of any family which had had knights among its members should be accounted Magnates (8), and that such persons should be ineligible for the office of Prior, or Gonfalonier of Justice, or for their Colleges (9). These families were in all . . . in number (10). And they further decreed that the outgoing Priors, with certain men added to their number (11), should elect the new ones. And they bound the twenty-one Guilds to observe these laws, granting certain powers to the consuls of the Guilds (12).

1. By "the popular government" is meant the system of government by the Priors of the Guilds instituted in 1282 (see above, Chap. IV.).

2. 1293, New Style (*cf.* above, Chap. III. *n.* 1). Giano sprang from a noble Ghibelline family (see *Par.* xvi. 131, 132 *n.*). It might be supposed from a perusal of this chapter that the whole of the legislation described in it dated from the Priorate of Giano. It is therefore important to bear in mind that the Ordinances of Justice, in their original form, had become law on January 18, 1293, before the Priorate of Giano; that they were, as to some of their provisions, a re-enactment of previously existing laws (see below, *notes* 6, 8), and that one of the most important of the provisions singled out for notice by Dino was subsequent to Giano's priorate (see below, *n.* 9). Giano was, however, the leader of the movement which resulted in this legislation, and this may very probably be the reason why Dino groups it all under his priorate (*cf.* II. 25, *n.* 13).

3. We have seen (I. 4) that one Prior was chosen from each Sesto. Similarly, the Gonfalonier was chosen from each Sesto in rotation, so that in every year each Sesto furnished one Gonfalonier. The Priors and Gonfalonier were henceforth collectively known as the Signory. The office of Gonfalonier was not an absolute novelty, two officers with similar functions having been instituted in 1289 (Salvemini, *Magnati e Popolani*, p. 157). These were now abolished.

4. Not the arms of the Commonwealth (see I. 10, n. 3), but a device invented for this officer and his men, whose business it was to enforce obedience to the Ordinances.

5. In April 1293 the force under the Gonfalonier's orders was raised to 2000 men, and there was added to it a company of 200 workmen to carry out effectively the destruction of the property of magnates who had incurred this penalty. At the end of the same year the force was raised to 4000 men.

6. The first law compelling Magnates to give security against the commission of crimes was passed in March 1281. This statute was amended and extended in October 1286, when it was enacted that all males between the ages of fifteen and seventy of all families contained in a list appended to the statute, were made responsible for the good behaviour of themselves, their sons, and brothers, and became bound with their sureties in a penalty of 2000 *lire* to the fulfilment of a long series of promises (*e.g.* not to assault any person of the city or Contado of Florence or elsewhere). In case of a Magnate refusing to give the required security, his father or brother was to be compelled to do so. During the Priorate of Giano it was enacted, that if a Magnate liable to give security, as above, refused to do so, his father, or sons, or brothers by the same father, or uncles, or nephews, or father's father were to be compelled to do so. This is the enactment referred to by Dino, when he speaks of "one kinsman being made answerable for another"; and its effect, so far, was (as Salvemini observes) only to extend by one degree in the ascending and descending lines, the liability to give security for a Magnate refusing to give it. But it was further enacted by the same law, that if a magnate refusing to give security committed a crime, the kinsmen who were made liable, and, failing them, their sureties, should pay the same fine as if they had committed the crime, and the criminal himself was outlawed; and, if the punishment of the crime was death, the kinsmen (in the order above stated) were liable to a fine of 3000 *lire*.

7. The requirement of proof by two witnesses only to

establish public report, was enacted in reference to injuries to property by the Ordinances of January 18, 1293. In case of injuries to person, the number of witnesses required to prove public report was not stated, but by subsequent legislation was also fixed at two. By the revised Ordinances of 1295 (see I. 18, *n.* 1), the number was raised to three, in case of injury to person. The evidence as to public report had to be supported by the oath of the injured party if living, or, if dead, by that of his nearest relatives.

8. By the law compelling Magnates to give security, passed in 1286 (above, *n.* 6), or possibly by some other law passed before 1293, it was enacted that those families should be deemed Magnates' families among whose members there had been a knight within twenty years preceding the enactment. It appears that some Magnates' families, included in the list contained in that enactment, had succeeded in getting exempt from the necessity of giving security; and in the Ordinances of January 18, 1293, the exemption was recognised, and the families in question were declared to be not Magnates, but *popolani*. But during the Priorate of Giano the exemption was disallowed, and knighthood within twenty years previously was reimposed as a test to determine what families were to be deemed Magnates' families; and the definitive list of such families was compiled. From this time the term *nobles* or *magnates* acquired a statutory meaning, viz. any family which fell within the statutory definition of a Magnate's family. Under this enactment a certain number of *popolano* families became Magnates in the statutory sense of being subject to the penalties and disabilities imposed by the Ordinances.

9. This enactment was subsequent to the Priorate of Giano, but its date is unknown. Under the Ordinances of January 18, 1293, Magnates had been excluded from the Councils of the Hundred Men, the Councils of the Captain, and the Capitadini of all the Guilds (see Appendix II.). The "colleges" here mentioned were bodies of citizens which shared in the deliberations of the Signory, especially (*a*) the Council of the Gonfalonier, a body of six *popolani* appointed by the incoming Signory; (*b*) the Gonfaloniers of the Companies (see II. 22, *n.* 4).

10. The number is left blank in most of the MSS. The number of Magnates' families was probably thirty-eight at the time of the passing of the Ordinances of January 18, 1293, and was probably raised to seventy-two in consequence of the enactment under the Priorate of Giano, referred to in *n.* 8 (Salvemini, 200, 201).

11. *Arroti* (past participle of *arrogere*, to add). These comprised the consuls of the greater Guilds (see Appendix II.), together with a number of *popolani* chosen by the retiring Signory (see II. 12).

12. The Guild-consuls were empowered by the Ordinances, at the request of any member of a Guild who had been outraged by a Magnate, to go before the Priors or any other of the executive officers of the Commonwealth, and demand redress.

CHAPTER XII

The dominant Popolani, hounded on by Giano della Bella, exasperate the Magnates by their rigorous administration of the Ordinances (1293).

THE accursed lawyers began to cavil at these laws, which had been drafted by M. Donato di M. Alberto Ristori, M. Ubertino dello Strozza, and M. Baldo Aguglioni (1). They alleged that whereas it was ordained that crimes should be effectively punished, the punishment was extended so as to injure the enemies [of the aggrieved party] (2); that the laws were a cause of alarm to the Magistrates, so that if the injured person was a Ghibelline the judge became Ghibelline also, and that it was the same in the case of a Guelf (3); and that the men of the Magnates' families did not accuse their own kinsmen for fear of incurring the penalties. [But] there were few crimes hidden [by the Magnates] which were not discovered by their adversaries, and many such crimes were punished according to the law. The Galigai furnished the first example of this (4). For a man of that family committed an outrage in France against two sons of a well-known merchant, named

Ugolino Benivieni, for they had had words together, in consequence of which one of the brothers was wounded by that member of the Galigai family, so that he died. And I, Dino Compagni, being myself Gonfalonier of Justice in 1293, went to their houses and to those of their kinsmen, and caused the former to be pulled down according to the law. This beginning led to an evil custom under subsequent Gonfaloniers, because when under the law they demolished houses, the *popolani* said that they were cowardly if they did not carry out the business very thoroughly (5). Thus many [Gonfaloniers] perverted justice through fear of the *popolani*. It happened [for instance] that a son of M. Buondelmonte had committed a murder; and his houses were destroyed in such circumstances that he was compensated for it afterwards.

The arrogance of the evil men [among the *popolani*] increased greatly, because the Magnates were punished when they had incurred penalties; for the Magistrates feared to violate the laws, which required them to punish effectually. This "effectual punishment" was carried to such a length that the Magistrates feared that if a man who had been accused remained unpunished, the Magistrate [in that case] would have no defence or excuse in the eye of the law; for which cause no accused person remained unpunished. The Magnates therefore complained loudly of the laws, and said to those who carried them out, "If a horse is running along and hits a *popolano* in the face with its tail; or if in a crowd one man gives another a blow in the chest without intending harm; or if some children of tender age begin quarrelling, an accusation will be

made. But ought men to have their houses and property destroyed for such trifles as these?"

The aforesaid Giano della Bella, a man intrepid and of high spirit, was so bold that he defended things which others abandoned, and spoke of things whereon others kept silence; and he did his utmost in favour of justice against the guilty; and so greatly was he dreaded by the Magistrates that they feared to conceal the crimes (6). The Magnates began to speak against him, accusing him in threatening terms of doing these things, not for the sake of justice, but to bring about his enemies' death, and abusing him and the laws; and wherever they happened to be they threatened to cut in pieces the *popolani* who were in power. Certain therefore who heard them reported it to the *popolani*, who began to be exasperated, and in dread and indignation increased the severity of the laws (7), so that every one lived in fear. The leaders of the *popolani* were the Magalotti, because these had always been their helpers; and they had a great following and drew round them many families who were of the same way of thinking; many amongst the smaller trades-people (8) also gathered round them.

1. On M. Baldo Aguglioni (more properly d'Aguglione), (see I. 19; II. 23, *n.* 4), Dino here hints at an understanding (expressly stated by G. Villani, viii. 8) between the guild of the lawyers and the Magnates. This guild, consisting of professional men (see Villari, 312, 313) differed from all the others, which were composed of traders, and its members formed no small part of the intellectual aristocracy of the city. In political affairs they occupied an intermediate position between the Magnates and *popolani*, sometimes being found on one side, sometimes on the other (Salvemini, p. 73). Hence it is not surprising that the traders looked upon the lawyers with some ill-will, a feeling which Dino, a

typical *popolano*, evidently shared, and which was strengthened on this occasion by the circumstance that the *popolani* had been obliged to resort to these three lawyers to get their Ordinances drafted.

2. *I.e.* even if they happened to be innocent of the crime for which the punishment was inflicted. The insinuation was that the provision for the personal responsibility of all the members of a family, in the case of an outrage by one of them, caused the administration of justice to become an engine for gratifying private spite against innocent persons.

3. The lawyers' insinuation here is, that the penalties imposed on the Magistrates (*i.e.* the Podestà and Captain, see Appendix II.), in case of their neglecting to put the Ordinances in force, were so severe that in order to escape any imputation of remissness they acted recklessly and with partiality in condemning the Magnates.

4. *I.e.* of a crime which the Magnates had attempted to hide, but which had been brought to light by their enemies the *popolani*. Dino here answers the last of the "cavils" by saying, "It may be true, as you say, that the Magnates tried to hide their crimes, but the crimes were, in fact, almost always brought to light." There is some uncertainty about the details of this particular case.

5. *I.e.* in excess of their duty. Dino goes on to quote as an instance the case of a Buondelmonte, in which the houses of a family were destroyed as the punishment of a murder which for some reason or other did not come within the purview of the Ordinances.

6. *I.e.* the crimes against which the Ordinances were framed.

7. See I. II, n. 5.

8. *I.e.* *popolani* belonging to the lesser guilds.

CHAPTER XIII

The Magnates determine to upset the government of the Popolani. To this end they negotiate with Pope Boniface VIII., and with an Imperial emissary. Finding it impossible to murder Giano della Bella, they stir up enemies against him among the Popolani (1293-1294).

THE powerful citizens, who were not all noble by race, some being called Magnates accidentally (1), tried many means of subduing the *popolani*, on account of the hatred they bore them. They fetched from Champagne a bold French knight named M. Gian di Celona (whose power was more conspicuous than his good faith), on whom certain jurisdictions had been conferred by the Emperor (2). This man came into Tuscany, having made an agreement with the Florentine Magnates, and by the desire of the newly-elected Pope, Boniface VIII.; and he was furnished with charters and powers over any cities he might win (3). In order to upset the government of Florence, such men as M. Vieri de' Cerchi and Nuto Marignolli set seal to this agreement (4), according to the statement of M. Piero Cane of Milan, the agent of the said M. Gian di Celona (5). They made many plans to slay the aforesaid Giano [della Bella], saying, "Smite the shepherd and the sheep shall be scattered."

One day they plotted to get him murdered; then they drew back through fear of the *popolani*; then they cunningly found a means of compassing

his death by subtle craftiness, saying : " He is just ; let us place before him the wicked deeds of the butchers, who are men full of mischief and evil-disposed." Among these there was one great butcher, called Pecora, upheld by the Tosinghi (6), who carried on his trade by means both fraudulent and hurtful to the Republic (7). Proceedings were taken against him by his guild (8) because he fearlessly carried on his evil practices. He menaced the Magistrates and their officers, and with the support of a large number of armed men put himself forward to do evil (9). Those in the conspiracy against Giano, being engaged in the church of Ognissanti on an amendment of the laws (10), said to him, " Look at the deeds of the butchers, how they multiply their wrong-doing." And Giano replied, " May the city perish sooner than that this be suffered : " and endeavoured to frame laws against them. And in like manner they said of the lawyers : " See, the lawyers threaten to call the Magistrates to strict account (11) and draw unjust favours from them through fear, and keep causes undecided for three or four years ; and judgment is not given in any cause ; and when any one wishes to discontinue his action or withdraw his defence he cannot do so ; to such an extent do they confuse the issues to be tried, and quibble as to liability to penalties, acting dishonourably." Giano, moved to righteous anger against them, would say, " Let laws be made which may be a check on such wrong-doing." Then, when they had thus stirred him up to justice (12), they secretly sent to the lawyers and to the butchers and the members of

the other guilds, saying that Giano was maligning them and that he was proposing laws to be framed against them.

1. Lit. "by other accidents." A *substance* is that which exists on its own account. An *accident* exists only as an experience, quality or capacity of a substance. The persons in question were in substance *popolani*, but, in virtue of the quality of belonging to families which had had a knight among their members within twenty years past (see I. II, n. 8), they were Magnates "accidentally."

2. Gian di Celona is the Italianised form of Jean de Chalon. It seems more probable that he came from Chalon-sur-Saône in Burgundy than from Châlons-sur-Marne in Champagne. He had already been in relations with the Florentine government in 1284. The "Emperor" was Adolphus of Nassau, King of the Romans, elected in 1292, but never crowned at Rome, and therefore not, strictly speaking, Emperor. His object in sending Jean de Chalon was of course to revive the drooping cause of Ghibellinism and enforce the Imperial rights in Tuscany (cf. III. 34, n. 5). The vague phrase "certain jurisdictions" is used because apparently Jean de Chalon was not formally appointed vicar in Tuscany by Adolphus.

3. *I.e.* cause to submit to the Imperial authority. Boniface VIII. (Benedetto Gaetani) was elected Pope on December 24, 1294. His connivance with the Florentine Magnates and the Imperial emissary on this occasion was in accordance with the general line of Papal policy indicated above (I. 7, n. 3).

4. Dino insinuates that it was a shameful thing for members of such well-known Guelf families as the Cerchi and Marignolli to be coquetting with the Ghibellines. The Magnates of Florence included the remains of the Ghibelline party there.

5. This was a lawyer employed by Jean de Chalon to conduct the negotiation with the Florentine Magnates.

6. These words are very significant, as they show that the Tosinghi, a family of Magnates, had come to an understanding with one of the most influential *popolani*. It will be observed that the events of this latter part of the chapter are earlier in time than those of the former part.

7. Because contrary to the laws.

8. *I.e.* by the chief officials of the guild who had jurisdiction in such a case.

9. *I.e.* to join the Magnates in their attack on the government.

10. The allusion is to the appointment of a committee (as we should say) of fourteen members chosen by the Signory and approved by the Council of the Hundred Men (see Appendix II.) for the purpose of introducing into the statutes defining the duties of the Magistrates, viz. the Podestà and the Captain of the People, certain alterations which the passing of the Ordinances of Justice had rendered necessary. The committee was appointed on December 9, 1294, and sat on into January 1295. Of the fourteen members five were among those "in the conspiracy against Giano."

11. They were, in any case, bound by law to give a strict account of their administration at the end of their term of office. The "conspirators against Giano" were therefore insinuating that the lawyers threatened to bring false accusations against the Magistrates as to their conduct in office. The committee were, according to custom, shut up during their deliberations in the monastery of Ognissanti (All Saints). The presence among the five "conspirator" members of two lawyers, M. Baldo Aguglioni (see above, I. 12, n. 1) and M. Palmieri Altoviti, gives piquancy to the proceedings; and with Dino Compagni himself (see next chapter) and Giano on the other side, the debates must have been lively enough.

12. *I.e.* either stirred him up "to propose measures for doing justice on the butchers and lawyers," or simply, "stirred up his zeal for justice."

CHAPTER XIV

Dino Compagni reveals to Giano della Bella the plot against him. Scene in the monastery of Ognissanti (January 1295).

THE plot against Giano was discovered one day when I, Dino, and some of them (1) were about to assemble in Ognissanti, and Giano was walking in the garden. Those in the conspiracy were con-

certing a deceitful law (2) which all did not understand, namely, that every city or fortress should be deemed hostile which harboured any one outlawed as an enemy of the people; and this they did because the conspiracy was made [by the Magnates] with false *popolani* to banish (3) Giano and bring him into hatred with the people (4). I got knowledge of the conspiracy, my suspicions having been aroused by the conspirators concerting the law without their colleagues. I revealed to Giano the plot formed against him, and showed him how [his foes] were making him out the enemy of the people and of the craftsmen (5), and that if he persisted in his proposed legislation (6), the people would turn round upon him: [so I advised him] to drop his proposals and speak on the defensive against his adversaries. And so he did, saying: "May the city sooner perish than that so many wicked deeds be suffered!" Then Giano knew who was betraying him, for the conspirators could be hidden no longer. Those who were innocent wished to examine the facts prudently; but Giano, more bold than prudent, threatened to have them (7) put to death. Therefore the making of the laws was not further proceeded with, and we separated in great discord.

The conspirators against Giano remained there (8). These were M. Palmieri di M. Ugo Altoviti, [and] M. Baldo Aguglioni, doctors of law, Alberto di M. Jacopo del Giudice, Noffo di Guido Bonafedi, and Arriguccio di Lapo Arrighi. The notary secretaries were Ser Matteo Biliotti and Ser Pino of Signa (9). All the words which had been spoken were greatly exaggerated by repetition, so that all

the conspirators hastened to kill [Giano], for they feared his deeds more than him (10).

1. *I.e.* some of the members of the committee (see preceding chapter, *n.* 10).

2. The committee were about to hold a meeting to proceed with their work, and the "conspirator" members were concerting beforehand the proposal they should make at the meeting, with the object of compassing the ruin of Giano. Their proposed enactment is called "deceitful," because its motive was not at the first glance apparent.

3. *Sbandeggiare*, which strictly means to condemn, in a general sense, to any kind of penalty. The word is translated "outlawed" just before.

4. The term "people" here includes, in addition to the *popolani*, the lesser traders and the populace, of whom Giano had constituted himself the champion. Dino Pecora (see preceding chapter), however, had also a certain following among the latter classes, and, as we have seen, was in confederacy with the Magnates. It should be borne in mind that the traders of the lesser guilds and the populace depended to a considerable extent on the Magnates' custom for their prosperity, and were therefore to some extent under their influence. The fact that the Magnates, as well as the classes at the bottom of the social scale, were now alike excluded from participation in the government of the city, constituted a further bond of sympathy between them. The *popolani*, on the other hand, in whom all political power was now concentrated, carried on an immense trade with all Europe and the East (*cf. Inf.* xxvi. 1-3); while their interest in local trade was comparatively unimportant, and the patronage of the Magnates a matter of indifference to them (see Villari, 346, 469).

5. The "people" here are the *popolani*—the craftsmen, the traders of the lesser guilds.

6. *I.e.* the clauses he proposed to add to the statutes (see I. 13, *n.* 10) to check the abuses among the lawyers, the butchers, and others.

7. The conspirators, probably.

8. It is difficult to be sure how much Dino means to convey by this. His words seem to imply that the majority of the committee withdrew, and that thereupon the business was left incomplete. But it is known that the committee did in fact carry out the amendment of the statutes, and that as amended they came into force on February 1 in this year

(1295), though after Giano had been driven from the city (below, I. 16) they were further modified. It seems best, therefore, to conclude that Dino is only referring here to a temporary interruption of the labours of the committee.

9. *Ser*, derived (ultimately) from Latin *senior*, was prefixed to the names of priests and notaries.

10. "The laws advocated by Giano would, if passed, produce real and serious effects; but he himself was a man too straightforward, simple and impulsive to inspire his enemies with fear."—*Del Lungo*.

CHAPTER XV

The Magnates make a scheme to divide the Popolani (1294-1295).

THE Magnates held their council in S. Jacopo Oltrarno, and there all agreed that Giano should be slain. Afterwards there was a meeting of one member from each House; and the spokesman was M. Berto Frescobaldi. He talked of how these dogs of *popolani* had bereft them of their privileges and of office, and how they durst not enter the Palace and push forward their causes (1); adding, "if we beat one of our servants our houses are pulled down (2). And therefore, sirs, I counsel that we come forth from this bondage. Let us take our arms and rush into the streets; let us kill as many of the *popolani* as we find, friends and enemies alike, so that neither we nor our sons may ever more be brought under their yoke."

After that M. Baldo della Tosa stood up and said: "Sirs, the wise knight's counsel would be good if it were not too hazardous, seeing that if our intention failed we should all be dead men.

But let us conquer them first by cunning, and disunite them by mild words, saying that the Ghibellines will take our city from us, and will drive out them and us, and that for God's sake they should not allow the Ghibellines to rise to power. Having thus caused a division amongst them (3), let us smite them so that they never lift themselves up any more." The knight's counsel was pleasing to all, and they appointed two for each district, who should corrupt and divide the *popolani* and malign Giano, and estrange from him all the powerful *popolani* for the reasons mentioned (4).

1. Not the palace of the Signory, which was only begun in 1299 (see II. 12, *n.* 2), but the palace of the Podestà (now known as the Bargello), which had been erected some forty years previously. It will be readily understood, by referring to Appendix II., that it would not be difficult for Magnates to bring undue influence to bear on the administration of justice in the Podestà's court, which sat in his palace. The allusion in this passage is to a law, passed probably in 1294, restricting the access of Magnates to the palaces of the Podestà and Captain.

2. Under a modification of the Ordinances, which came into force on July 6, 1295 (some six months after the events related in this chapter), it was provided that the Ordinances should not apply to chastisement inflicted by Magnates on their servants.

3. The Ghibellines were to serve as a bugbear to divide the *popolani*. Some would be frightened, and fall into the trap, while others would persist in hostility to the Magnates.

4. Viz. because they would allege that it was by Giano's fault that the Magnates and *popolani* were at strife, and thereby the whole Guelf party in Florence was in danger.

CHAPTER XVI

Riot in Florence on Jan. 23, 1295. The Podestà's palace plundered. Giano della Bella driven from the city.

WHILST the citizens were thus dissembling (1) the city was in a state of great discord. It befell in those days that M. Corso Donati, a powerful knight, sent some foot-soldiers to attack M. Simone Galastrone, his kinsman, and in the struggle one [a *popolano*] was killed, and several were wounded. An accusation was made on both sides, and it was therefore necessary to proceed according to the Ordinances of Justice in taking the evidence (2), and in awarding the punishment. The trial came on before the Podestà, named M. Giano of Lucino (3), a noble Lombard knight of great sense and goodness. One of his doctors of law (4), who was engaged in the case and hearing the evidence produced on both sides, perceived that it went against M. Corso; [but] he made the notary write the contrary so as to make out that M. Corso ought to be absolved, and M. Simone condemned. The Podestà therefore, being deceived, acquitted M. Corso and condemned M. Simone. The citizens who heard what had been done thought that he had done it for money, and that he was the enemy of the *popolani*, and M. Corso's adversaries especially cried with one voice, "Death to the Podestà; to the fire, to the fire!" (5). The first to start the uproar, more from the ill-will they bore M. Corso than from sorrow for offended justice, were Taldo

della Bella (6) and Baldo dal Borgo. And the tumult increased so greatly that the mob ran with faggots to the palace of the Podestà to burn the door.

Giano, who was with the Priors, hearing the cry of the mob, said, "I will go to save the Podestà from the hands of the rioters," and he mounted his horse, thinking that the people would obey him and retire at his words. But on the contrary they turned their lances against him to throw him off his horse; so he turned back. In order to please the people the Priors came out (7) with the Gonfalon, thinking to appease the uproar; but it increased so much that the rioters burnt the palace door, and stole the horses and goods of the Podestà. The Podestà fled into a neighbouring house; his household were seized, the records were torn in pieces, and any evil-disposed person who was being sued in court went to destroy the papers relating to his case. This destruction was effectually helped on by a certain doctor of law named M. Baldo dell' Ammirato, who had many opponents, and was in court at the time engaged in criminal and civil business. This man, who had proceedings pending against himself and feared to be punished, was so crafty that with the help of his followers he broke open the cupboards, and tore up the records, so that they were never found again. Many persons did strange things during that riot. The Podestà and his household were in great peril. He had brought his wife with him, a lady highly esteemed in Lombardy, and of great beauty. She and her husband, hearing the shouts of the mob, fled, calling upon death (8), to the neighbouring houses,

where they found help, and were hidden and concealed.

The next day the Council (9) assembled, and it was decided for the honour of the city that the stolen goods should be restored to the Podestà, and that his salary should be paid. This was accordingly done, and he went away. The city remained in great discord. The good citizens blamed what had been done; others laid the guilt on Giano, seeking to drive him away, or to make him come to harm; others said, "Now that we have made a beginning, let us burn the rest," and there was such an uproar throughout the city, that it stirred the minds of all against Giano. And the Magalotti (10), his kinsmen, shared in this feeling; and they advised him, in order to put an end to the people's excitement, to absent himself for a while from the city. He trusted to their false counsel and departed; and forthwith he was banished and condemned in person and property.

1. *I.e.* secretly nursing their mutual ill-will.

2. See I. 11. The case fell within the Ordinances because a *popolano* had been killed in a scuffle between Magnates. M. Corso and M. Simone accused each other of the murder, so as to escape the penalty. Under the modification of the Ordinances already referred to (I. 15, n. 2), it was provided that they should not apply to the killing of a *popolano* who wilfully meddled in a scuffle between Magnates.

3. Lucino was a small village in the territory of Como.

4. The establishment or household of this Podestà consisted of 82 persons, including 10 doctors of law, 24 notaries, and 4 knights. He also had his wife with him (which was unusual) and a son.

5. *I.e.* "set fire to the Podestà's palace!"

6. Giano's brother.

7. *Scesono in piazza.* This is a general expression meaning that they came out of their residence and went into the

streets. It does not necessarily refer to a *piazza*. The *Piazza della Signoria* was not in existence at this time.

8. *Cf. Inf. xiii. 118.*

9. *I.e.* the general council of the Podestà (see Appendix II.).

10. See I. 12 (near the end).

CHAPTER XVII

The Magnates quarrel with the Imperial emissary.

The quarrel made up by the intervention of the Pope (1295).

WHEN Giano della Bella had been driven away on the 5th of March 1294 (1), and his house had been robbed and partially destroyed, the smaller trades-people lost all their boldness and energy through having no leader, and remained inactive. The citizens appointed as Podestà one who was the Captain (2), and they began to accuse Giano's friends, some of whom were sentenced to pay 500 *lire*, some 1000 *lire*, and some were declared contumacious (3). Giano and his kindred left the country (4). The citizens remained in great discord; some praised, others blamed him. M. Giovanni di Celona, who had come at the request of the Magnates and wished to carry out what he had promised, and to obtain what had been promised him, was demanding the payment for 500 horsemen whom he had brought with him. This was denied him, for he was told that he had not kept his word. The knight, who was a man of high spirit, betook himself to the enemies of the Florentines at Arezzo, and said to them: "Sirs, I came into Tuscany at the request of the Guelfs of Florence; here are the

papers. They refuse to give me what they bargained; therefore I and my companions will join with you in putting them to death as enemies." So the Aretines, the Cortonese, and the Ubertini did him honour.

The Florentines, hearing this, sent to Pope Boniface, begging him to interpose and make peace between them. And this he did, and adjudged that the Florentines should give him [M. Giovanni di Celona] 20,000 florins (5); which they gave him. And being friends once more with him, and perceiving that the Aretines were relying on him, they arranged with him that on his return to Arezzo, he should show himself hostile to us, and should lead [the Aretines] to take San Miniato from us (6), which, he said, belonged to him by virtue of the rights of the Emperor in whose name and by whose commission he had come. But one person, who knew the secret, disclosed it in levity of mind, and in order to show that he had knowledge of secret affairs, and the person to whom he told it made it known to M. Ceppo de' Lamberti (7); so that the Aretines heard of it, and dismissed the knight with all his followers.

1. 1295 N.S.

2. *I.e.* the Captain of the People (see Appendix II.), Guglielmo dei Maggi of Brescia. He now held both offices together.

3. *I.e.* they were condemned in default of appearing to answer the charge against them. The machinations of the Magnates had been to a great extent successful, and the Signory, which came into office on Feb. 15 in this year (1295), was favourable to them.

4. According to Villani, viii. 8, he died in France.

5. According to Villani, viii. 10, the sum was 30,000 florins (about £15,375), which, Del Lungo observes, corresponds

with the 60,000 *lire* stated in a document as the sum authorised by the Government to be paid to Jean de Chalon.

6. *I.e.* to make S. Miniato rebel against the authority of Florence, the head of the league of Guelf cities in Tuscany. S. Miniato (see I. 7, *n.* 4) was at this time an independent city, and did not come under the dominion of Florence till 1369. The scheme here mentioned by Dino was that Jean de Chalon should head the Ghibelline army as though to attack S. Miniato, and then leave them in the lurch.

7. The Lamberti were a prominent Florentine Ghibelline family, and would therefore naturally be in communication with the Ghibelline city of Arezzo. M. Ceppo was one of those who had had to remain in exile under the terms of Cardinal Latino's settlement (see I. 3, *n.* 6).

CHAPTER XVIII

Condition of Florence after Giano's expulsion (1295-1299).

THE Priors who drove Giano della Bella away were these: Lippo del Velluto, Banchino di Giovanni, a butcher, Geri Paganetti, Bartolo Orlandini, M. Andrea of Cerreto, Lotto del Migliore Guadagni, with Gherardo Lupicini, the Gonfalonier of Justice, and they took office on the 15th of February 1294 (1). The citizens began to accuse one another (2), and to condemn and to banish some, insomuch that Giano's friends were terrified and remained in subjection. Their enemies tyrannised over them very haughtily, and accused Giano and his followers of great arrogance, saying that he had caused discord in Pistoja, and burnt villages, and condemned many persons, when he was Captain there (whereas he deserved praise for these things, seeing that he had punished the exiles and evil-doers who used to meet together without fearing

the laws) (3); and they said that in doing justice (4) he acted for the sake of tyranny. Many people spoke evil of him through cowardice and to please the wicked.

The renowned butcher who was called Pecora, a man of little truth, a follower of evil, and a flatterer, dissembled in that he spoke evil of him to please others (5). He corrupted the smaller tradespeople, formed conspiracies, and was so crafty that he made the Priors believe they owed their election to his influence. He promised office to many, and deceived them by these promises. He was a big man, bold and impudent, a great tattler; and he declared openly who the conspirators against Giano were, saying that he used to meet together with them in an underground cellar. He was little to be trusted, and more cruel than just. He maligned Pacino Peruzzi, a man of good fame. Without being called upon, he often made speeches in the Councils (6), and he used to say that it was he who had freed the citizens from the tyrant Giano, and that he had gone about many nights with a little lantern persuading people to agree in conspiring against him.

I. 1295 N.S. Dino passes over the attempt of the Magnates in this year to follow up the expulsion of Giano by overthrowing the government of the *popolani* (see Villani, viii. 12). They were unsuccessful; but they procured some important relaxations of the Ordinances of Justice. In addition to the modifications already referred to (I. 15, n. 2; I. 16, n. 2) it was provided that in order to be deemed a member of a guild, and consequently to be eligible for the priorate and to enjoy all other rights inherent in the status of a member of a guild, the actual practice of a trade should no longer be necessary, and that mere enrolment in a guild should suffice. In this way

Magnates were readmitted to share in political power—*on condition of becoming popolani*. But no knight might be elected Prior, and no Magnate Gonfalonier of Justice. Furthermore, it was enacted that thenceforth no family not having then or not having had within the twenty years preceding more than two knights among its members should be obliged to give security, except those already on the list of Magnates' families on 6th July 1295. There was, therefore (except in the case of families with more than two knights, as stated above), no further possibility of a family of *popolani* becoming a Magnate's family accidentally (I. 13, n. 1).

2. *I.e.* the *popolani* who were Giano's enemies accused those who were his friends, Dino himself among the number (see II. 10).

3. Giano had been Captain at Pistoja the year before. The "exiles and evil-doers" whom he "punished" were persons who had taken sanctuary, and, apparently, had abused this privilege; and for his proceedings against them he had been excommunicated by the bishop of Pistoja (*cf.* I. 25).

4. Perhaps rather, "in inflicting punishment."

5. *I.e.* his new friends among the Magnates (see I. 13, n. 6).

6. The Podestà and Captain brought forward the business for discussion in the Councils, and called upon the members to express their opinions. Pecora did not wait to be called upon.

CHAPTER XIX

Scandalous administration of M. Monfiorito, Podestà from January to May 1299.

To safeguard themselves the most wicked of the citizens (1) appointed as their Podestà M. Monfiorito, a poor nobleman of Padua, in order that he might inflict punishment like a tyrant and turn right into wrong and wrong into right, as it seemed good to them. He quickly understood their will and followed it. For he acquitted and condemned without law (2), as appeared fitting to them; and

he became so presumptuous that he and his household openly sold justice, and did not refuse the price, were it small or great. He made himself so hated that the citizens could not endure him, and caused him and two of his attendants to be seized and tortured with the rope; and by his confession they learnt things, in consequence of which much infamy and danger accrued to many citizens. Then they fell out, for one desired him to be tortured further, and another did not. One of them, whose name was Piero Manzuolo, caused him to be drawn up once more (3). Whereupon he confessed that he had received a false deposition in favour of M. Niccola Acciaioli, and had therefore not condemned him. So a note was made of this. When M. Niccola heard it, he feared lest more might be revealed, and took counsel with his advocate, M. Baldo Aguglioni, a most cunning lawyer, who found means to gain a sight of the notary's records, and erased from them that part which went against M. Niccola (4). And when the notary began to fear whether the records he had lent might not have been tampered with, he discovered the erasure, and accused them both. M. Niccola was seized and sentenced to pay 3000 *lire*; M. Baldo escaped, but was sentenced to pay 2000 *lire*, and placed under bounds (5) for a year. The Signory (6) fell into great disgrace; and there were many persons who, after seeking to discover the misdeeds of others, were ill content to find themselves proved guilty (7).

M. Monfiorito was put into prison. Many times did the Paduans send to demand him; [the Florentines] refused to give him up for love

or favour. Afterwards he escaped from prison; for the wife of one of the Arrigucci, whose husband was in the same prison, caused noiseless files and other tools to be made, with which they broke open their prison and fled.

1. *I.e.* the *popolani* who had been hostile to Giano, and favourable to the Magnates (I. 13, n. 6).

2. *Sanza ragione.* *Ragione* here=law, as in Dante *Conv.* ii. 9: 72.

3. The victim was hung up with his arms tied behind him, and beaten with a rope.

4. Dante alludes to this nefarious business in *Purg.* xii. 105. M. Monfiorito was evidently a mere tool in the hands of the "most wicked citizens." He was deprived of his office early in May 1299. M. Baldo Aguglioni was one of the Priors who held office from 15th August till 15th October in the same year, and it was then that the "erasure" of the record against M. Niccola Acciaioli was made. It would seem from a document quoted by Del Lungo that the entry against M. Niccola Acciaioli, with other documents, was cut out of the book containing them.

5. See I. 3, n. 5.

6. *I.e.* the Signory of which M. Baldo Aguglioni had been a member.

7. The persons in question had shown special eagerness in bringing M. Monfiorito and his attendants to justice, hoping thus to divert attention from their own misdeeds; but the record of the proceedings against M. Monfiorito revealed their own guilt.

CHAPTER XX

The eve of the conflict. Incidents in the long-standing feud between the Cerchi and the Donati which led up to the outbreak.

THE city, governed with little justice, [now] fell into a new danger, because the citizens began to be divided through rivalry for office, one maligning

another (1). It happened that certain members of a family called the Cerchi (men of low rank, but substantial merchants and very rich, who dressed well and kept many servants and horses, and made a brave appearance), had bought the palace of the Counts (2), which was close to the houses of the Pazzi and Donati, who were of more ancient lineage but not so rich. Wherefore, seeing the Cerchi rising to eminence (they had built and added to the palace, and kept great state), the Donati began to feel a deep hatred towards them. This increased greatly, because M. Corso Donati, an ambitious knight, whose wife had died, became betrothed to another, the daughter of the late M. Accirrito of Gaville (3), an heiress. But when her kinsmen would not consent to this, because they were expecting the inheritance, the maiden's mother, seeing he was a very handsome man, concluded the match, contrary to the wishes of the rest. The Cerchi, kinsmen of M. Neri of Gaville, became angry, and tried to prevent M. Corso from getting the inheritance. However, he took it by force; and hence arose much mischief and danger to the city [in general] and to individuals. And some young men of the Cerchi family, being detained on a matter of suretyship in the courtyard of the Podestà's palace, as is the custom (4), a black pudding made of pork was set before them, of which those who ate had a dangerous sickness, and some died of it; on which account there was a great stir in the city, for they were much beloved. M. Corso was freely accused of this crime, but it was not investigated, seeing that proof could not be had; but the rancour grew from day to day, inso-

much that the Cerchi began to withdraw both from the Donati and from the meetings of the Party (5), and to make advances to the *popolani* and the Signory, with whom they were in favour, both because they were men of good and kindly disposition and because they were very obliging, so that they could obtain from them (the Signory) what they wished ; and they were on similar terms with the Magistrates. And many citizens drew to their side, amongst others, M. Lapo Salterelli and M. Donato Ristori, doctors of law, and other powerful families (6). The Ghibellines, in like manner, loved them for their kindness and because they got favours from them, and were not wronged by them ; the smaller traders and the populace loved them because the conspiracy against Giano had displeased them (7). They were much counselled and urged to make themselves supreme in the Government, which, on account of their goodness, they might easily have done ; but they would never consent to it.

One day a number of citizens were assembled in the Piazza of the Frescobaldi for the funeral of a lady. It was the custom of the place at such gatherings for the [ordinary] citizens to be seated low down on rush-mats, and the knights and doctors (8) up high on benches. The Donati and the Cerchi being seated opposite one another (those who were not knights being on the ground), one of them, either to rearrange his dress, or for some other purpose, stood up. Their adversaries also rose up in mistrust (9), and placed their hands on their swords ; the others did likewise ; and they came to blows ; but the rest of the company threw

themselves between, and did not allow them to fight. Nevertheless, the strife could not be so far quelled as to prevent many people from rallying to the houses of the Cerchi, and they would gladly have gone on to attack the Donati; but one of the Cerchi did not allow it.

A young man of gentle birth, named Guido (10) (son of a noble knight, M. Cavalcante Cavalcanti), courteous and bold, but disdainful, solitary and intent on study, an enemy of M. Corso, had several times determined to attack him. M. Corso feared him greatly, because he knew him to be high-spirited, and when Guido was going on a pilgrimage to S. James (11), he sought to murder him, but did not succeed. Wherefore Guido, hearing of this on his return to Florence, stirred up against M. Corso many young men, who promised to help him. One day when he was riding with some of the House of the Cerchi, having a dart in his hand, he spurred his horse against M. Corso, believing he would be followed by the Cerchi, whom he meant to lead into the fray. And as his horse was galloping on he hurled his dart, but without effect. With M. Corso there were present Simone, his son (12), a strong and bold young man, Cecchino de' Bardi, and many others with their swords; they pursued Guido, but not overtaking him, they cast stones after him, and some were thrown at him from the windows, so that he was wounded in the hand.

For this cause the hatred began to increase; and M. Corso greatly slandered M. Vieri, calling him the "Ass of Porta" (13), because, though a very handsome man, he was of small wit and rude of

speech; therefore he often said: "Has the Ass of Porta been braying to-day?" And he greatly despised him. Guido also he called "Cavicchia" (14). And thus the jesters used to report, and especially one called Scampolino (15), who very much exaggerated what was said, to the end that the Cerchi might be moved to quarrel with the Donati. The Cerchi kept quiet, but used their friendship with the Pisans and the Aretines as a threat. The Donati were afraid of them, and said that the Cerchi had made a league with the Ghibellines of Tuscany; and to such an extent did they defame them that it came to the ears of the Pope (16).

GENERAL NOTE TO THIS CHAPTER

At this point Dino enters on his subject proper by giving an account of the feud between the Cerchi and the Donati, which caused the division of the Guelf party into the Whites and the Blacks. This division was completed in 1300 (see I. 22), which date may be regarded as the fundamental date of the present chapter, to which its opening sentence and closing paragraph refer; while the events recorded in the intermediate portion of the chapter occurred at various times between 1280 and 1297.

1. The words "governed with little justice" refer to the administration of the Magistrates (see I. 5, *n.* 1). The words "rivalry for office" refer to the Signory.

2. The migration of the Cerchi into Florence from the country is touched on in *Par.* xvi. 65. The "Counts" are the Counts Guidi (as in *Par.* xvi. 64). Guido Salvatico of that family sold his houses to M. Vieri (abbreviation of Ulivieri) dei Cerchi and other members of his family in 1280.

3. Corso is an abbreviation of Buonaccorso. M. Corso's first wife belonged to the Cerchi family; his second wife (the lady here spoken of), to the Ubertini family; and he married, thirdly, a daughter of the great Ghibelline leader, Uguccone of La Faggiuola. Gaville (see *Inf.* xxv. 151)

was a village in the Upper Val d'Arno (see I. 9, *n.* 2), belonging to the Ubertini. M. Neri of Gaville (mentioned just below) was likewise one of the Ubertini.

4. Some of the Cerchi had been condemned in the matter of an affray between them and the Pazzi. They had made default in paying the fine; their sureties (see above, I. 11, *n.* 6) were also in default, and were accordingly confined as stated in the text. The affray is believed by Del Lungo to have occurred on December 20, 1298.

5. See I. 3, *n.* 2.

6. *I.e.* of the *popolani*. M. Lapo Salterelli is referred to in *Par.* xv. 128. Del Lungo prints (vol. i. pp. 327-329) a poem addressed by Dino Compagni to Lapo in which he puts before him a legal conundrum about three husbands, two wives and three children, and the respective claims of the latter to the property of the first wife, with Lapo's poem in reply. M. Donato Ristori was one of the draftsmen of the Ordinances (I. 12).

7. It will be observed that the adherents of the Cerchi, soon to be known as the Whites, formed a rather heterogeneous body; of which the *popolani* were the nucleus. The presence of Ghibellines among them, coupled with their relations with the Ghibelline states of Pisa and Arezzo (see below, end of this chapter), tended to weaken their position, and indeed contributed to their eventual overthrow. The Ghibellines hated the Guelf Magnates more than the *popolani*, because the former had chiefly contributed to their defeat at Campaldino. Their support of the Cerchi was therefore in the nature of a choice of the lesser of two evils. The concluding words of the sentence present some difficulty, arising from the fact already recorded by Dino (I. 13), that Vieri dei Cerchi had himself taken part in the conspiracy against G. della Bella, the champion of the smaller traders and populace. Much, however, had happened since then, and we must suppose that the consequences of Giano's expulsion and the increasing animosity against the Donati had caused the Cerchi to repent of their previous action. At any rate, they had contrived to secure the support of Giano's followers (see below, I. 22).

8. The "doctors" here include physicians as well as doctors of law. The women on these occasions assembled inside the house, the men in front of it. The date of the disturbance at the Frescobaldi funeral was previous to January 17, 1297. The date (December 1300), given by G. Villani (viii. 41), is proved by Del Lungo to be impossible.

9. *I.e.* fearing that the man's jumping up was a signal for their opponents to attack them.

10. The famous poet and friend of Dante, so often mentioned by Dante in his writings. If, as Del Lungo suggests, the event here recorded occurred not long before 1300, Guido Cavalcanti was at least forty years old at the time.

11. *I.e.* the sanctuary of S. James at Compostella (Santiago de Compostella) in Galicia (*cf. Par. xxv. 17, 18; Vita Nuova, xli. 46 ff.*).

12. His son by his first wife (see *n. 3* to this chapter).

13. *I.e.* of Porta S. Piero, the name of the *sesto* in which both Cerchi and Donati lived (see *Par. xvi. 94-95*).

14. *Cavicchia* means a peg; and Del Lungo says that its synonym *piuolo* is used figuratively of a hard, awkward man (*uomo goffo e duro*), suggesting that this was the impression that Guido Cavalcanti made upon his enemy Corso Donati. He also says that Corso's taunt calls to mind the story told by Sacchetti (*Novelle, 68*), of a boy who fastened Guido's clothes with a nail to the bench on which he was sitting playing a game of chess.

15. The jesters or buffoons, who frequented the houses of the rich, earning a dinner by their wits, were a prominent feature of Florentine society (see Boccaccio, *Decameron ix. 8*).

16. It was a very dangerous move on the part of the Cerchi openly to proclaim their alliance with the Ghibellines, and their opponents, the Donati, lost no time in taking advantage of it by accusing them to the Pope, the head of the Guelf party, of treachery to the Guelf cause.

CHAPTER XXI

Ineffectual mission of Cardinal Matthew of Acquasparta to Florence. The Guild-consuls assaulted by Magnates on S. John's Eve (June 23rd). The leading members of the Cerchi and Donati parties placed under bounds (1300).

THERE sat at that time in the seat of S. Peter Pope Boniface VIII., a man of great daring and consummate ability, who guided the Church as he

pleased and humbled those who did not submit to him (1). The Spini, a rich and powerful Florentine family, were in his service as his bankers, and Simone Gherardi, a man experienced in similar business, was their representative at Rome. With him was the son of a refiner of silver, a Florentine named Nero Cambi, an astute man of subtle wit, but wicked and disagreeable, who, in order to overthrow the position of the Cerchi and their followers, worked upon the Pope to such an extent that he sent M. the Friar Matthew of Acquasparta, Cardinal of Porto (2), to Florence to make peace among the Florentines (3). But he achieved nothing, because he did not receive from the [opposing] parties the authority he desired, and therefore he departed in anger from Florence (4).

One S. John's Eve, as the guilds were going to offer gifts, according to custom (5), and their Consuls were walking in front, they were assaulted and beaten by certain Magnates, who said to them: "We are they who brought about the defeat of Campaldino, and you have removed us from the offices and dignities of our city." The Priors, being indignant, took counsel of several citizens (6), and I, Dino, was one of these. And they placed under bounds some of each party; that is to say, of the party of the Donati, M. Corso and Sinibaldo Donati, M. Rosso and M. Rossellino della Tosa, M. Giachinotto and M. Pazzino de' Pazzi, M. Geri Spini, M. Porco Manieri, and their respective kinsmen [were ordered] to Castel della Pieve; and of the party of the Cerchi, M. Gentile and M. Torrigiano and Carbone de' Cerchi, Guido Cavalcanti, Baschiera della Tosa, Baldinaccio

Adimari, Naldo Gherardini and some of their kinsmen, to Sarezzano. These obeyed, and went to their appointed residence (7).

Those of the party of the Donati refused to go, showing thereby that there was a conspiracy amongst them. The Magistrates wished to sentence them; and if they had not obeyed, but had taken up arms, they would that day have conquered the city, since the Lucchese, with the privity of the Cardinal, were coming to their aid with a great army of men. Hearing that the Lucchese were coming, the Priors wrote to bid them not dare to enter their territory—(it was my business to write the letter)—and the villagers (8) were commanded to seize the approaches. And so much was done through the diligence of Bartolo, son of M. Jacopo de' Bardi, that they (9) obeyed. Then the Cardinal's aim was clearly revealed; I mean, that the peace he sought was for the purpose of humbling the party of the Cerchi and of exalting the party of the Donati. And this aim, which was understood by many, caused great displeasure, and accordingly a man of not much sense came forward and with a cross-bow shot a dart at the window of the Episcopal Palace (where the Cardinal was) which stuck in the woodwork; and the Cardinal in fear departed thence, and went to dwell for greater safety at the house of M. Tommaso across the Arno (10).

The Priors, in order to atone for the affront he had received, presented him with 2000 new florins (11); and I brought them to him in a silver cup, and said: "Messere, disdain them not because they are few, for without the sanction of the open

Councils (12) it is not possible to give more money." He answered that they were pleasing to him; and he looked at them long, but would not take them.

1. The persecution of the Colonna family by Boniface is specially referred to (see *Inf.* xxvii. 85-111).

2. Porto is about twenty miles from Rome, near the mouth of the Tiber. Matthew of Acquasparta (in Umbria) was a Franciscan, and had been Minister-General of the Order (see *Par.* xii. 124). In 1288 he was made Cardinal (by Pope Nicholas IV.), and in 1291 Bishop of Porto and S. Rufina. On May 23, 1300, he was appointed, by Boniface VIII., legate and pacificator in Lombardy, Tuscany, and other parts of Italy. He died in 1302.

3. The words "to make peace among the Florentines" indicate the pretext of his mission; its object is indicated in the earlier part of the sentence.

4. The Cardinal remained in Florence till the end of September. Dino (here and elsewhere) groups his facts, without regard to chronological sequence, in the order in which he thinks they will make the most vivid impression on his readers. That is why in the next sentence he speaks of "one St. John's Eve" instead of saying "on St. John's Eve, 1300."

5. An annual ceremony at the Cathedral (*i.e.* the building now known as the Baptistery). In addition to ceremonial gifts, a certain number of prisoners were "offered up" and received their liberty (see Dante, *Epistola*, ix. 19, *n.*).

6. *I.e.* they summoned an extraordinary council (see Appendix II. and *cf.* II. 10). Dante was one of the Priors of this Signory, which held office from June 15 till August 15.

7. It will be noticed that the della Tosa or Tosinghi family was divided; but most of them held with the Cerchi (see next chapter). Castello della Pieve is among the Apennines, in the province of Massa Tribara, near Urbino (see below, I. 23). Sarezzano is the modern Sarzana, near the sea-coast, about nine miles east of Spezia. Its climate was unhealthy, and Guido Cavalcanti died during his exile there.

8. *Villate*, *i.e.* the bodies of militia of the villages in the direction of Lucca. The Contado furnished a force of irregular troops raised from each parish (*popolo*); and for this purpose the parishes were grouped in confederacies (*leghe*).

9. The members of the Donati faction submitted to the Signory and went into exile.

10. M. Tommaso was the head of the Mozzi family, whose houses were on both sides of the Arno.

11. *I.e.* gold florins, first coined at Florence in 1252. The sum would be about £1025, the florin being worth about 10s. 3d. of our money.

12. *I.e.* the councils in which open voting was the rule; that is to say, the General Council of the Captain of the People, and the General and Special Councils of the Podestà (see Appendix II.).

CHAPTER XXII

Account of the affray between Cerchi and Donati at the ball in the Piazza of S. Trinità on 1st of May 1300, which was the proximate cause of the division of the citizens. List of the more prominent supporters of either party.

SINCE youth is more easily deceived than age, the Devil, that multiplier of evil, began his work with a company of young men who were in the habit of riding together. One evening on the first of May (1) as they were at supper together they reached such a pitch of arrogance that they determined to attack the company of the Cerchi, and use their hands and weapons against them. On that evening, which is the birthday of Spring, the women are much given to frequent balls in their neighbourhood. The young men of the Cerchi encountered the company of the Donati, among whom was a nephew of M. Corso, and Bardellino de' Bardi, and Piero Spini, and other of their companions and followers, who made an armed attack on the company of the Cerchi. In this affray Ricoverino de' Cerchi's

nose was cut off by an adherent of the Donati (said to have been Piero Spini), and they (the Donati) took refuge in his house (2). This same blow proved the destruction of our city, because it greatly increased the hatred amongst the citizens. The Cerchi never revealed who the offender was, waiting to take heavy vengeance for it.

The city was divided anew; the division prevailed alike among the Magnates, the middle and the lower classes; and [even] the clergy could not avoid siding with one or the other of the two factions. All the Ghibellines held with the Cerchi, because they hoped to receive less ill treatment from them, and all those who were of the opinion of Giano della Bella, for it seemed to them that the Cerchi had been grieved that he had been driven away (3). Guido, son of M. Cavalcanti, was also of their party, because he was the enemy of M. Corso Donati; Naldo Gherardini, because he was the enemy of the Manieri, kinsmen of M. Corso; M. Manetto Scali and his kinsmen, because they were related to the Cerchi; M. Lapo Salterelli, their kinsman; M. Berto Frescobaldi, because he had received much money on loan from them (4); M. Goccia Adimari, on account of a quarrel he had with his kinsmen; Bernardo, son of M. Manfredi Adimari, because he was a partner of the Cerchi; M. Biligiardo and Baschiera, and Baldo della Tosa, out of spite against M. Rosso, their kinsman, because they had been deprived of their honours (5) by him. The Mozzi, the Cavalcanti (the elder branch), and many other noble families and *popolani* held with them.

The following held with the party of M. Corso

Donati, M. Rosso, M. Arrigo, M. Nepo, and Pinuccio della Tosa on account of great intimacy and friendship; M. Gherardo Ventraia (6); M. Geri Spini and his kinsmen, on account of the wrong done [to the Cerchi]; M. Gherardo Sgrana and M. Bindello (7), on account of intimacy and friendship; M. Pazzino de' Pazzi and his kinsmen; the Rossi, the greater number of the Bardi, the Bordoni, the Cerretani, Borgo Rinaldi, Manzuolo, Pecora the butcher, and many others. And amongst the *popolani* who were with the Cerchi, there were the Falconieri, Ruffoli, and Orlandini, the Delle Botte, the Angiolieri, the Amuniti, those of the family of Salvi del Chiaro Girolami (8), and many other wealthy merchants.

1. Cf. I. 21, n. 4; Villani, viii. 39; and Boccaccio's "Life of Dante" (King's Classics), p. 15.

2. The houses of the Spini fronted the Piazza di S. Trinità.

3. Cf. I. 20, n. 7.

4. Cf. I. 15 and II. 22.

5. *I.e.* privileges or dignities belonging to the family. See *Par.* xvi. 112-114.

6. He belonged to the Tornaquinci family, and had borne the royal standard (I. 7, n. 7) at Campaldino.

7. These belonged to the Adimari, which family was therefore divided in the conflict. M. Bindello had died on 15th of August in the year before; but his name is not out of place here, for, as we have seen, the feud between Cerchi and Donati was of long standing, though it was only after the affray described in this chapter that it involved the whole population of Florence.

8. Salvi had been one of the original Priors (I. 4).

CHAPTER XXIII

Corso Donati breaks bounds and betakes himself to the Pope. The Cerchi exiles are recalled (1300). The Donati in Florence, in June 1301, call a meeting in the Church of S. Trinità (which is attended by the majority of the Guelf party) for the ostensible purpose of restoring peace to the city.

M. CORSO DONATI, having been placed under bounds at Massa Trebara (1), broke them, and betook himself to Rome (2), being disobedient; for which cause he was condemned in person and property. And, together with Nero Cambi (3), who was a partner of the Spini at Court (4), he employed the agency of M. Jacopo Guatani (5), a kinsman of the Pope, and of certain of the Colonna (6), to beg most urgently that the Pope would apply a remedy, since the Guelf party was perishing in Florence, and the Cerchi were favouring the Ghibellines. Therefore the Pope caused M. Vieri de' Cerchi to be summoned, who went to Rome in great state. The Pope, at the petition of his bankers the Spini, and of his above-named friends and kinsmen, called upon M. Vieri to make peace with M. Corso, to which he would not consent, making out that he was not acting against the Guelf party (7). So he was dismissed by the Pope, and departed.

Those of the Cerchi who had been placed under bounds returned to Florence (8). M. Torrigiano, and Carbone, and Vieri, son of M. Ricovero de'

Cerchi (9), M. Biligiardo della Tosa, and Carbone and Naldo Gherardini, and M. Guido Scimia de' Cavalcanti (10), and the others of that party remained quiet. But M. Geri Spini, M. Porco Manieri, M. Rosso della Tosa, M. Pazzino de' Pazzi, Sinibaldo son of M. Simone Donati, the leaders of the other party, ill content at their return (11), having determined to drive out the Cerchi and their party, assembled with their followers one day in Santa Trinità, and held a great meeting, for which they assigned many false motives. After a long discussion M. Buondelmonte, a wise and discreet knight (12), said that the risk was too great, that too much evil might come of it, and that for the present they had better proceed no further. And the larger party came together to this meeting, since M. Lapo Salterelli had promised Bartolo di M. Jacopo de' Bardi (in whom great trust was placed) (13) that affairs would be satisfactorily settled. So they separated without doing anything.

1. See I. 21, n. 7; I. 4, n. 1.

2. Because the Donati were already intriguing with the Pope (I. 21).

3. See I. 21.

4. *In corte*, which expression, used without qualification, generally means the Papal Court.

5. More properly written Gaetani; for this name is the plural of Gaetano, which means "a native of Gaeta," from which place the Pope's family originally came. This person belonged to a Pisan branch of the family.

6. The persecution of the Colonna (I. 21, n. 1) originated in a family dispute. The persons here spoken of were those members of the family whose quarrel had been taken up by the Pope. One of them was his chaplain.

7. See I. 20, n. 7, 16.

8. In the second half of August 1300. The leaders of the Donati who had not broken bounds returned somewhat

later. Observe that Dino immediately goes on to the summer of the following year.

9. To be distinguished from Vieri, son of Torrigiano dei Cerchi, the head of the party.

10. To be distinguished from Guido Cavalcanti, the poet. It is uncertain how this Guido came by the name of Scimia (ape). His father, Gianni Cavalcanti, surnamed Schicchi, placed by Dante in hell among the falsifiers (*Inf.* xxx. 32), is said to have been an accomplished mimic.

11. *I.e.* that the Cerchi exiles had been allowed to return earlier than themselves. Lionardo Bruni tells us in his *Life of Dante* ("Early Lives of Dante," *King's Classics*, p. 125) that Dante said that the early return of the Cerchi exiles was due to the illness and death of Guido Cavalcanti at Sarzana (*I.* 21, *n.* 7).

12. He belonged to the party of the Donati.

13. By "the larger party" is meant the party of the Cerchi. Though the Donati's aim was to drive the Cerchi from the city and get the control of the government into their own hands, and they were intriguing for the Pope's help in order to accomplish their purpose, still it behoved them for the present to walk warily in Florence. Hence they sought to hoodwink their opponents by calling this meeting in order to justify their conduct, affecting to be moved by disinterested zeal for the Guelf cause and the good of the city. It was therefore important that the assembly should be representative of the whole Guelf party, and Bartolo de' Bardi, who had been one of the original Priors (*I.* 4), a man of high character and great influence (*I.* 21), was accordingly persuaded to induce the supporters of the Cerchi to attend. Dino Compagni himself was among them, as will be seen in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XXIV

Dino Compagni's speech at the meeting at S. Trinità. Discovery by the Government of the conspiracy of the Donati (June 1301).

I, DINO COMPAGNI, being myself at this meeting, and desirous of unity and peace amongst the citizens, said before they departed: "Sirs, wherefore would

ye confound and undo such a goodly city? Against whom would ye fight? Against your own brethren? What victory will ye have? No other than lamentation." They replied that their meeting was for no other purpose than to quell discord and to promote peace.

On hearing this I conferred with Lapo di Guazza Ulivieri, a good and loyal *popolano* (1); and we went together to the Priors, taking with us certain [of the faction of the Donati] who had been at the meeting; and we acted as mediators between the Priors and them, and appeased the Signory with gentle words, so that M. Palmieri Altoviti, who was then one of the Signory (2) [only] reproved them sharply, without menaces. Their answer was that nothing further would come of that assembly, and [they begged] that certain soldiers, who had come at their request, should be allowed to leave without being molested. And thus it was commanded by the Priors.

The adverse party (3) continually kept urging the Signory to punish them for the meeting held in S. Trinità, because they had contravened the Ordinances of Justice, their object being to make a conspiracy and plot against the Government.

On investigating the alleged conspiracy it was found that the Count of Battifolle (4) was sending his son with his vassals, and with arms at the request of the conspirators; and letters from M. Simone de' Bardi (5) were found, in which he wrote asking them to have a large quantity of bread made, so that the soldiers who were coming might have whereof to live. It was therefore clearly understood that there was a conspiracy on foot in

connection with the meeting held in S. Trinità; so the count and his son and M. Simone were condemned to a heavy penalty (6).

The hatred and ill-will of both parties being now unconcealed, each sought to injure the other; but the Donati displayed their enmity much more openly in words than the Cerchi, and they feared nothing.

1. He was a member of the Donati faction (see II. 26).

2. See above, I. 13, n. 11. He was one of the Priors from April 15 to June 15, 1301.

3. *I.e.* the Cerchi.

4. *I.e.* Simone, Count of Battifolle (a stronghold in Casentino), of the family of the Counts Guidi. He had become a Guelf in consequence of wrongs done him by his brother, Guido Novello (Villani, v. 37). His son's name was Guido.

5. The widowed husband of Beatrice Portinari. He was with the Count of Battifolle.

6. The two Counts Guidi and M. Simone de' Bardi were outlawed (*messi in bando*); the adherents of the Donati who had been "set under bounds" were sent back to their enforced place of residence, with others, both Magnates and *popolani*; the property of the Donati was laid waste; and the sentence of outlawry against M. Corso, incurred by his breaking bounds (above, I. 23), was renewed. In Del Lungo's opinion the words in Ciacco's prophecy (*Inf.* vi. 65, 66), "the party of the woods shall expel the other with much offence," refer to this proscription of the Donati by the Cerchi.

CHAPTER XXV

The Cerchi, in order to strengthen their position, ally themselves with the White faction in Pistoja, and banish the Black faction from that city (May 1301). Thenceforth the party of the Cerchi in Florence are known as the Whites and the party of the Donati as the Blacks.

THE Cerchi were endeavouring to engage on their side the Pistoians, who had [already] given the

Florentines authority to send to Pistoja a Podestà and Captain (1). Cantino, son of M. Amadore Cavalcanti, a dishonourable man, who had been sent there as Captain, broke a law of the Pistoians, which was that their Elders (2) should be chosen from both their parties, namely, the Blacks and the Whites. These two parties, Blacks and Whites, sprang from a family called Cancellieri which had divided, and, in consequence of this, some of them who were closely related to one another called themselves Whites, and the others Blacks; and so the whole city was divided; and it was the practice to elect the Elders accordingly (3). This Cantino broke their law, and caused all the Elders to be chosen from the White party; and, being reprovèd for it, gave as his excuse that he had an order to do so from the rulers of Florence. But he did not speak the truth (4).

The Pistoians, ill content, dwelt in great tribulation, injuring and slaying one another; and they were often condemned and ill-treated by the Magistrates, both rightly and wrongly; [and] much money was drawn from their hands: for the Pistoians are naturally quarrelsome, cruel and savage men (5). M. Ugo Tornaquinci, the Podestà, drew 3000 florins from such sentences; and in like manner many other Florentine citizens who were Magistrates there (6).

Giano della Bella had been Captain at Pistoja; he ruled the citizens faithfully; but he was very severe, for he burnt some of their houses outside the city where they harboured exiles in disobedience [to his orders] (7).

In Pistoja there was a formidable knight of the

party of the "Black" Cancellieri named M. Simone of Pantano (8), a man of middle height, spare and dark, pitiless and cruel, a robber and perpetrator of every evil; and he was with M. Corso Donati's party. And with the opposing party was another called M. Schiatta Amati, a man more cowardly than prudent, and less cruel [than M. Simone]. He was a kinsman of the "White" Cerchi (9).

At this time the Florentines sent Andrea Gherardini as Captain to Pistoja, who was knighted [on that occasion] (10); and he was made to believe at that time that the Lucchese were coming to Pistoja to seize the city (11). Wherefore the said M. Andrea placed many citizens under bounds; however, they would not depart at his command, but fortified themselves and sought to defend themselves, thinking to receive succour: and the said M. Simone summoned many of his friends and foreign foot-soldiers. The Podestà (12) set his opponents a time in which to depart, but they did not obey: therefore he was indignant, and, having received assistance from Florence, punished them with sword and fire, and outlawed their followers (13). Some said that M. Andrea had got 4000 florins from them (14); and others that this money was given him by the Commonwealth of Florence in consideration of the enmity he had incurred by his action.

Observe that the expulsion of the Blacks from Pistoja related in this chapter immediately preceded the meeting in S. Trinità, and the expulsion of the Donati party from Florence already related (*cf.* I. 21, n. 4).

1. This authority had been conferred on the Florentine Government in the early part of 1296.

2. Cantino seems to have held the office for the six months November 1300 to April 1301. The name Cantino is a diminutive of Cante, which is short for Cavalcante. The Elders of Pistoja (eight in number, with a Gonfalonier of Justice) answered to the Priors of Florence.

3. Viz. half from one party and half from the other. The family feud had begun in 1286, and the absolute and complete division of the citizens into the Black and White factions dated from 1295.

4. Though it may not have been true that the Signory then in office actually gave such an order, there is no doubt that the exclusion of the Blacks from office in Pistoja was carried out by the Cerchi party with their privity and connivance; and the fact of the Cerchi identifying themselves with the White Cancellieri at Pistoja caused them and their adherents at Florence to be known as the Whites.

5. Cf. *Inf.* xxiv. 125, 126; *De Vulg. El.* i. 13 : 39, n.

6. *I.e.* under the authority conferred on Florence in 1296. The Magistrates were entitled to a portion of the fines imposed.

7. See I. 18, n. 3.

8. Both this man and M. Schiatta Amati, mentioned just afterwards, belonged to the Cancellieri, and they were the heads of the two factions.

9. "The use of the terms Whites and Blacks to denote the two well-known factions of the Guelfs in Florence only began in 1301; but these same terms had been already long in use as distinctive appellations within the Cerchi family; and it is in this sense only that Dino here speaks of the 'White' Cerchi" (Del Lungo).

10. Gherardini's term of office began in May 1301. He was knighted because the Captain of the People was required by law to have been invested with that dignity.

11. This was a mere pretext to enable him to take measures against the Blacks. The Lucchese were in alliance with the Donati (I. 21).

12. Gherardini seems to have held this office as well as that of Captain.

13. The exiled Blacks (*Inf.* xxiv. 143) sought refuge in various places; but Villani's statement (viii. 38) that they were banished to Florence is erroneous and indeed absurd, for they were the last people that the Cerchi would want to come into the city.

14. Viz. from the Whites of Pistoja.

CHAPTER XXVI

Dino interrupts his narrative to glance by anticipation at the terrible siege and overthrow of Pistoja in 1306, the ultimate consequence of the expulsion of the Blacks in 1301.

How beautiful, profitable, and prosperous a city is overthrown! Let its citizens weep; they are of more powerful frame than any in Tuscany, the possessors of such a rich habitation, which is surrounded by beautiful streams, profitable mountain pastures, and excellent soil; they who are strong in arms, quarrelsome, and savage; for which cause this city was well-nigh done to death. For in a short time fortune changed, and they were besieged by the Florentines, insomuch that they gave their own flesh for food, allowing their limbs to be cut off [by the enemy] in order to bring provisions to their city (1), and were reduced to such straits that they ate nothing else but bread (2) till the last day [of the siege]. But the glorious God took thought for them, so that without the knowledge of their adversaries they swore to surrender (3) [to the Florentines] on terms providing for their safety; which terms were not kept. For after the Florentines had got possession of the city, its beautiful walls were demolished. Though there was an end of the horror and cruelty of cutting off the noses of the women and the hands of the men who left the city on account of hunger, [yet] the enemy did not spare the beauty of the city, which was left like a ruined village (4). Of the

siege, of the danger and famine endured, of the sallies made, and of the brave deeds done by those who were shut up there, I do not intend to write, nor of the loss of their fine fortresses by treachery, since another will write of this with more certain knowledge, and if he writes with sympathy, he will cause his hearers to weep abundantly.

1. See III. 14, where the siege is described more at large.
2. See III. 15, where Dino says that pigs would not have touched the bread the citizens ate at the end of the siege.
3. Lit. "they were received," *i.e.* their oath was received (see below, II. 17). The "adversaries" spoken of here are the exiled Blacks of Pistoja, without whose knowledge the surrender was negotiated.
4. The demolition of the walls had left the city open like a village.

CHAPTER XXVII

The White party at Florence appoint Schiatta Cancellieri Captain of War, with extensive powers. His incompetence. (Summer of 1301.)

WHEN M. Andrea's office was at an end (1), the White party elected M. Schiatta Amati of the White Cancellieri as their Captain of War, for they knew not how to maintain their position, since they had no head, for the Cerchi shunned and disliked the name of rulers; though more from cowardice than compassion, because they greatly feared their adversaries. And they gave their Captain authority, in virtue of which the soldiers were under his immediate orders, and he issued decrees on his own account, imposed penalties, and directed

troops to be sent against the enemy (2) without [consulting] any Council (3). The said knight was a very weak and timorous man; war did not please him, and he was quite the opposite of his kinsman, M. Simone of Pantano, of the Black Cancellieri (4).

The said Captain did not make himself master of the city as he ought to have done; therefore his enemies did not fear him. The soldiers were not paid; [the Whites] had no money, nor had they the boldness to raise any; the Captain did not secure any of the strongholds (5), and he placed no one under bounds. He spoke menacing words, and made show enough, but followed up nothing effectually. Those who did not know him deemed the Whites rich, powerful, and prudent, and for this reason were hopeful (6). But wise men said: "They (7) are occupied in trade and are cowardly by nature, while their enemies are masters of war, and bold men."

The enemies of the Cerchi began to defame them to the Guelfs, saying that they had an understanding with the Aretines, the Pisans, and the Ghibellines, which was untrue. And together with many people they turned against them, accusing them of what was false; for the Cerchi had no treaty with the aforesaid, nor did they possess their friendship. But when any one reproached them with it, the Cerchi did not deny it, thinking to be all the more feared on that account, and thereby overpower their enemies, saying: "They will dread us the more, fearing lest we join [the Ghibellines], while these will love us the more, having hope in us." But the Cerchi, wishing to be lords, were

lorded over themselves, as shall be related hereafter.

1. As Captain of Pistoja (see I. 25). The phrase refers not so much to the duration of Gherardini's term of office, which extended till the end of October 1301, as to the accomplishment of the business on which he had gone to Pistoja, viz. to drive out the Black Cancellieri, and put the government into the hands of the Whites.

2. *I.e.* he was empowered to do these things.

3. *I.e.* he could act without reference either to the Signory or to the Councils.

4. *Cf.* the description of Simone of Pantano (I. 25).

5. *I.e.* towers and fortified buildings within the city (*cf.* Villari, 120, 121).

6. Taken in by the specious bearing of M. Schiatta, the persons in question imagined that the Cerchi and their adherents had shown consummate wisdom in their choice of a Captain, and that their supremacy rested on a firm foundation.

7. *I.e.* the Cerchi and the White leaders.

BOOK II

CHAPTER I

An ironical apostrophe to the Black Guelfs of Florence.

ARISE, O wicked citizens, full of discord, take sword and fire in your hands, and spread abroad your evil doings. Disclose your iniquitous desires and abominable purposes; delay no longer; go and lay waste the beauties of your city. Shed your brother's blood, strip yourselves of faith and love, deny one another help and service. Sow your falsehoods, which shall fill the granaries of your sons (1). Act as did Sulla in the city of Rome, whose wicked practices, wrought during ten years, were all avenged by Marius in a few days (2). Think ye that God's justice has become slack? Truly even that of the world renders like for like. Consider whether your forefathers were recompensed for their quarrels (3); barter away the rights which they won. Delay not, ye miserable men, for more is destroyed in one day's war than is gained through long years of peace; and small is that spark which brings a great kingdom to destruction.

1. Meaning, of course, "which shall bring your sons to penury."

2. Dino seems to be writing under a confused impression of events, for the five days' massacre by Marius of the followers of Sulla in B.C. 87 was committed after Sulla had only wielded power in Rome for one year (the year of his consulship in 88), and Marius died in 86, four years before the confiscations and proscriptions of Sulla's dictatorship.

3. See I. 2: "After much hurt had been received in ancient times through the quarrels of the citizens." The opening of that chapter should be compared with this one.

4. *Cf. Par. i. 34.*

CHAPTER II

The Black Guelfs persuade the Pope to appoint Charles of Valois peacemaker in Tuscany, 1301.

THE citizens of Florence, being thus divided, one began to defame another (1) by making false statements [both] in the neighbouring cities and in the Roman Court to Pope Boniface. And the words falsely spoken wrought more harm in Florence than the point of the sword. And to such a degree did they work upon the said Pope by declaring that the city was falling again into the Ghibellines' hands, and that it would become a refuge for the Colonna (2), and such influence did the great quantity of money, mingled with the false words, have with him that he, being advised to cast down the arrogance of the Florentines, promised to bestow on the Black Guelfs the great power of Charles of Valois, of the Royal House of France, who had left France to go to Sicily against Frederick of Aragon (3). And he wrote to Charles saying

that he intended to appoint him peacemaker in Tuscany against the opponents of the Church (4). The said commission sounded very well in name, but its purpose was to the contrary, since the Pope wished to cast down the Whites and exalt the Blacks, and make the Whites enemies of the House of France and of the Church (5).

1. *I.e.* the Blacks defamed the Whites.

2. See I. 21, *n.* 1; I. 23, *n.* 6.

3. Charles Count of Valois, Alençon, and Anjou (1270-1325), son of Philip III. and brother of Philip IV. of France, had been induced by Pope Boniface VIII. to come to Italy in order to help Charles II. of Anjou, king of Naples, to conquer Sicily from Frederick of Aragon (see I. 7, *n.* 6).

4. Charles was (nominally) to make peace between the Black and White Guelfs and crush the Ghibellines (the opponents of the Church).

5. *I.e.* to force the Whites into Ghibellinism. Dino thus indicates the effect actually produced by the Pope's policy.

CHAPTER III

Charles of Valois receives ambassadors at Bologna from the Blacks and Whites. The former secure his favours and persuade him to advance by way of Pistoja, but without entering the city (August 1301).

WHEN M. Charles of Valois had already come to Bologna, ambassadors from the Blacks of Florence appeared before him, using these words: "Sir, for God's sake, help! *We* are the Guelfs of Florence, vassals of the House of France; for God's sake have a care for thyself and thy followers, for our city is ruled by Ghibellines."

The ambassadors from the Blacks having de-

parted, [those from] the Whites arrived, and with the utmost reverence made him, as their liege lord, many offers of service. But the guileful words had more weight with him than the true; for the saying, "Have a care how thou goest," seemed to him a greater sign of friendship than the offers of service. He was counselled (1) to come by the way of Pistoja, in order to embroil him with the Pistoians, who [indeed] wondered to see him go that way (2), and, being in apprehension, furnished the gates of the city with concealed arms and men. The sowers of strife (3) said to him: "Sir, enter not Pistoja, for the inhabitants will seize thee, seeing that they have secretly armed the city, and are men of great boldness, and enemies of the House of France." And they put him in such fear that he went, outside Pistoja, by way of a little stream, showing ill-will towards Pistoja. And here was fulfilled the prophecy of an old peasant who long before had said: "There will come from the West, by the Ombroncello (4), a Prince who shall do great things; wherefore by reason of his coming, the beasts of burden shall go over the tops of the towers of Pistoja" (5).

1. *I.e.* by the Blacks of Florence and Pistoja.

2. Because the shorter way to Florence from Bologna lay further eastward, and passed through the Mugello or Valley of the Sieve.

3. *I.e.* the Blacks. *Cf. Inf.* xxviii. 35.

4. An offshoot of the river Ombrone. It is not certain by which of the numerous streams near Pistoja Charles took his way.

5. This happened after the capture of Pistoja in 1306 (an indirect consequence of Charles's coming), when many towers and palaces in Pistoja were laid low (*cf. I.* 26).

CHAPTER IV

Charles of Valois visits the Papal Court, to which the White Guelfs of Florence send an embassy in conjunction with the Bolognese (September to October 1301).

M. CHARLES passed on to the Court of Rome (1) without entering Florence; he was vehemently urged on [by the Black Guelfs], and many suspicions were put into his mind [by them]. The Prince did not know the Tuscans nor their wiles. M. Mucciatto Franzesi, a very crafty knight (2), small in person, but of great ability, well understood the craftiness of the words which were spoken to the Prince; but since he, too, had been bribed, he confirmed what Charles was told by the sowers of strife (3), who were about him daily.

The White Guelfs had ambassadors at the Court of Rome, and [had] the Bolognese [ambassadors] in their company (4); but they were not trustworthy (5), [for] there were among them certain pernicious men, among whom was M. Ubaldino Malavolti, a Bolognese doctor of laws (6), a man full of cavils, who had halted on the way to lay claim to certain rights over a fortress which the Florentines were holding, but which he said belonged to him; and he delayed his companions' journey to such an extent that they did not arrive in time (7).

When the ambassadors arrived in Rome, the Pope received them alone in his chamber, and said to them secretly, "Wherefore are ye (8) thus obstinate? Humble yourselves before me. And

I declare to you in truth, that I have no other intention but to promote your peace. Let two of you (9) go back, and let them have my blessing if they can cause my will to be obeyed."

1. The Court of Rome was then at Anagni.

2. Musciatto (or Mucciatto) Franzesi was a Florentine merchant, who had enriched himself in France and acquired the dignity of knighthood (Boccaccio, "Decameron," i. 1). According to G. Villani (vii. 147), on the advice of Musciatto Franzesi and his brother Biccio, Philip IV. of France seized all the Italians in his dominions, and held them to ransom in 1291; and the same authority (viii. 56) tells us, that by the advice of the same brothers, Philip debased the coinage in order to meet the expense of his Flemish campaign in 1303.

3. See II. 3, n. 3.

4. *I.e.* it was a joint embassy from Florence and Bologna. Documentary evidence has recently been discovered of the appointment of Bolognese ambassadors to Boniface at the request of the Florentines in October 1301; but there is no such evidence as to the Florentine embassy, the members of which were (according to Dino) Maso di Ruggerino Minerbetti, Corazza of Signa (see below, II. 11), and Dante Alighieri (see below, II. 25). Doubts have accordingly been entertained as to the statement that the Florentine government sent any embassy to the Pope at this time, and particularly as to the statement that Dante was a member of it. The question is very intricate, and the reader is referred for a full and able discussion of it to Zenatti's work, *Dante e Firenze* (Florence, Sansoni), pp. 134*ff.* It must suffice to mention here that the case in favour of the accuracy of Dino's statements is exceedingly strong, and that they may be accepted, to say the least, as in the highest degree probable. We may add that Zenatti, "in spite of weighty arguments to the contrary," is satisfied as to the correctness of Dino's information.

5. *I.e.* they were not all trustworthy. The "untrustworthy" members were, among the Florentines, probably Minerbetti (see below, II. 11), and among the Bolognese, Malavolti, whom he here calls a "pernicious man."

6. Ubaldino Malavolti enjoyed a high reputation as a lawyer, and was frequently employed by the Government of Bologna in public affairs.

7. Owing to the delay caused by Malavolti's staying in

Florence to prosecute his claim, the joint embassy did not reach the Papal Court till after Charles of Valois had set out on his mission as peacemaker. It is, however, as Zenatti points out, not necessary to assume that the sole object of the embassy was to prevent Charles from starting.

8. *I.e.* the White Guelfs of Florence whom the ambassadors represented.

9. The two were Minerbetti and Corazza (II. 11). Dante remained behind.

CHAPTER V

The Signory which entered on their office on 15th of October 1301 open negotiations for peace with their Black opponents, who delude them with a specious promise of help in the good work. Fatal apathy among the Whites.

MEANWHILE in Florence new Priors were elected almost unanimously by both parties. These were good men, above suspicion, in whom the smaller traders placed great hope, as did also the White party (1), since they were conciliatory and free from arrogance, and were willing that the offices should be shared (2), saying, "This is the last remedy [that can be tried]" (3).

Their adversaries' hopes were raised by this, for they knew them to be weak and peace-loving men, and thought they could easily deceive them under a show of peace.

The Priors, who took office on the 15th of October 1301, were these: Lapo del Pace Angiolieri, Lippo di Falco Cambio, and I myself, Dino Compagni, Girolamo di Salvi del Chiaro, Guccio Marignolli, Vermiglio di Jacopo Alfani, and Piero Brandini, Gonfalonier of Justice; who,

when they had been drawn by lot (4), betook themselves to Santa Croce, because the others' term of office had not yet expired (5).

The Black Guelfs immediately agreed to go and visit them by fours and by sixes at a time, as might occur to them; and they said: "Sirs, ye are good men, and our city had need of such. Ye behold the discord of your citizens; it behoves you to pacify the city, or it will perish (6). Ye are those who hold the necessary authority; and for this purpose we proffer you our goods and our persons with honourable and loyal mind." And I, Dino, replied on behalf of my companions, and said: "Dear and faithful citizens, we willingly receive your offers, and intend to begin to avail ourselves of them; and we request you to counsel us, and to dispose your minds after such sort as may bring rest to our city." And thus we lost the early days, for we durst not close the gates, nor cease giving audience to the citizens, although we doubted of such false offers, believing that they were covering their wickedness with their false speaking. We encouraged them to negotiate for peace, when we ought to have been sharpening our weapons; and we began with the Captains of the Guelf party (7), who were M. Manetto Scali and M. Neri Giamdonati, and said to them: "Honourable Captains, forsake and abandon everything else, and concern yourselves solely with making peace in the party of the Church (8): and we place the office we hold at your entire disposal in all that you shall ask." The Captains departed very cheerfully and with good courage, and began to persuade people and to speak soothing words. Hearing of this, the Blacks at

once said that it was wickedness and treason (9), and began to reject the [Captains'] words. M. Manetto Scali was so courageous, that he set himself to try to make peace between the Cerchi and the Spini (10), but it was all reputed as treason. The people who held with the Cerchi grew careless in consequence of this (11) [saying]: "There is no need to trouble oneself, for there will be peace." But their adversaries thought only of fulfilling their wickednesses.

No warlike preparation was made, because they (12) could not imagine that anything could ensue but concord; and that for several reasons. The first was, consideration for the Party and a desire to avoid sharing the offices of the city [with the Ghibellines] (13); the second, because [warlike preparations] would only have been a cause of discord, inasmuch as the [mutual] injuries [done by the two parties] had not yet reached such a pass that concord could not be established by sharing the offices [between them]. But [the Blacks] thought that those who had been the offenders (14) could not escape unless the Cerchi and their followers were destroyed; and this could hardly be effected without the destruction of the city (15), so great was their power.

1. The term "White party" seems to stand for the *popolani*, for the party also included the smaller traders mentioned just before (see I. 20, n. 7), or at least a considerable number of them.

2. *I.e.* shared between the Whites and Blacks.

3. To prevent the threatened intervention of the Pope and Charles of Valois.

4. *I.e.* after their names had been drawn from the purses containing the names of persons eligible.

5. And therefore the official residence of the Signory was not yet vacant. The election of the incoming Signory was sometimes (as on this occasion) held before the usual time.

6. They wanted the White Signory to try to pacify the city, and at the same time intended to make it impossible for them to succeed, in order to have a specious justification for calling in Charles of Valois themselves.

7. See I. 3, *n.* 2. The Captains of the Guelf party, who were appointed every two months, varied in number at different times.

8. *I.e.* the Guelf party.

9. *I.e.* that the Captains were being used as tools by the Signory to entrap the Black party.

10. See I. 22.

11. *Viz.* the pacific exertions of the Captains. By the "people who held with the Cerchi" are meant the White *popolani*.

12. *I.e.* the Whites.

13. As in the days of Cardinal Latino (see above, I. 3).

14. *I.e.* the Blacks themselves.

15. *I.e.* without a revolution, as we should say (*cf.* *Conv.* ii. 14: 177).

CHAPTER VI

Charles of Valois arrives at Siena and sends two ambassadors to the Signory of Florence (end of October 1301).

THE Black Guelfs arranged and contrived that M. Charles of Valois, who was at Court (1), should come to Florence; and the deposit of 70,000 florins was made for his pay and that of his knights (2); and they brought him to Siena. And when he was there he sent as ambassadors to Florence M. Guglielmo, a Frenchman, his chancellor (3), who was a dishonourable and bad man (though good and benign in appearance), and a Provençal knight, who was the opposite. [These came] bringing letters from their lord.

On their arrival at Florence they went with great reverence to the Signory, and asked leave to address the Great Council (4), which was granted them. Here an advocate from Volterra, a deceitful and incompetent man, whom they had brought with them, acted as their interpreter; and he talked in a very confused fashion, and said that the blood royal of France had come into Tuscany solely to bring peace to the party of Holy Church (5), and for the great love it bore to the city and the said party; and that the Pope was sending him [Charles of Valois], as a Prince who might well be trusted, seeing that the princes of the blood of the House of France had never betrayed either friend or foe: therefore it ought to please them that he should come to fulfil his office (6).

Many members rose to their feet aflame to speak and magnify M. Charles, and hastened to the tribune (7), each trying to be the first: but the Priors allowed none to speak. Yet they were so many, that the ambassadors saw that the party which desired M. Charles was greater and bolder than that which did not desire him, and they wrote to their lord saying, they had perceived that the party of the Donati had risen very high, while that of the Cerchi had sunk very low (8).

The Signory told the ambassadors that they would reply to their lord by an embassy, and meanwhile they took advice (9), for in view of the great novelty [of the situation] they would do nothing without the consent of their fellow-citizens.

1. *I.e.* the Papal Court (above, I. 23, *n.* 4). Dino here recapitulates what he has narrated in II. 2.

2. *I.e.* the Blacks deposited, probably in the Papal trea-

sury, the sum they had pledged themselves to provide for Charles and his army.

3. *Cherico*, which word is not employed here in its usual acceptation of "a clerk in holy orders," but means the confidential official of a king or prince. In II. 17, we learn that this Guglielmo was Charles's chancellor, or private secretary, as we should say.

4. *I.e.* the general council of the Podestà (see Appendix II.).

5. *I.e.* the Guelf party.

6. *I.e.* the office of peacemaker to which Charles had been appointed by the Pope (II. 2).

7. *Ringhiera*. A kind of movable pulpit from which the members addressing the council had to speak.

8. The ambassadors were wrong in identifying with the party of the Donati all those who were in favour of Charles's mediation, for the majority of the Whites, less clear-sighted than the rest, were disposed to put their trust in the good faith of the French prince.

9. As will be seen in the next chapter, the Signory called together an extraordinary assembly to decide the question whether Charles should be admitted to the city or not.

CHAPTER VII

The Signory, after consulting the general council of the Guelf party and of the seventy-two trades of the city, send ambassadors to Charles of Valois, with instructions to allow him to come to the city on condition of his previously giving his promise, under seal, to respect the liberties and laws of Florence. Charles gives the required promise and begins to approach the city, urged on by the Black Guelfs (end of October 1301).

THEY therefore summoned the general council of the Guelf party (1), and of the seventy-two trades comprised in guilds, all which trades had their own consuls (2), and enjoined upon them that each should

answer in writing whether it were pleasing to his guild that M. Charles of Valois should be permitted to come to Florence as peacemaker. All replied by voice and in writing that he should be allowed to come, and should be received as a prince of noble blood, except the bakers, who said that he should neither be received nor honoured, since he was coming to destroy the city.

The ambassadors, who were prominent *popolani*, were sent to tell M. Charles that he might freely come. Instructions were given them to obtain from him letters under seal [declaring] that he would neither assume any jurisdiction as against us, nor usurp any of the city's rights whether in respect of the Empire (3) or under any other pretext; and that he would not change the laws or customs of the city. The draftsman was M. Donato d'Alberto Ristori, with whom were associated several other doctors of law. Charles's chancellor was asked to beg his master not to come on All Saints' Day, because the common people celebrated the new vintage on that day with feasting, and many outbreaks might occur, which by means of the wickedness of the bad citizens (4) might disturb the city. He therefore determined to come on the following Sunday (5), deeming that the delay was made for a good purpose.

The ambassadors went to him more for the sake of obtaining the letter (6) before his arrival than for any other cause, being instructed that if they did not obtain the fulfilment of his promises (7) they should cease to put any trust in him, and should bar his passage at Poggibonsi (8), the approach to which had been ordered to be strengthened for the

safety of that place. And M. Bernardo di' Rossi, who was vicar (9) [there], was ordered to refuse him provisions.

Meantime the letter came, and I saw it and caused it to be copied, and kept it until the prince's coming; and when he was come, I asked him if it had been written by his wish? He answered, "Yes, certainly." Those who were escorting him were in haste, and drew him from Siena almost by force, and gave him 17,000 florins to urge him on; because he greatly feared the precipitation of the Tuscans (10), and was advancing with great caution. His escort encouraged him and his soldiers, saying: "Sir, [the enemy] are vanquished, and they are asking thee to delay thy coming for some evil purpose, and are making a conspiracy." And they pushed him on in other ways. But no conspiracy was being made.

1. See I. 3, n. 2.

2. The guilds were twenty-one in number (see Appendix II.). The seventy-two "trades comprised in guilds" (*mestieri d'arti*) included a number of crafts and occupations which, though not forming guilds, were in some way associated with the guilds and subordinated to them, though possessing an organisation of their own under "consuls." They covered the whole of the *popolo minuto*, and the present assembly was therefore much more largely representative of the whole population than all or any of the councils of the Commonwealth.

3. The Pope, who claimed the right during a vacancy of the Empire to exercise the Imperial functions as Vicar, had, acting expressly in this capacity, appointed Charles as peacemaker in Tuscany. The Empire was technically vacant, for Albert of Austria (1298-1308) was never crowned at Rome (*cf.* I. 13, n. 2).

4. *I.e.* the Black Guelfs.

5. *I.e.* November 5.

6. *I.e.* the "letters under seal" which the ambassadors had been instructed to procure from Charles.

7. *I.e.* the promise made by his ambassadors (see preceding chapter) that he would come for the sole purpose of bringing peace to the Guelf party.

8. A strong fortress belonging to Florence on the Sienese frontier.

9. The title given to the magistrates appointed by the Signory to govern the towns in the Florentine dominions (*contado*).

10. *I.e.* the haste with which the Black Guelfs, who were escorting him, wanted him to proceed.

CHAPTER VIII

Dino Compagni avails himself of his official position as one of the Priors to make a final appeal to the better feelings of the more prominent citizens, in order to promote concord in the city. Duplicity and perjury of some among them (end of October 1301).

WHEN affairs were in this state a holy and virtuous thought came to me, Dino. Imagining "This prince will come and will find all the citizens divided, from which great mischief will follow," I thought that by reason of the office I held, and of the good-will which I perceived among my colleagues, I might bring together many prominent citizens in the Church of S. Giovanni; and so I did.

All the officials (1) were present; and when it appeared to me fitting, I said: "Dear and worthy citizens, who have all in common received Holy Baptism from this font, reason compels and urges you to love one another as dear brethren; and the more so because ye possess the noblest city in the world. Some ill-will has arisen amongst you

through rivalry for the offices of the State ; but, as ye know, my colleagues and I have promised you with an oath to allow both parties to share them (2). This Prince is coming, and it behoves us to do him honour. Put away, then, your ill-will and make peace amongst yourselves, so that he find you not divided ; put away all the offences and the wicked desires which have hitherto been amongst you ; let them be pardoned and remitted for the love and the good of your city. And on this hallowed font, whence ye drew Holy Baptism, swear good and perfect peace betwixt one another, to the end that the Prince who is coming may find the citizens all united." To these words all agreed, and they did accordingly, touching the Book with their hands, and swearing to observe perfect peace, and to maintain the rights and jurisdiction of the city. This done, we departed from that place.

Those wicked citizens who ostentatiously shed tears of tenderness, and kissed the Book, and made the greatest show of fervour were the chief in the destruction of the city ; whose names, for decency's sake, I will not tell. But I cannot conceal the name of the first, because he was the cause of the others following [his example] : he was Rosso dello Strozza, a man fierce in aspect and in deeds, the instigator of the others. But soon after he paid the penalty for his oath.

Those who were evil inclined said that this peace, full of charity, had been procured by deceit. If there was any fraud in the words spoken (3) I ought to suffer the penalty ; although a good intention ought not to receive an ill reward. Many tears have I shed for that oath, thinking of how

many souls are damned for it through their wickedness.

1. *I.e.* the whole official class, comprising the officers of the Commonwealth, of the Guelf party, and of the guilds.

2. *Cf.* II. 5 (at the beginning).

3. Not, of course, by Dino, but by those who took the oath falsely.

CHAPTER IX

'Arrival of Charles of Valois in Florence. The forces at his disposal (1st November 1301).

THE said M. Charles entered the city of Florence . . . (1), and was much honoured by the citizens with races and tilting (2). Those who were impartial (3) lost their energy; wickedness began to spread (4). The Lucchese arrived, saying that they came to do honour to the Prince (5); the Perugians came with 200 horsemen; M. Cante of Gubbio with many Sienese knights (6) and with many others, adversaries of the Cerchi, who came in by sixes and by tens at a time. Entrance was not denied to Malatestino (7) and Mainardo of Susinana (8), in order not to displease the Prince; and each one (9) showed himself friendly. Thus, including M. Charles's own horsemen, who were 800 in number, and those come from the places around (10), he had 1200 horsemen at his command.

The Prince alighted at the house of the Frescobaldi. He was entreated to alight where the noble and honoured King Charles had alighted, and all the great lords who came to the city (11), because

there was plenty of room there, and the place was secure. But those who were escorting him would not allow this, but looked out beforehand how they might occupy a strong position in Oltrarno (12), saying to themselves: "If we lose the rest of the city, we will assemble our force here."

In Chapters IX.-XIX., inclusive, the story of events in Florence during the first eight days of November 1301 is related. They are related without strict regard to their succession in time, and anticipations frequently occur in the narrative.

1. The MSS. have the erroneous date of Sunday the 4th November. Charles entered Florence on Wednesday, 1st November, All Saints' Day (*cf.* II. 7, *n.* 5).

2. See I. 7, *n.* 7.

3. *La gente comune*, *i.e.* those who had only the public good at heart (*cf.* *comune* in the same sense in Villani, vii. 13; viii. 69).

4. The "wickedness" is that of the Black Guelfs.

5. *Cf.* I. 21.

6. M. Cante dei Gabrielli of Gubbio had been Podestà of Siena in 1298. He was, as we shall see (II. 19), appointed Podestà of Florence by the Blacks when they had gained possession of the city.

7. This was the eldest son of Malatesta of Verrucchio, lord of Rimini from 1295 to 1312. He was half-brother to Gianciotto (*Inf.* v. 107) and Paolo Malatesta (*Inf.* v. 140). He is mentioned in *Inf.* xxvii. 46 as "the young mastiff of Verrucchio," and in *Inf.* xxviii. 85 as "the traitor who sees but with one eye." He succeeded his father as lord of Rimini, and died in 1317.

8. See I. 7, *n.* 5.

9. *I.e.* all those who came with Charles into Florence from the places just mentioned or referred to.

10. See list of towns from which forces came in II. 14.

11. *I.e.* the monastery of S. Maria Novella. The visit to Florence of Charles I. of Anjou here referred to was made in 1267 after the overthrow of the Ghibellines, when the Guelf party became supreme in Florence (I. 3, *n.* 2). Observe that S. Maria Novella was at this date (1301) outside the city.

12. *I.e.* that part of Florence which is on the left bank of the Arno, where the palace of the Frescobaldi was situate at the end of the bridge of S. Trinità. Others of Charles's adherents occupied the Spini palace at the other end of the bridge, which was thus entirely commanded by Charles (see II. 14).

CHAPTER X

The Signory summon a special body of citizens, chosen from both parties, to advise them as to the measures to be taken for the safety of the city during the visit of Charles of Valois. Description of the deliberations of this body (end of October 1301).

THE Priors composing the Signory chose forty citizens from both parties, in order that they might not be held in suspicion by either, and took counsel with them concerning the safety of the city (1). Those who had a wicked purpose did not speak (2); the others had lost their energy.

Bandino Falconieri, a coward, said, "Sirs, [now] I am easy, whereas I used not to sleep securely" (3); showing cowardice before his adversaries. He occupied the tribune (4) half the day, and we were at the ebb of the year (5).

M. Lapo Salterelli, who greatly feared the Pope, on account of the severe measures the Pope had taken against him (6), mounted the tribune, and, in order to curry favour with his adversaries (7), began to abuse the Signory, saying, "You are bringing Florence to ruin: cause a new and mixed Signory to be elected; recall to the city those who have been set under bounds!" (8). And

[all the time] he had in his house M. Pazzino de' Pazzi, who had been set under bounds, and who, he trusted, would save him when he (Pazzino) should be reinstated (9).

Alberto del Giudice (10), a rich *popolano*, a man of melancholic temperament and indifferent character, mounted the tribune and blamed the Priors because they did not hasten to elect their successors and recall those set under bounds. M. Loteringo of Montespertoli (11) said, "Sirs, would you be advised? Elect a fresh Signory, recall to the city those set under bounds, [and] draw the gates off their hinges; in other words, if you do these two things you may say that you are striking the locks off the gates" (12).

I asked M. Andrea of Cerreto, a learned lawyer sprung from an old Ghibelline family, but now become a Black Guelf (13), whether a new Signory could be elected without transgressing the Ordinances of Justice? (14). He replied that this could not be done. And I, who had been accused of such transgression, and been charged with a breach of the Ordinances (15), determined to observe them, and not to allow the [new] Signory to be elected against the laws.

1. See I. 21, n. 6. As a result of the meetings of this body, stringent measures for ensuring the tranquillity of the city during Charles's visit were passed by the Councils of the Commonwealth on October 26-28, and extraordinary powers for the protection of the city and territory were conferred on the Signory (see II. 13, n. 6).

2. The policy of the Blacks (those who had a wicked purpose), amply justified (from their point of view) by the miserable exhibition made by the White speakers, which Dino so graphically described, was to give their opponents rope enough to hang themselves with.

3. *I.e.* "I feel quite comfortable, now that the Peacemaker is coming."

4. See II. 6, *n.* 8.

5. *Nel più basso tempo dell' anno, i.e.* when the days were getting shortest.

6. See I. 20, *n.* 6. The Signory, which held office from April 15 till June 15, 1300, had taken proceedings against three citizens resident at Rome in the Pope's service, for being concerned in a plot against the State, and had sentenced them to a heavy fine. On April 24, 1300, Pope Boniface VIII. wrote to the Bishop of Florence, ordering him to summon the Signory and Magistrates to quash the proceedings against the three citizens on pain of excommunication and interdict, and to cite Lapo Salterelli (at that date one of the Priors) and two others as being the "chief authors" of the proceedings to appear before him (the Pope) within fifteen days, on pain of excommunication and perpetual disqualification for "all honours and offices whatsoever." Lapo took no notice of this, but on the contrary disclaimed the right of the Pope to meddle with the jurisdiction of the Florentine government; and on May 15 Boniface writes again a furious letter to the Bishop of Florence and the Inquisitor of the Province of Tuscany, bidding them again to cite Lapo and others to appear before him within eight days; and on their failing to appear, Boniface threatens them with divers pains and penalties, including proceedings for heresy. These were the "severe measures" (*aspro processo*), which caused the contumacious Lapo to be "in great fear of the Pope." (The letters of Pope Boniface above referred to are printed in the *Codice Diplomatico Dantesco*, *disp.* 9.)

7. *I.e.* the Blacks.

8. In calling for "a new and mixed Signory" Lapo Salterelli meant that the Signory should elect their successors at once (an illegal proceeding: see below, *n.* 14), and that these should consist of Blacks as well as Whites.

9. *I.e.* when the Blacks should be triumphant in the city. Pazzino de' Pazzi was one of the leaders of the Blacks (see I. 23; I. 24, *n.* 6). Lapo Salterelli's base manoeuvres did not save him from his enemies (see II. 25; *cf.* *Par.* xv. 128).

10. He had been one of the conspirators against Giano della Bella (see I. 14). His surname, *del Giudice*, was derived from an ancestor named Rustico, who had been a famous lawyer.

11. A place situated some fifteen miles S.W. of Florence.

12. Because (he intimates) the tranquillity of the city would be so fully assured that no guard would be needed to maintain the authority of the government.

13. His family, originally Ghibelline, had become Guelf, and had joined the Black Guelfs at the schism of the party (see II. 23, and I. 22).

14. The difficulty was, that it was expressly provided by the Ordinances that the election of a new Signory should be made one day before their predecessors went out of office; and the existing Signory would not go out of office until December 15. They had, in fact, only held office themselves for about a fortnight.

15. In 1295 Dino had been accused of having neglected to enforce the punishment prescribed by the Ordinances against two Magnates, who had committed an assault against *popolani* during the time that he had been Gonfalonier in 1293 (see I. 12). He was acquitted by implication; for the proceedings were directed against the then Captain of the People for not having proceeded against Dino, and the Captain was acquitted on this charge.

CHAPTER XI

The ambassadors, sent back to Florence by the Pope (see II. 4), report his answer to the Signory. The Signory, in view of the critical state of affairs, determine to keep back this report from the Councils of the Commonwealth, and in consultation with six lawyers pass a resolution, on the motion of Dino Compagni, in favour of submitting to the Pope, and of requesting him to send Cardinal Gentile of Montefiore to reform the government of the city. Maso Minerbetti, one of the ambassadors, reveals the Pope's answer to the Blacks, who determine to overthrow the Government by force (first days of November 1301).

At this time the two ambassadors, who had been sent back by the Pope, returned. One of them was

Maso di M. Ruggierino Minerbetti, a false *popolano*, who did not stand up for his own will, but followed that of others ; the other was Corazza of Signa (1), who was so deeply imbued with Guelf principles that he could hardly believe such principles not to be extinct in the minds of everybody else (2). They reported the Pope's words (3) [to the Signory] ; wherefore I was to blame in the matter of reporting his (*sic*) embassy, [for] I kept it back, and swore the ambassadors to secrecy ; but I did not keep it back from a bad motive (4). Afterwards I assembled six learned lawyers, and caused it to be brought before them, and I did not permit the Councils to be summoned, but with my colleagues' consent I brought forward, supported, and put to the vote a resolution that this Potentate (5) should be obeyed, that a letter should be at once written to him stating that we were submissive to his will, and requesting him to send us the Cardinal M. Gentile of Montefiore (6) to put us straight (7). That man (8), who, on the one hand, was using flattering words, and, on the other, was urging on the Prince against us, on finding out who was in the city (9), abandoned flattery and used threats (10).

One of the ambassadors who was false (11) revealed the Pope's answer, which the Blacks could not otherwise have heard. Simone Gherardi (12) had written to them from Court that the Pope had said to him, "I am not going to destroy men for the sake of silly women" (13). Thereupon the Black Guelfs took counsel, thinking by reason of these words that the ambassadors had come to terms with the Pope, and said : "If they have come to terms we are undone." They determined

to wait and see what course the Priors would take, saying: "If they answer 'no,' we are dead men; if they answer 'yes,' let us draw the sword, so that we may get from them what we can" (14). And so they did. Immediately on hearing that the Priors (15) were submitting to the Pope, they armed themselves at once and began to attack the city with fire and sword, to consume and to waste the city (16). The Priors wrote to the Pope secretly, but the Black party knew all, inasmuch as those who had sworn secrecy had not observed it. The Black party had two officers (17) unknown outside [the party], whose office lasted six months (18). One of them was Noffo Guidi (19), an iniquitous *popolano* and a pitiless man. For he acted in the worst manner for his city, and it was his habit to blame in public the things he did in secret and the doers of them. He was therefore held to be a person of good character, and he drew gain from evil doing.

1. See II. 31. *Corazza* (breastplate) is a nickname. His real name was Guido d'Ubalдино Aldobrandinelli. He had been Gonfalonier in the Signory which held office from April 15 to June 15 in 1300.

2. *Il quale tanto si riputava guelfo che appena credea che nell'animo di niuno fusse altro che spenta.* This clause is very awkwardly constructed, and is complicated by a difficulty as to the reading. We have followed the reading and interpretation of Del Lungo.

3. See II. 4 (at the end).

4. The constitutional practice was for the reports of ambassadors to be laid at once before the Councils of the Commonwealth; but, as this would have been highly dangerous in the present crisis, the Signory felt justified in holding over the report. Of course, when Dino speaks in the first person singular of the things done during his priorate, it must be understood (even when he does not expressly say so) that he was acting with the consent of his

colleagues. It is clear from his narrative that he was the leading member of the Signory.

5. *Questo signore*, viz. the Pope.

6. Gentile of Montefiore (a small place in the modern province of Ascoli Piceno) was a Franciscan; he was created Cardinal by Boniface VIII. in 1298, and was for a long time legate in Hungary under Pope Clement V. He died at Avignon in 1312.

7. The same expression in the same sense is used by Dante in *Par.* xxx. 137.

8. *I.e.* the Pope.

9. *I.e.* the forces at the disposal of Charles of Valois (see II. 9).

10. The threats were probably addressed to the ambassador (Dante), who was still at Rome (II. 4, *n.* 9), on receipt of the letter sent by the Signory.

11. Doubtless Minerbetti.

12. See I. 21 (near the beginning).

13. *I.e.* "it won't be worth my while to quarrel with the White Guelfs (who, after all, are in possession of Florence), unless you act like men, and lose no time in crushing them."

14. The Black Guelfs were persuaded that the Pope had come to terms with the Whites. Arguing on this erroneous assumption, they came to the conclusion that whatever answer the Signory might make to the Pope's summons to submit had been preconcerted with the Pope; and they viewed the alternatives thus: "If the Signory says 'no,' *i.e.* declines to submit, on the ground that we, the Blacks, are not sincere in wishing for a peaceful settlement, the Pope will withdraw Charles's authority, or, worse still, will bid him side with the Whites, and we shall be undone. If the Signory says 'yes,' *i.e.* submits, the Pope will commission Charles to effect a genuine pacification, and our vengeance will elude us. In this case our only chance is to fight at once."

15. *Rettori*. The word here obviously refers to the Priors, and is not used in its technical sense (see Appendix II. p. 269).

16. An anticipation in the narrative (see II. 15).

17. *Priori*.

18. *I.e.* these officers, whose existence was not generally known outside the party, were appointed every six months.

19. The same person as Noffo di Guido Bonafedi, enumerated among the conspirators against Giano della Bella in I. 14.

CHAPTER XII

Yielding to outside pressure, the Signory decide to elect their successors at once from men of both parties. Dino Compagni is commissioned by his colleagues to proceed to the election ; but, in consequence of a demand by Noffo Guidi that the Blacks should preponderate in the new Signory, the election is not carried out (first days of November 1301).

THE Priors were being vehemently urged by the greater citizens to elect a new Signory. Although this was contrary to the Ordinances of Justice, because it was not yet the time to elect them (1), we agreed that they should be appointed, more out of compassion for the city than for any other cause. And I attended in the chapel of S. Bernard (2) on behalf of the whole Signory, where I had with me many of the most powerful of the *popolani*, because the election could not be made without them (3). These were Cione Magalotti, Segna Angiolini, and Noffo Guidi on behalf of the Black party ; M. Lapo Falconieri, Cece Canigiani, and Corazza Ubaldini on behalf of the White party (4). And in a conciliatory manner and with great tenderness I spoke to them of the deliverance of the city, saying : "I am going to make the new Signory a mixed one, since rivalry for office causes so much discord." We [all] agreed, and chose six impartial (5) citizens, three from the Blacks and three from the Whites. We chose for the seventh (who could not be divided) a man of so little im-

portance that no one mistrusted him. The names of these having been written down I laid them on the altar. Then Noffo Guidi spoke and said: "I will say something that will make thee think me a pitiless (6) citizen." And I told him to keep silence; but yet he spoke, and had the arrogance to ask me that I would be pleased to make their party more numerous than the other in the [new] Signory, which was as much as saying: "Destroy the other party," and putting me in Judas's place. And I answered him that before I committed such treason I would give my children to the dogs to eat. And thus (7) we departed from the assembly.

1. See II. 10, n. 14.

2. Previously to 1299 the Signory had had no fixed official residence, though the members of it were obliged to live together (see I. 4). At first they occupied the Abbey buildings (I. 4, n. 6), and subsequently various other residences were rented for their use. Early in 1299 the Councils of the Commonwealth authorised the building of a palace for the Signory to dwell in; and the existing Signory at once took possession of certain buildings purchased at the public expense, which formed the nucleus of the famous structure built by Arnolfo di Cambio (who began his work that very year) now known as the Palazzo Vecchio. It is uncertain whether the chapel adorned with frescoes by Ridolfo Ghirlandaio, now existing on the second floor of this building, is the same as the "chapel of S. Bernard" here mentioned by Dino, or whether the latter was situated in some other part of the pile. The houses of the Uberti were demolished to form the Piazza in front of the palace (Villani, viii. 26).

3. See I. 11, n. 11.

4. Only the most prominent among those present are mentioned by name.

5. *Comuni*. See II. 9, n. 3.

6. *Crudele*. Cf. II. 11, where Dino applies this epithet to Noffo Guidi. In the present passage the word is used in the special sense of pitiless to his native city. So again in II. 20 of Corso Donati.

7. *I.e.* without having completed the election. The existing Signory therefore remained in office.

CHAPTER XIII

Charles of Valois and the Blacks try to get the members of the Signory into their hands and murder them. The stratagem is foiled (November 5, 1301). Measures taken by the Signory for the safety of the city (October 26-28).

M. CHARLES OF VALOIS often caused us to be invited to eat with him. We answered him that the law bound us by our oath so that we could not do it (which was true) (1), because between ourselves we thought that he would have detained us against our will. But yet one day he drew us from the palace, saying that he wished to hold a conference at Santa Maria Novella outside the city for the welfare of the citizens, and might it please the Signory to be present. Since to refuse would have shown too much suspicion, we decided that three of us should go there and the others should remain in the palace. M. Charles caused his men to be armed, and set them to guard the city at the gates, both within and without, since his false counsellors told him that he would not be able to get back into the city (2), and that the gate would be shut against him. And under this pretext they had wickedly intended, if the whole Signory had gone there, to kill us outside the gate and make themselves masters of the city. But they did not succeed in this, because not more than three [of the Signory] went there; and to them he said nothing, being a man who did not want to talk, but to kill (3). Many citizens sorrowed for us on account of that

journey, for it seemed to them that they (*sic*) were going to martyrdom. And when they returned, those citizens praised God that He had saved them from death.

Pressure was put on the Signory from all sides. The good citizens told them to look well to themselves and to their city; the wicked ones harassed them with difficulties (4); so that amid the questions and answers the day wore away: M. Charles's barons took up their time with long speeches. Thus they lived in distress.

One day a holy man came to us secretly and by stealth (5), begging us not to tell his name, and said, "Sirs, ye are coming into great tribulation, and your city also. Send to bid the Bishop make a procession, and charge him that it go not across the Arno. Then a great part of the danger will cease." This was a man of holy life and great abstinence and of great renown, by name Friar Benedict. We followed his counsel, and many derided us, saying that it would be better to sharpen our weapons.

We passed through the Councils strict and severe laws (6), and we gave the Magistrates full powers against any who might cause any affray or tumult; and we imposed personal penalties, and ordered the block and the axe to be put in the Piazza to punish malefactors and any who should disobey. We increased the authority of the Captain of War, M. Schiatta Cancellieri (7), and encouraged him to do well; though it was of no avail, for the messengers, servants, and serjeants betrayed him. And the Priors discovered that twenty of their serjeants were to receive 1000 florins for killing them; whereupon

they put the conspirators out of the palace. They tried very hard to defend the city from the wickedness of their adversaries; but nothing availed, because they took peaceable measures, whereas their measures should have been prompt and severe. Gentleness is of no avail against great wickedness.

1. The provisions of the Ordinances of Justice, with regard to the seclusion of the Priors during the term of office, were very strict.

2. *I.e.* after the conference at S. Maria Novella.

3. There is again an anticipation of the narrative here. What actually happened at the conference is related in II. 17. G. Villani (viii. 49) says that the Priors and the Magistrates were present in S. Maria Novella, and adds that he was there himself; but in view of the express statement of Dino, himself a Prior, it must be understood that only three of the Priors were present. Villani, then a young man, was a mere spectator, while Dino was one of the principals in the transaction.

4. *Questioni*, *i.e.* vexatious, embarrassing questions.

5. Lit. "closed" (*chiuso*). Cf. *Inf.* xxv. 147.

6. There is here a retrogression in the narrative (see II. 10, n. 1).

7. See I. 27.

CHAPTER XIV

Military preparations of the Blacks. Feebleness of the Whites (1st to 3rd November 1301).

THE citizens belonging to the Black party spoke defiantly, saying: "We have the Prince with us; the Pope is our protector; our adversaries are equipped neither for war nor for peace (1); they have no money; their mercenaries are not paid." They themselves had set in order everything needful for war so as to gather all their allies within the Sesto of Oltrarno, where they had determined

to station the forces from Siena, Perugia, Lucca, Sanminiato, Volterra, and Sangimignano. They had corrupted all the neighbours (2); and had designed to hold the bridge at S. Trinità, and to erect on the two palaces (3) an engine for casting stones. They had also summoned many auxiliaries (4) from the places around, and all who had been banished from Florence.

The White Guelfs durst not place soldiers in their houses, because the Priors threatened to punish them and any others who should gather together bodies of armed men; and thus they kept friends and foes in fear. But the friends should not have believed that their friends [the Priors] would have put them to death for making preparations to save their city, even though that order had been given (5). However, it was not so much from fear of the law as from avarice that they neglected [to arm themselves], for it had been said to M. Torrigiano de' Cerchi: "Provide for your defence, and tell your friends to do the same" (6).

1. Not for war, because of their military weakness; not for peace, because of their disunion (see especially II. 6, n. 8; II. 8, 10).

2. The word "neighbours" is here used in a special sense. The reference is to the practice of a number of citizens occupying neighbouring houses, and forming a neighbourhood (*vicinanza*) to club together and maintain a tower for their common defence in case of a civil war (see Villani, v. 9). These towers were known as the Towers of the neighbourhood (*Torri delle vicinanze*), or of the companies (*Torri delle compagnie*), to distinguish them from similar towers maintained by single families (*Torri delle famiglie*). The meaning of the passage therefore is, that the Blacks had taken measures to ensure that the members or "neighbours" composing these Tower Clubs should be on their side in the coming fight.

3. See II. 9, *n.* 12.

4. *Villani*, *i.e.* irregular troops (*cf.* I. 10, *n.* 8).

5. The stringent regulations for the preservation of peace within the city (see preceding chapter) were not intended to prevent the Whites from taking measures to defend the city against the forces of Charles of Valois and the Blacks.

6. See II. 21. Torrigiano de' Cerchi was one of the heads of the White party (I. 21, 23).

CHAPTER XV

The beginning of bloodshed : the Medici assault and wound a *popolano*, but the Podestà and Gonfalonier fail to take action under the Ordinances of Justice. The Signory send for the militia from the Contado. The streets of Florence barricaded (4th November 1301).

THE Blacks, knowing that their enemies were cowardly and had lost their energy, hastened to seize the city, and one Saturday, the . . . of November (1) they made ready their mail-clad horses, and began to carry out what they had planned. The Medici, powerful *popolani* (2), assaulted and wounded a worthy *popolano*, called Orlanduccio Orlandi, by day, after vespers (3), and left him for dead. The *popolani* armed themselves, horse and foot, and came to the Priors' palace (4); and a worthy citizen, called Catellina Raffacani, said: "Sirs, ye are betrayed; night is coming on; delay not; send for the militia of the Contado (5); and to-morrow at dawn fight against your adversaries." The Podestà did not send his officials to the offender's house, neither did the Gonfalonier of Justice stir to punish the outrage, because he had ten days' time [to wait].

The militia were sent for, and they came and displayed their banners; and then secretly went over to the side of the Black party, and to the Commonwealth they offered not their service (6). There was no one to exhort the *popolani* to assemble at the palace of the Signory, though the Gonfalon of Justice was at the windows (7). The hired soldiers came thither, for they were not corrupted, and so did other *popolani* (8), who, as they stood by the palace, armed, produced some effect (9). Other citizens also, friends [of the White party], came thither on foot and on horseback, and some enemies came to see how things would turn out.

The Priors, unused to war, [were] kept busy by many who desired audience; and in a short time night fell (10). The Podestà did not send his officials there (11), nor did he arm himself; he abandoned his duty to the Priors; whereas he had the power to go armed to the offender's house with weapons, fire, and implements of destruction. The assembled *popolani* gave no counsel (12). M. Schiatta Cancellieri, the Captain, did not come forward and busy himself in opposing the enemy, because he was a man fitter for repose and peace than for war (13); though it was commonly said that he boasted he would kill M. Charles. But this was not true. When night was come the people began to depart, and they strengthened their houses by blocking the streets with barricades of wood, so that people might not pass along.

1. The date is left blank in all the MSS., but it must have been the 4th.

2. *I.e.* *popolani* who were Magnates in the statutory sense

(see I. II, n. 8; I. 13, n. 1). This seems to be the first historic mention of the Medici.

3. *I.e.* towards evening (see *Conv.* iv. 23: 130 n.).

4. This was in accordance with the Ordinances of Justice, which enjoined that when a *popolano* had been murdered by a Magnate the shops were to be shut, and the *popolani* were to arm themselves and remain under arms until justice should have been done on the offender. The duties enjoined by the Ordinances on the Podestà and the Gonfalonier in this case were as follows: The Podestà, with the privity of the Gonfalonier, was to summon the armed force of the Gonfalonier (see I. 11, n. 5), and was to send with him certain officials of his own household (see I. 16, n. 4) to assist in the execution of the sentence. The Gonfalonier was to proceed with his force and with the Podestà's officials to the abode of the offender, and demolish his houses and lay waste his goods. The Podestà and Gonfalonier were bound to act in the business with the utmost despatch. In the present case it is important to bear in mind that it was at first taken for granted that Orlandi had been killed, and Dino in blaming the Podestà and Gonfalonier for their remissness (as he does below in this chapter), implies that they showed disloyalty to the government in not taking action against the offender *immediately on being informed that the victim was dead*, even though the fact, afterwards discovered, that he had only been wounded made it illegal for them to proceed to demolish the offender's house until after ten days had elapsed without the prescribed fine having been paid.

5. *Le vicarie*, *i.e.* the forces commanded by the Vicars (see II. 7, n. 9) of the Contado, including the irregular troops or militia of the country districts (see I. 21, n. 8).

6. An anticipation in the narrative. The militia did not arrive till later (see II. 17).

7. It was the business of the Podestà to summon the forces of the Gonfalonier (see n. 2).

8. Not the Gonfalonier's forces, of course, but other *popolani*.

9. Lit. "were followed to some extent," *i.e.* somewhat reassured the panic-stricken Whites.

10. This sentence, unusually concise, even for Dino, needs some expansion in order to be understood. The meaning apparently is that the Priors had sent for the militia, as they had been advised, and made up their minds to fight, but, being inexperienced in military matters, consumed so long a time in seeing people and giving orders about the necessary steps to be taken, that night came on before they had finished their business.

11. *I.e.* to the houses of the Medici (see *n.* 4). The Podestà was M. Tebaldo of Montelupone.

12. The meaning seems to be that the Priors in their extremity called upon the *popolani* who had gathered at the palace to deliberate with them on the situation, but in vain.

13. See I. 27.

CHAPTER XVI

The Magnates of the Black and White parties come to an understanding. This weakens the Signory (a) by depriving them of the support of the Magnates of their own party; (b) by taking all heart out of their Ghibelline supporters (November 1-4, 1301).

M. MANETTO SCALI (in whom the White party had great confidence, since he was strong in friends and adherents) began to fortify his palace, and made engines there for casting stones. The Spini had their great palace opposite his and had taken steps to fortify themselves (1), for they well knew that they would need to make a stand there on account of the great power which they judged the House of the Scali to possess.

Within the said time (2) the said parties began to work fresh guile (3), for friendly words passed between them. The Spini said to the Scali, "Come now, why do we act thus? We are, after all, friends and kinsmen, and we are all Guelfs; we have no other purpose than to lift from our necks the chain which the people (4) lays on you and us; and we shall [then] be greater than we are

[now]. Help, for God's sake! let us be one, as we ought to be."

And thus the Buondelmonti behaved toward the Gherardini, and the Bardi to the Mozzi, and M. Rosso della Tosa to Baschiera his kinsman; and thus did many others behave (5). Those who listened to such words were moved in their hearts through love for their party (6). Wherefore their followers (7) lost heart. The sight of this [reconciliation] made the Ghibellines believe that they were being deceived and betrayed by those in whom they trusted (8), and they were all filled with consternation. And thus it happened that few people, save certain craftsmen to whom [the Priors] had committed the guard [of their palace], remained out of doors (9).

1. The importance of the position will be made plain by a reference to II. 9, *n.* 12, and II. 14.

2. The concluding sentences of this chapter seem to imply that the negotiations about to be described took place in the afternoon and evening of the same day (Nov. 4) on which the events of the preceding chapter occurred.

3. The Black Magnates acted with "guile," because their only object was to get possession of the city; the Whites because they were betraying their own cause.

4. The "people" are, of course, the *popolani* (see I. 4, *n.* 2). The "chain" denotes in particular the Ordinances of Justice.

5. *Cf.* the lists of the adherents of the two parties in I. 21, 22.

6. *I.e.* the White Magnates who listened to the overtures of the Black Magnates were moved by a desire to heal the breach in the Guelf party.

7. *I.e.* the White *popolani*.

8. See I. 20, *n.* 7; I. 22.

9. *Cf.* end of preceding chapter.

CHAPTER XVII

Charles of Valois demands that the custody of the city shall be made over to him ; and his officers pledge his word that he will exercise his authority at the pleasure of the Signory ; whereupon Charles admits the banished members of the Black party. Helpless position of the Signory (November 5, 1301).

THE barons of M. Charles and the wicked knight M. Mucciatto Franzesi (1) were always about the Priors, saying that the custody of the city and its gates, and especially of the Sesto of Oltrarno, should be left to them ; that the custody of that Sesto belonged to their Prince (2), and that he would have the evil-doers (3) severely punished. And beneath this [pretext] they hid their wickedness, for their object was to acquire greater authority (4) in the city.

The keys were denied to M. Charles, but the gates of Oltrarno were committed to his charge ; and the Florentines were removed from them and the French placed there in their stead. And M. Guglielmo, the Chancellor (5), and the Marshal of M. Charles made oath before (6) me, Dino, who received the oath on behalf of the Commonwealth ; and they pledged me the faith of their lord, that he would take upon himself the custody of the city and keep and hold it at the pleasure of the Signory. And never did I believe that so great a prince, and one of the Royal House of France, would break his faith ; whereas but a

small part of the following night had passed when, by the gate which we had committed to his custody, he admitted Gherarduccio Buondelmonti, who had been banished, accompanied by many other banished citizens (7). Application was made to the Priors by a worthy *popolano* named Aglione di Giova Aglioni, who said, "Sirs, it will be well to cause the gate at San Brancazio (8) to be more strongly fortified." He was answered that he might cause the gate to be strengthened as seemed fitting to him; and they sent the masons thither with their banner. The Tornaquinci, a powerful family (9), who were well provided with retainers and friends, assaulted the said masons, wounded them, and put them to flight; some foot-soldiers also who were in the towers (10) abandoned them through fear. The Priors, therefore, on hearing this news and that, perceived that they could find no remedy (11). And this they [also] learnt from one who was arrested at night going about disguised as a seller of spices, summoning (12) the powerful Houses (13) [and] warning them to arm themselves before daybreak.

And so all their hope failed; and they decided, when the militia of the Contado (14) should have come to their aid, to undertake the defence [of the city]. But this plan miscarried; for the worthless militia abandoned them, and concealed their flags, breaking them off from the poles; and their servants (15) betrayed them; while the noblemen from Lucca, who had been robbed by the Bordoni and had had the houses where they were lodging taken from them, departed and would not trust themselves [to remain in the city] (16); and many

of the hired soldiers deserted to the service of their adversaries. The Podestà did not take up arms, but exerted himself to aid M. Charles Valois with words.

1. See II. 4, *n.* 2.

1. On the ground that he had fixed his residence there (see II. 9, *n.* 12).

3. *I.e.* with special reference to the attack by the Medici on Orlandi (II. 15).

4. *Più giuridizione.*

5. See II. 6, *n.* 3.

6. Lit. "into the hands of." This scene took place at S. Maria Novella (see II. 13, *n.* 3).

7. See I. 24, *n.* 6.

8. The ancient church of S. Pancras (*Brancazio* is a corruption of *Pancrazio*) gave its name to one of the gates in the old walls (the *cerchia antica* of *Par.* xv. 97), which at the time of which Dino is writing had long since disappeared. The gate corresponding to it in the "second circle" of walls (which were still existing) was called S. Paul's Gate (*Porta di S. Paolo*), and this is the gate which Dino here refers to; but the old association of a gate with S. Pancras' Church still apparently survived in popular language. The gate was a little to the south of the modern Piazza di S. Maria Novella. The church also gave its name to one of the Sesti or Sestieri into which Florence was divided (I. 4, *n.* 5).

9. They were Magnates of the Black party, and their houses were close to the "gate at S. Pancras."

10. The "towers" are the towers on the walls and gates of the city. The "foot-soldiers" were probably the mercenaries from Romagna mentioned in II. 24, under the command of Baschiera Tosinghi.

11. *I.e.* that they must give up all hope of controlling the Blacks and enforcing the supremacy of the laws.

12. *Invitando*: elsewhere used in the technical sense of summoning troops (I. 25; II. 14).

13. *I.e.* the families of Magnates and *popolani* of the Black party.

14. See II. 15, *n.* 5.

15. *Cf.* II. 13.

16. One is surprised that the Signory should have looked for help in this quarter (see II. 9; I. 21); but it is clear

that the nobles from Lucca must in some way have led the Signory to count on their support. The fact that the Lucchese were attacked by the Bordoni, a family of Black *popolani*, points the same way.

CHAPTER XVIII

Treacherous manœuvres of the Blacks. Corso Donati forces his way into the city. The chiefs of both parties sent as hostages to Charles, who releases the Blacks and keeps the Whites prisoners (November 6, 1301).

THE day following the barons of M. Charles and M. Cante of Gubbio (1), and several others, came to the Priors to occupy their time and energy with long speeches. They swore that their Prince deemed himself to have been betrayed (2), and that he was ordering his knights to arm themselves, and they trusted it might be the Priors' pleasure that ample vengeance should be taken. They said: "Hold it for certain that if our Prince is not minded to avenge the misdeed as you would have it avenged (3), you may cut off our heads." And the Podestà, who came from M. Charles's house, said the same, [adding] that he had heard him swear with his own mouth that he would have M. Corso Donati hanged. The latter, who had been outlawed, had entered Florence in the morning (4) with twelve companions, coming from Ognano (5). He had crossed the Arno, and gone along the walls as far as S. Piero Maggiore, which place had been left unguarded by his adversaries, and entered the city like a bold and fearless knight (6). M. Charles

did not swear the truth, since it was with his knowledge that M. Corso came.

M. Corso having entered Florence, the Whites were warned of his arrival, and they went against him with what force they could. But those who were fully armed and mounted durst not resist him; the others, seeing themselves abandoned, drew back (7), so that M. Corso took the houses of the Corbizzi by S. Piero without opposition, and placed his own banners upon them (8); and he broke open the prisons, so that the prisoners came out of them; and many people followed with a large force. The Cerchi took refuge in their own houses, remaining there with closed doors. Those who were bringing so much evil to pass (9) set to work with guile, and converted [to their side] M. Schiatta Cancellieri, and M. Lapo Salterelli (10), who came to the Priors and said: "Sirs, ye see that M. Charles is very angry, and desires that the vengeance taken be ample, and that the Commonwealth remain supreme. And therefore we think that the most powerful men of both parties should be chosen and sent to him as hostages (11); and then let the very greatest vengeance be executed." These words were far from the truth. M. Lapo wrote the names: M. Schiatta commanded all whose names were written to go to M. Charles for the greater tranquillity of the city. The Blacks went with confidence, the Whites with fear; M. Charles placed them under guard; the Blacks he allowed to depart, but the Whites he kept prisoners that night, without straw and without mattresses, like murderers.

O good King Louis (12), thou who so fearedst God, where is the faith of the Royal House of France, fallen through evil counsel, fearing not shame? O wicked counsellors who have made a Prince of such high dignity (13) not [only] a hireling but an assassin, imprisoning citizens wrongfully, breaking his faith, and dishonouring the name of the Royal House of France!

Master Roger, sworn [clerk] to that house (14), said to M. Charles, when he came to Master Roger's convent: "Under thee a noble city is perishing!" to whom M. Charles answered that he knew nothing about it.

1. See II. 9, *n.* 6.

2. By the Blacks; referring to the outrage committed by the Medici against Orlandi (II. 15), the attack by the Tornaquinci on the masons (II. 17), and the return of the banished citizens (II. 17 and the present chapter).

3. *I.e.* under the Ordinances of Justice, the reference being to the outrage on Orlandi.

4. *I.e.* the morning of the previous day, Sunday, November 5 (see I. 23; I. 24, *n.* 6).

5. A village on the left bank of the Arno, a few miles west of Florence, now known as S. Stefano a Ugnano.

6. Corso Donati, after crossing over to the right bank of the Arno, worked his way northward and eastward along the city walls and forced the gate of Pinti (*cf.* G. Villani, viii. 49), also known by the name of S. Peter's Gate (*Porta di S. Piero*), formerly borne by a corresponding gate in the "first circle" of walls (see II. 17, *n.* 8), which gate gave its name to the Sesto of Porta (Por) S. Piero. The effect of Corso's entrance was that the eastern part of the city fell into the hands of the Blacks, who had also secured the west (*Sesto di S. Pancrazio*) and the south (*Sesto d'Oltrarno*) (see II. 17).

7. Those who were "fully armed and mounted" (*bene a cavallo*) were Magnates and *popolani*; the others were people of lower station.

8. He seized the houses of the Corbizzi because his own (which were in that same Sesto) had been destroyed (I. 23; I. 24, *n.* 6).

9. *I.e.* the Blacks.

10. *Cf.* II. 15; II. 10, n. 9.

11. *I.e.* so as to ensure that no excesses should be committed by either party.

12. St. Louis IX., king of France from 1226 to 1270, and paternal grandfather of Charles of Valois.

13. *Il sangue di sì alta corona.*

14. "Master" was the title given to doctors of divinity. The "sworn clerks" of a prince were a kind of ecclesiastical advisers, or state theologians, employed in matters where the relations between Church and State were involved.

CHAPTER XIX

The Priors, after a last fruitless appeal to the Popolani, resign office, and their successors, all members of the Black party, are appointed (November 7). Six days of anarchy and pillage in the city (November 4-9, 1301).

THE leaders of the White party being thus kept prisoners, the dismayed *popolani* began to lament. The Priors commanded the great bell which was on their palace to be sounded, although it was of no use, since the *popolani*, being dismayed, did not assemble. From the houses of the Cerchi not a man came out armed either on horseback or on foot. M. Goccia and M. Bindo Adimari and their brothers and sons alone came to the palace; and as no one else came, they returned home, and the piazza remained deserted.

In the evening (1) a marvellous sign appeared in the sky, namely, a bright red cross above the Priors' palace. Its beams were more than a span and a half in width, the length of the one line appeared to be 20 cubits, that of the tranverse line a little

less. This appearance lasted during such time as a horse would take to run twice in the tilt (2). Wherefore the people who saw it, and I who clearly saw it, might understand that God was greatly angered against our city (3).

The men who feared their adversaries (4) hid themselves in their friends' houses. One enemy attacked another; houses began to be burnt; robberies were committed; and furniture was removed to the houses of the poorer inhabitants (5). The Black Magnates demanded money from the Whites; maidens were married by force; men were slain. And when a house was burning fiercely, M. Charles would ask, "What fire is that?" and he was told that it was a cottage when it was a rich palace. And this evil-doing lasted six days (6), for so it was planned. The Contado was burning on every side.

The Priors, out of compassion for the city, seeing the wrong-doing increasing, called on many powerful *popolani* for help, praying them for God's sake to have compassion on their city. But they would do nothing; and therefore the Priors resigned their office.

The new Priors entered office on the 8th of November 1301. They were Baldo Ridolfi, Duccio di Gherardino Magalotti, Neri di M. Jacopo Ardinghelli, Ammannato di Rota Becanugi, M. Andrea of Cerreto, Ricco di Ser (7), Compagno degli Albizzi and Tedice Manovelli, Gonfalonier of Justice, all *popolani* of the worst stamp, and powerful in their party. And they made laws that the outgoing Priors might not assemble in any place on pain of death (8). And when the

six lawful (9) days ordained for robbery were fulfilled, they elected as Podestà M. Cante Gabrielli of Gubbio, who redressed many evils and dealt with many charges brought, to many of which he consented (10).

1. The evening of Monday, Nov. 6, when Charles kept the White hostages prisoners.

2. *A correre due aringhi*, i.e. within the lists (*aringhi*) in a tournament.

3. See *Conv.* ii. 14, 176 ff.

4. I.e. the Whites.

5. Viz. from the houses of the wealthy, with a view to its greater security.

6. Nov. 4-9 inclusive. Cf. G. Villani, viii. 49.

7. See I. 14, n. 9.

8. On the 7th Nov. the Council of the Hundred Men (see Appendix II.) had passed an Act (afterwards, probably on the same day, passed by the other councils also) appointing the new Signory (which was to hold office during the remaining period of the term of the outgoing Signory, viz. till Dec. 15), and conferred on them full powers of government. In the Act a special proviso was inserted, enabling all or any of the members of the outgoing Signory and their Notary to meet together wherever they pleased during their successors' term of office. Almost the first thing the new Signory did in virtue of the full powers conferred on them was to repeal this proviso, as Dino here tells us. The premature election of the first Black Signory may perhaps be alluded to in *Purg.* vi. 143-144.

9. *Dì utili*. A technical phrase in law and commerce which Dino here ironically applies to the licensed pillage instituted by the victorious Blacks.

10. *Il quale riparò a molti mali e a molte accuse fatte, e molte ne consentì*. The meaning appears to be that while the new Podestà in his judicial capacity redressed some of the more monstrous wrongs committed during the six days of anarchy, or at least attempted to clothe them with some semblance of legality, he gave favourable audience to accusations made by the Blacks, and laid a heavy hand on the Whites.

CHAPTER XX

Description of the Black leader Corso Donati. Excesses committed by Charles of Valois and the Black Magnates (November 1301).

A KNIGHT, after the likeness of Catilina the Roman, but more pitiless than he, of gentle blood and handsome person, pleasant of speech, adorned by courteous manners, a man of subtle wit, with a mind always intent on evil-doing (who had a great retinue and round whom many adherents gathered), caused many acts of arson and robbery to be committed, and wrought great damage to the Cerchi and their friends. Much wealth did he gain, and to a great height did he rise. This was M. Corso Donati, who, on account of his pride, was called the Baron; and when he passed through the city many would shout, "Long live the Baron!" and it seemed as if the city belonged to him. Led on by vainglory he rendered many services [to his supporters].

M. Charles of Valois, a prince given to lavish and ill-regulated expenditure, must needs [at last] disclose his wicked intention (1), and he began to try to get money from the citizens. He caused to be cited before him the former Priors whom he had distinguished so highly, and invited to eat with him, and to whom he had promised on his faith and by his sealed letters (2), not to overthrow the rights of the city nor to transgress the municipal laws. He wished to get money from them by charging them with having opposed his passage (2), and taken on

themselves the office of peacemaker (3), and injured the Guelf party, and with having begun to build fortifications at Poggibonsi (2) contrary to the honour of the king of France and his own. Thus he persecuted them in order to get money. And Baldo Ridolfi, one of the new Priors, played the mediator, and said, "Ye would surely sooner give him of your money than go prisoners into Apulia" (4). They gave none; for [M. Charles] was so increasingly blamed throughout the city, that he let them alone.

There was in Florence a rich *popolano* of great goodness, called by name Rinuccio di Senno Rinucci, who had paid much honour to M. Charles at a beautiful estate of his, when M. Charles was going out fowling with his barons. This man he caused to be seized, and imposed on him a ransom of 4000 florins, without which he would send him prisoner into Apulia. At the prayers of his friends, however, he released him for 800 florins. And in similar ways he extorted much money.

The Donati, the Rossi, the Tornaquinci, and the Bostichi wrought grievous mischief; many *popolani* (5) did they violently oppress and plunder. And especially the sons of Corteccione Bostichi (6); they had undertaken to guard the goods of one of their friends, a rich *popolano* called Geri Rossoni, from whom they received 100 florins for guarding them; and when the money was paid they robbed him of the goods. On Geri's complaining of this, their father told him that he would, in exchange for his property, give him so much of his own land as would satisfy him; and proposed to give him (Geri) an estate which he had at S. Sepolcro (7)

that was worth more than what they had deprived him of. But when Corteccione wanted the excess value in ready money, Geri answered, "So you want me to give you money in order that your sons may take the land away from me? (8). This I will not do, for it would be poor amends." And thus the affair ended. These Bostichi did very many evil things, and persisted in them for long (9). They punished men with the rope at their own houses, which were situated in the New Market in the midst of the city, and they put them to the torture at midday. And it was commonly said throughout the city, "There are many courts here" (10): and in counting the places where torture was applied, men said, "At the houses of the Bostichi in the Market."

1. Viz. not to act as a peacemaker, but to oppress the White Guelfs and extort money from them.

2. See II. 7, 17.

3. *I.e.* he accused them of having tried to settle the government of the city (see, for instance, II. 12), independently of the authority committed to him by the Pope.

4. *I.e.* the dominions of Charles's kinsman, Charles the Lamé (see I. 7, n. 6).

5. *Molta gente*. *Gente* here, as elsewhere, seems to be used as synonymous with *popolani*.

6. *Corteccione* is a nickname. Its derivation, from *cor-teccia* (bark), suggests a person of rough exterior. The Bostichi occur in Cacciaguida's enumeration of the great families of ancient Florence in *Par.* xvi. 93.

7. A village close to Florence.

8. Even as they had already robbed him of his goods.

9. *I.e.* beyond the six "lawful" days (II. 19, n. 9).

10. There is a play on court=courtyard, and court=tribunal.

CHAPTER XXI

The victorious Blacks oppress and plunder their enemies. Dino's apology for the conduct of himself and his colleagues in the last White Signory.

MANY shameful wrongs were done: maidens were outraged, wards were robbed; helpless men were spoiled of their property and driven out of the city (1).

And [the Blacks] took whatever measures they pleased in whatever manner and to whatever extent they pleased. Many people were accused, and were obliged to confess that they had made a conspiracy which they had not made, and were each condemned to pay 1000 florins. Those who did not defend themselves were accused (2) and condemned for contumacy in person and property. Those who submitted (3) paid [the fine], and then, accused of new offences, were driven from Florence without any mercy.

Many treasures were hidden in secret places; within a few days many changed their tone (4); many insults were uttered, and most unjustly, against the former Priors, even by those who shortly before had cried them up: these men bitterly reviled them to please their adversaries (5): and they endured many annoyances. But those who spoke ill of them lied, since they were all disposed to the common good and the honour of the Republic; but fighting would have been useless, because their adversaries were full of hope:

God was favouring them; the Pope was helping them; they had M. Charles for a champion; they did not dread their enemies. And so, partly through fear and partly through greed, the Cerchi made no preparations; and they were the leaders in the discord (6). They, by refusing to feed the hired troops (7), and by their cowardly conduct, failed to take any measures of defence and protection against their overthrow (8); and, when blamed and reproved for this slackness, they answered that they feared the laws (9). But this was untrue, for when M. Torrigiano de' Cerchi came to the Priors to know how to act, he was urged by them in my presence to provide and prepare himself for defence, and to tell our other friends [to do the same]; and to play the man. They did not do so, for their hearts failed them through cowardice; wherefore their adversaries took courage from this, and grew bold. That is why [the Priors] gave the keys of the city to M. Charles.

1. It is to be understood that the oppression of the Whites by the Blacks extended for several months after the nominal restoration of order at the end of the six days of anarchy.

2. *I.e.* were charged with contumacy because they had ignored the proceedings against them.

3. *I.e.* who made an appearance to answer the charges brought against them. It is implied that their defence was unavailing.

4. *I.e.* turned their coats.

5. *I.e.* to please the victorious Blacks.

6. *I.e.* the leaders of the White party.

7. Del Lungo considers that there is a reference here to the difficulty about paying the mercenaries mentioned below (see II. 24, at the end). If so, we must take it that the Priors applied for the money to the Cerchi in the first instance,

and on their refusal were reduced to borrowing 100 florins from Baldoni Angelotti.

8. *Niuna difesa nè riparo feciono nella loro cacciata.*

9. See II. 14.

CHAPTER XXII

Dino apostrophises individually and collectively the citizens responsible for the "destruction" of Florence.

O WICKED citizens, workers of the destruction of your city, to what a pass have ye brought her! And thou, Ammannato di Rota Beccanugi, traitorous citizen, who didst iniquitously address thyself to the Priors, and with menaces didst procure that the keys should be given up (1), behold to what a pass your evil doings (2) have brought us!

O thou Donato Alberti (3), who madest the citizens' lives a weariness to them, where are [now] thy arrogant dealings—thou who didst hide thyself in a mean kitchen of Nuto Marignolli? And thou Nuto, provost and elder of thy *Sesto* (4), who sufferedst thyself to be deceived through thy zeal for the Guelf party! (5).

O M. Rosso della Tosa, glut thy great soul! (6) Thou who, in order to have the pre-eminence, saidst that thy share was great, and didst shut out thy brothers from their shares! (7).

O M. Geri Spini, glut thy soul! root out the Cerchi, in order that thou mayest live securely in thy perfidy! (8).

O M. Lapo Salterelli, menacing and beating the Magistrates who did not truckle to thee in

thy law-suits (9), where didst thou arm thee? In the house of the Pulci (10), lying hid!

O M. Berto Frescobaldi, who madest such a show of friendship for the Cerchi, and didst constitute thyself a mediator in the strife, because thou hadst borrowed 12,000 florins from them (11), where didst thou repay them? [or] where didst thou enter an appearance? (12).

O M. Manetto Scali, who desiredst to be thought so great and terrible, believing that thou wouldst lord it for all time (13), where didst thou seize thy weapons? where is thy retinue? where are those mail-clad horses? Thou sufferedst thyself to be overcome by those who, compared with thee, were in nowise feared!

O ye *popolani* who longed for office and were greedy of dignities (14), and took possession of the Magistrates' palaces (15). Wherein lay the defence ye made [against the enemy]? In lies, in feigning and dissembling, in blaming friends and praising foes, [and that] only that ye might [yourselves] escape! Weep therefore over yourselves and your city!

1. Cf. II. 17.

2. Note the change from second person singular to second person plural. Dino seems to regard Ammannato as in some sort personifying his colleagues. Ammannato was one of the new Priors (II. 19).

3. Called in I. 12 and II. 25 Donato di M. Alberto Ristori, in I. 20 Donato Ristori, and in II. 30, as here, Donato Alberti. The surname Alberti comes from Donato's father; the surname Ristori from some other ancestor.

4. On the establishment of the popular government in 1250 (*popolo vecchio*) a civic militia was set on foot which was divided into twenty companies (cf. below, III. 4, n. 4), each

with its own Gonfalon and Gonfalonier (see G. Villani, vi. 40). The Gonfaloniers of the companies (at the time of which Dino is speaking) on their appointment chose two out of their number to bear rule over the rest with the title of provost (*proposto*). They held office for two months at a time, and were chosen in rotation from the *Sesti* grouped in pairs. The provosts of the Gonfaloniers were also known as elders (*anziani*): they must not be confounded with the "elders" or "ancients," who in 1250 formed the Council of the Captain of the People (Villani, *l.c.*), and whose office had now been superseded.

5. *I.e.* to be deluded into the belief that the Blacks were the true Guelfs and that the Whites (to which party Nuto originally belonged) were tainted with Ghibellinism. *Cf.* I. 13, where we read that Nuto was said to have been mixed up in the intrigue of the Magnates with Jean de Chalon.

6. *Empi il tuo animo grande*. Del Lungo opportunely refers to the *vastus animus* ascribed to Catilina by Sallust.

7. See I. 22, n. 5.

8. To appreciate the bitterness of this sarcasm, see III. 41.

9. See II. 10. In the sentence of banishment against Lapo Salterelli (II. 25) reference is made to several gross acts of bribery committed by him in judicial proceedings, on one occasion even when he was a Prior.

10. The Pulci were Magnates, and most of them belonged to the Blacks.

11. See I. 22.

12. *I.e.* in court, on a summons for payment of the debt.

13. *I.e.* whether the Whites or Blacks gained the victory (see II. 16).

14. *Cf.* Dante's taunt in *Purg.* vi. 133-135.

15. *I.e.* frequented them in order to intimidate the Magistrates and prevent the due administration of justice (*cf.* I. 15, n. 1).

CHAPTER XXIII

The Whites persecuted and driven into exile.

Some of the Whites, belonging to old Ghibelline families, join in the persecution (November 1301 and after).

MANY [now] became powerful through wicked actions whose names were unknown before, and, using their power in order to do pitiless deeds, drove out many citizens, and proclaimed them rebels, and condemned them in person and property (1). They destroyed many mansions, and they punished many of the Whites in accordance with what had been settled in writing between them. None of the Whites escaped being punished. Neither kindred nor friendship availed anything, nor could the punishments appointed for any be diminished or commuted. New marriages were of no avail (2); every friend became a foe; brother forsook brother; son forsook father; all love, all humanity was extinguished. The Blacks sent many of the Whites into exile as far off as sixty miles from the city; they laid upon them many heavy fines and many imposts, and took much money from them. Many patrimonies they ruined. Neither equity nor mercy nor favour was ever found in any one. He became greatest who cried loudest, "Death, death to the traitors!" Many of the White party who were of ancient Ghibelline origin were welcomed as associates by the Blacks solely on account of their evil doing (3). Among them were M. Betto Brunelleschi, M. Giovanni

Rustichelli, M. Baldo d'Aguglione, and M. Fazio of Signa (4), and several more, who gave themselves up to destroy the Whites; and besides the others, M. Andrea and M. Aldobrando of Cerreto, now called Cerretani (5), who were of ancient Ghibelline origin and had joined the Black party.

1. "Proclaimed (lit. made) them rebels," &c., *i.e.* pronounced them contumacious because they did not defend themselves (see II. 21, *n.* 2), and sentenced them to banishment and outlawry.

2. On December 15th, Cardinal Matthew of Acquasparta (see I. 21) returned to Florence, at the bidding of Pope Boniface VIII., to co-operate with Charles of Valois in the "pacification" of the city, where he remained until February 28, 1302. He arranged some marriages between Whites and Blacks (G. Villani, viii. 49; Villari, 517), which are here alluded to. The Cardinal's efforts were chiefly directed to consolidating the power of the Magnates against the *popolani* (see Del Lungo, I. 297, 298). Dino does not anywhere expressly mention this second mission of the Cardinal to Florence.

3. *I.e.* the eagerness with which they joined in persecuting their former comrades.

4. See *Par.* xvi. 56, where Dante couples these names together. On Baldo d'Aguglione see I. 12; I. 19. Aguglione=Aquilone, a fortress in the valley of the Pesa (a tributary of the Arno), from which the family had migrated to Florence. Fazio of Signa (a small town on the Arno, west of Florence) belonged to the family of the Morubaldini.

5. *I.e.* the members of this family, which had now become well known and influential, were spoken of collectively as the Cerretani, lit. natives of Cerreto, a small place in the lower valley of the Arno, whence they had originally come. As to Andrea of Cerreto see II. 10; II. 29.

CHAPTER XXIV

Commendation of the behaviour of Baschiera Tosinghi.

BASCHIERA TOSINGHI was a young son of a Guelf, a knight named M. Bindo del Baschiera, who had suffered many persecutions for the sake of the Guelf party, and had lost an eye at the fortress of Fucecchio (1) from an arrow which struck him, and had been wounded and slain in the battle with the Aretines (2). This Baschiera survived his father, and when, as a young man who deserved it, he ought to have had his share of the honours of the city, he was deprived of it, because the elder branch of his House took the honours and profits for themselves, and did not share them in common (3). When at the coming of M. Charles the city changed its government, Baschiera, his mind aflame for the Guelf party, armed himself vigorously, and fought with fire and sword against his kinsmen and adversaries, with the company of soldiers which he had with him. The soldiers (whom the Commonwealth had hired from Romagna), on seeing that the city was being lost, abandoned him (4), and went to the Palace to receive their pay, which they demanded so as to have an excuse to depart (5). The Priors borrowed 100 florins from Baldone Angelotti, and gave them to the soldiers; but the lender insisted that the soldiers should stay with him to guard his house; and thus Baschiera lost the mercenaries who were with him. Would that the other citizens of his party had had such energy;

for [then] they would not have lost! But they deluded themselves into the belief that they would not be attacked.

1. The allusion is to the unsuccessful siege of Fucecchio (where the flower of the Guelf exiles had gathered) by Guido Novello (vicar of King Manfred in Florence) and the Ghibelline army in 1261 (G. Villani, vi. 82). Fucecchio is in the Arno valley between Empoli and Pisa.

2. See I. 10.

3. See I. 22, *n.* 5; II. 22. The "elder branch" was that of Rosso della Tosa (Tosinghi).

4. See II. 17, *n.* 10.

5. *I.e.* if, as they expected, their pay was refused (see II. 21, *n.* 7).

CHAPTER XXV

Visit of Charles of Valois to Rome, followed by a proscription of Ghibellines and White Guelfs to the number of 600 and more (1302).

AFTER M. Charles had restored the Black party to Florence, he went to Rome; and when he demanded money from the Pope, the latter answered, "that he had put him in the fountain of gold" (1). A few days later it was said that certain of the White party were engaged in a plot with M. Piero Ferrante of Languedoc, a baron of M. Charles, that he should slay M. Charles at their request, and papers containing the terms of the plot were found (2). M. Charles, having returned from Court, one night assembled in Florence a secret council of seventeen citizens, in which they consulted that they might cause certain, whom they named as guilty, to be seized and beheaded. The said council was reduced to a smaller number,

because seven departed from it, and ten remained ; and the seven did this in order that those named might flee and leave the city.

That night they secretly sent away M. Goccia Adimari and his son ; and M. Manetto Scali, who was at Calenzano, went thence to Mangona (3). And a little while after M. Muccio of Biserno, a mercenary with a large troop (4), and M. Simone Cancellieri (5), the foe of the said M. Manetto, arrived at Calenzano, thinking to find him, and in the search they even thrust their swords through the straw of the beds.

The day following M. Charles caused them and several others to be cited, and by virtue of his office of Peacemaker he condemned them as contumacious and as traitors (6), and burnt their houses and confiscated their goods to the public use. These goods M. Manetto caused his partners to buy back for 5000 florins, so that M. Charles might not cause the books of the firm in France to be seized : and [thus] the goods were saved by that firm (7). M. Giano, son of M. Vieri Cerchi, a young knight (8), was in the palace of M. Charles to appear to a citation ; and he had been given into the charge of two French knights who confined him to the house with all respect (9). M. Paniccia degli Erri and M. Berto Frescobaldi, hearing of it, went into the palace, which was theirs (10), and, placing themselves between the knight and his two guards, while speaking with them, made a sign to him to go, and thus he secretly departed. It was said that [M. Charles] would have taken much money from him and then put him to death (11). The like befell many who were cited, but had

departed ; for he condemned them in person and property, and confiscated their goods to the public use. By this means he got 24,000 florins from the Commonwealth, and he gave receipts [to the Commonwealth] for all that he had confiscated in the exercise of his office of Peacemaker (12). In the month of April 1302 (13), having caused many Ghibelline citizens and Guelf citizens of the White party to be cited, he condemned the Uberti, the family of the Scolari, of the Lamberti, of the Abati, Soldanieri, Rinaldeschi, Migliorelli [and] Tebaldini ; and he banished or placed under bounds (14) the whole family of the Cerchi—M. Baldo, M. Biligiardo, Baldo di M. Talano, and Baschiera Tosinghi ; M. Goccia and his son, Corso di M. Forese, and Baldinaccio Adimari ; M. Vanni de' Mozzi ; M. Manetto, and Vieri Scali ; Naldo Gherardini, the Conti (15) of Gangalandi, M. Neri of Gaville (16), M. Lapo Salterelli, M. Donato di M. Alberto Ristori, Orlanduccio Orlandi, Dante Alighieri who was ambassador at Rome (17), the sons of Lapo Arrighi, the Ruffoli, the Angelotti, the Ammuniti, Lapo del Biondo and his sons, Giovangiacotto Malispini, the Tedaldi, Corazza Ubaldini (18), Ser Petracco di Ser Parenzo of Ancisa (19), notary for the Reformation (20) ; Masino Cavalcanti and one of his kinsmen ; M. Betto Gherardini, Donato and Tegghia Finiguerra, Nuccio Galigai, Tignoso de' Macci, and many others, more than 600 men in all, who wandered about the world in need, some in one place and some in another.

1. Meaning that by a proscription of the Whites, Charles could get as much gold as he wanted. Charles left Florence

on February 13, 1302, for Rome, and got back on March 19.

2. A copy of the "papers" of this plot is in existence, but there is reason for suspecting it to have been a forgery of the Blacks, and that the whole plot was a trumped-up business—Charles's way of working the "fountain of gold." See G. Villani (viii. 49) and Lionardo Bruni's "Life of Dante" (Wicksteed's "Early Lives of Dante," King's Classics, pp. 125, 126).

3. *I.e.* Manetto Scali was warned to leave Calenzano, a village near Florence, in the direction of Prato. Mangona or Mangone was a fortress some distance north-east of Florence, in the valley of the Sieve, among the mountains.

4. He was a *condottiere* (to adopt the language of a later time), and had on several occasions been employed in the pay of the Commonwealth of Florence.

5. The Simone of Pantano described in I. 25.

6. As contumacious, for not appearing in answer to the citation, as traitors, because presumed guilty in default of appearance.

7. The transaction was advantageous to all concerned: to Charles, who doubtless preferred the ready money; to the Scali, as it prevented the ruin of their French business, which Charles, the brother of the French king Philip IV., might have effected by the seizure of their books; and to the condemned Whites, because their goods were preserved.

8. He is mentioned, though not by name, in I. 10 as having distinguished himself at Campaldino.

9. *Onestamente lo teneano per la casa, i.e.* he was in honourable captivity, and had the run of the house.

10. *I.e.* it belonged to the Frescobaldi (see II. 9, n. 12): Del Lungo gives good reasons for reading here "Paniccchia degli Erri, and M. Paniccchia and M. Berto Frescobaldi."

11. *Che toliti gli arebbe danari assai e poi la persona (cf. Inferno, v. 101, 102).*

12. The confiscated property had been seized by Charles for the treasury of the Commonwealth, and the value was paid out to him as remuneration for his services. The receipts he gave are still preserved in the Florentine archives.

13. The sentences here enumerated by Dino were pronounced at various dates between January and October 1302. Dante, for instance, was on January 27 condemned as contumacious to pay a heavy fine, and on March 10 was condemned to be burned to death in case he should come into the power of the Commonwealth.

14. The Ghibelline families first enumerated had long

since been driven out of Florence, and are therefore only said to be "condemned," *i.e.* in person and property in case of their coming within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth; the remaining families and individuals (White Guelfs) who had not already been exiled, were sentenced, some to banishment (outlawry), others to the modified form of banishment known as being placed under bounds, or assigned fixed limits of residence (*cf.* I. 3, *n.* 5).

15. A name, not a title.

16. See I. 20, *n.* 3.

17. See II. 4, *n.* 4.

18. See II. 11, *n.* 1.

19. The father of Petrarch (see below, III. 4). L'Ancisa, or, as it is now called, Incisa, is in the valley of the Arno, south-east of Florence, towards Arezzo.

20. We might perhaps describe this appointment as that of Registrar to the Signory. The Reformatiões (*Riformagioni*) were the bills (as we should say) brought by the Signory before the Councils for discussion, and passed by them.

CHAPTER XXVI

List of the principal families and individuals among the Black Guelfs who controlled the city.

THE government of the city was left to M. Corso Donati, M. Rosso della Tosa, M. Pazzino de' Pazzi, M. Geri Spini, M. Betto Brunelleschi, to the Buondelmonti, the Agli, the Tornaquinci, to some of the Gianfigliuzzi, to the Bardi, to some of the Frescobaldi, to the Rossi, to some of the Nerli, to the Pulci, the Bostichi, the Magalotti, the Manieri, the Bisdomini, the Uccellini, the Bordoni, the Strozzi, the Ruccellai, the Acciajuoli, the Altoviti, the Aldobrandini, the Peruzzi, and the Monaldi; to Borgo Rinaldi and his brother, to Palla Anselmi, Manno Attaviani, Nero Cambi, Noffo Guidi, Simone Gherardini, Lapo

Guazza, and many others, citizens and inhabitants of the Contado, of whom none can excuse himself from having been a spoiler of the city. Nor can they say that any necessity constrained them except pride and rivalry for office; seeing that the hatred amongst the citizens was not so great that the city need have been disturbed by war between them, if the minds of the false *popolani* (1) had not been corrupted to do wrong for the sake of gain, nay, rather, of robbery, and of holding the offices of the city.

A youth named Bertuccio de' Pulci, who had returned from France, finding his partners banished from the city, left his kinsmen in power and stayed away with his partners; and this came to pass through his greatness of soul.

1. *I.e.* the *popolani* who had joined the Blacks, and so identified themselves with that portion of the Guelfs which was, at bottom, hostile to the *popolano* government and desirous of increasing the power of the Magnates (*cf.* II. 16).

CHAPTER XXVII

The Blacks persuade Charles of Valois to attack Pistoja, which was still in the hands of the Whites (see I. 25). He does so (Dec. 1301), but without effect. Capture of the Pistojan fortresses of Serravalle (Sept. 1302) and Montale (May 1303).

M. SCHIATTA CANCELLIERI, the Captain (1), from whose family sprang the two accursed parties

among the Guelfs in Florence (2), returned to Pistoja and began to arm and provision the fortresses, and especially Montale towards Florence, and Serravalle towards Lucca (3).

The Black party came at once (4) to M. Charles of Valois to induce him to take Pistoja, and promised to give him a large sum of money if he did ; and with this intention they prevailed upon him to go against it with his troops, who were in very bad order. The city was strong and furnished with good walls and great ditches, and with brave citizens ; and they brought him thither several times [in vain], so that Mainardo of Susinana (5) blamed him and told him that he was acting imprudently in going there. And in consequence of being badly guided, at a rainy season, he and his soldiers were brought into the marshes, where the Pistoians, if they had so wished, might have captured him ; but, fearing his high rank, they let him go.

The Florentines and the Lucchese laid siege to Serravalle (6), knowing that it was not in a state of defence, because M. Schiatta had mentioned in conversation to M. Geri Spini and M. Pazzino de' Pazzi (wiser men than he) that it was not in a state of defence. Wherefore the fortress surrendered on terms, the inhabitants being granted their liberty ; but the terms were not kept, for the Pistoians were made prisoners (7). Montale, in consequence of negotiations which Pazzino dei Pazzi, who was near there, at Palugiano (8), had carried on with those inside, was surrendered for 3000 florins, which they received from the Florentines, and was demolished.

1. See I. 27.

2. It will, of course, be understood that the origin of the names of Whites and Blacks, as applied to the followers of the Cerchi and the Donati, is all that is to be ascribed to the family of the Cancellieri. The reader of B. I. will remember that the division of the Guelf party had already come to pass before the Cerchi drove the Blacks out of Pistoja (I. 25).

3. It does not appear, however, that he did anything effectual to strengthen Serravalle (see below, *n.* 7).

4. *I.e.* as soon as the White government had been overthrown.

5. See I. 7, *n.* 5 ; II. 9.

6. Dino connects with Charles's abortive attacks on Pistoja the captures of Serravalle and Montale, though these were later in date (see head-note to this chapter).

7. The capture of the important fortress of Serravalle was a more serious undertaking than would be supposed from Dino's account of it. The fortress was besieged by allied armies from Florence and Lucca under the command in chief of the Marquis Moro ello Malaspina (see *Inf.* xxiv. 143-150, *n.*). Although at the beginning of the siege the place was not (as Dino says) in a good state of defence, still, before the investment was complete, the Pistoians managed to reinforce the garrison with a large number of the chief Magnates and *popolani* of their city; and the fortress held out for about four months, at the end of which time, after an unsuccessful attempt to raise the siege had been made from Pistoja, the garrison, who had vainly endeavoured to make terms, surrendered unconditionally; and all the Pistoian citizens in Serravalle were sent as prisoners to Lucca. Dino's statement that the garrison made terms is incorrect (see authorities cited by Del Lungo).

8. Palugiano, now known as Parugiano, was a fortress belonging to the Pazzi.

CHAPTER XXVIII

The first wanderings and misfortunes of the White and Ghibelline exiles (April-June 1302).

AFTER M. Charles of Valois had left Florence on his way to Apulia to wage the Sicilian war (1),

the Blacks of Florence (2), preferring the ruin of the city to the loss of their own supremacy, applied themselves by every means to destroy their adversaries.

The Whites betook themselves to Arezzo, where Ugucione of La Faggiuola (3), a man of old Ghibelline family who had risen from low estate, was Podestà. But Ugucione, whom Pope Boniface had bribed by holding out the vain hope that one of his sons would be made a Cardinal, inflicted so many injuries on the White exiles, at the Pope's instigation, that they were obliged to depart; and a good number of them went to Forlì, where Scarpetta degli Ordelaffi, a nobleman of Forlì, was Vicar on behalf of the Church (4).

Many horrible misfortunes befell the White and Ghibelline party. They had a fortress at Pian di Sco in Valdarno (5), which was garrisoned by Carlino de' Pazzi with seventy horsemen and a large body of foot-soldiers. The Blacks of Florence laid siege to it. It was said that Carlino betrayed it to them for money he received (6). Accordingly, the Blacks sent their troops thither, and seized the men, some of whom they put to death and the rest they compelled to pay a ransom. Among others they compelled a son of M. Donato di M. Alberto Ristori, whose name was Alberto, to pay a ransom of 3000 *lire*; and they caused two of the Scolari, two of the Bagolesi (7), one of the Lamberti, one of the Migliorelli, and some others to be hanged.

The Ghibellines and Whites who had taken refuge at Siena did not trust themselves to stay there, on account of an adage which said, "The she-wolf plays the harlot;" that is, Siena, which

is represented by the she-wolf (8), and which sometimes gave passage and sometimes refused it (9). And therefore they determined not to remain there.

1. See II. 2, *n.* 3. Cf. Dante, *De Vulg. El.*, ii. 6: 47-50, *n.*; and *Purg.* xx. 70-78. Charles left Florence at the beginning of April.

2. He adds "of Florence" to distinguish them from the Blacks of Pistoja.

3. A fortress some sixty miles east of Florence, in the district of Montefeltro (modern province of Pesaro and Urbino). Uguccone's father was a person of some consequence, so that Dino's statement, just below, that Uguccone rose from low estate is to be understood not absolutely, but relatively. He was now Podestà of Arezzo for the sixth time. His daughter became the third wife of Corso Donati.

4. The Ordelaffi, a Ghibelline family, were already pre-dominant in Forlì in 1300 (*Inf.* xxvii. 43-45), and before long secured the absolute dominion of the city. Scarpetta, the head of the family, like many other Ghibellines in Romagna, had found it expedient to make some submission to Pope Boniface, who had succeeded in establishing the pre-eminence of the Guelfs in that part of Italy. The great power of this Pontiff is shown by the fact that several cities elected him to the office of Podestà either for life or for a limited period.

5. The name of the fortress was Piantrevigne (G. Villani, viii. 53); it was in the upper valley of the Arno, towards Arezzo.

6. See *Inf.* xxxii. 69.

7. Also known as the Fifanti. All the persons hanged were Ghibellines.

8. The arms of Siena.

9. See II. 36 and III. 34, where the adage is again quoted.

CHAPTER XXIX

The White exiles, with help from Pisa and from the Ubaldini, make war in Mugello, the upper valley of the Sieve (June 1302). The Blacks cross the Apennines and ravage the estates of the Ubaldini. By means of intercepted letters several of the White exiles are made prisoners by the Blacks, and beheaded (Jan. 1303).

WITH the help of the Ubaldini, the Whites and Ghibellines began war in Mugello; but first the Ubaldini insisted on being secured against loss (1). The Pisans also gave them security; but Vannuccio Buonconti, a Pisan, had been bribed to support the Black party, and therefore [the exiles] received no help or favour from him (2).

M. Tolosato degli Uberti, hearing of this discord (3) on his return from Sardinia, made an arrangement with the Pisans (4), and succoured the Ghibelline party; and he went in person to Bologna and Pistoja, and many others of the house of the Uberti [did the like]. The Uberti had been outlaws from their country for more than forty years without ever having found mercy or pity (5), living all the time in exile, in high state; nor was their dignity ever abased, for they were ever the companions of kings and lords, and occupied themselves in great matters.

The Black party crossed the mountains; they burned villages and fortresses; and they came into the [valley of the] Santerno, [and] into the Orto degli Ubaldini (6), and burned it. And not a man rose up with arms in its defence! Whereas, if they

had but cut down some of the trees that were there and put them on the ground across the places where the passage was narrow, not one of their adversaries would have escaped.

The Whites had another misfortune, through the simplicity of an outlawed citizen of Florence named Gherardino Diedati. He was staying in Pisa, and, trusting in his kinsmen, wrote to them that the exiles under bounds (7) were living from month to month in hopes of entering Florence by force; he also wrote thus to a certain friend of his. The letters were discovered; therefore, two young nephews of his, sons of Finiguerra Diedati, and Masino Cavalcanti, a beautiful youth, were seized and beheaded; while Tignoso de' Macci was tortured with the rope and died under the torture. And one of the Gherardini was beheaded. Ah! how was the sorrowing mother of the two sons deceived! (8). For with abundance of tears and dishevelled hair, she threw herself on her knees in the midst of the street before the lawyer M. Andrea of Cerreto (9), and prayed him, with her arms forming a cross, for God's sake to work for the deliverance of her sons. He answered that he was going to the [Podestà's] Palace on that account; but therein he was a liar, for he went to compass their death.

The citizens, who had hope that the city might have rest, lost it on account of the above-mentioned crimes; because until that day no blood had been shed which would have made peace impossible in the city (10).

1. The deed of indemnity to the Ubaldini (executed at S. Godenzo in the valley of the Sieve), by which eighteen of

the exiles, including Dante, bound themselves to make good any damage the Ubaldini might sustain in the war is printed by Del Lungo (ii. 569), and, in facsimile, in the *Codice Diplomatico Dantesco* (disp. 6). The date is now illegible, but there is every reason to believe it was June 8, 1302. The Ubaldini, one of the most powerful Ghibelline houses in Tuscany, ruled all Mugello, and their dominion extended across the Apennines. They were not subdued by the Commonwealth of Florence till near the end of the fourteenth century.

2. V. Buonconti was one of the most powerful of the citizens of Pisa, and, although the Pisan government gave a collateral security to the Ubaldini, Buonconti's influence prevented anything more from being done for the exiles.

3. *I.e.* the war between the Black Guelfs and the White Guelfs and Ghibellines.

4. Tolosato degli Uberti, an outlawed Ghibelline of Florence, had been employed by the Pisan government as governor of Arborea, one of the provinces (*giudicati*) into which Sardinia was divided. On his return he obtained leave to help the Ghibellines in the war.

5. The forty years are computed from 1258, the date of the first banishment of the Ghibellines from Florence (*cf. Inf. x. 82 ff.*).

6. Also known as *Podere degli Ubaldini* (estate of the Ubaldini). It comprised a number of castles and villages in the valley of the Senio, which is between the valleys of the Santerno and the Lamone, on the Adriatic side of the Apennines.

7. Mark the contrast between the condition of the exiles placed under bounds (*confinati, cf. II. 25, n. 14*), and still while at their fixed residence under the power of the Florentine government, and the condition of Gherardino Diedati, who was outlawed (*cittadino rubello*).

8. *I.e.* the two Diedati. Their names were Donato and Tegghia (II. 25; *cf. G. Villani, viii. 59*). The Gherardini beheaded was M. Betto, mentioned in II. 25.

9. See II. 23, n. 5.

10. *I.e.* it was the first time that any of the Whites, who, after all, were Guelfs, had been executed. After that extreme measure all possibility of reconciliation was at an end.

CHAPTER XXX

The second war of Mugello. The Whites and Ghibellines under the command of Scarpetta degli Ordelaffi, having secured the fortress of Monte Accenico as a base of operations, prepare to attack Florence, but are routed by the Blacks at Puliciano. Cruelty of the Podestà of Florence, Folcieri of Calvoli (March 1303).

THE Whites and Ghibellines met with their third misfortune (which united them so that the two names became one) through this cause: Folcieri of Calvoli being Podestà of Florence (1), the Whites elected Scarpetta degli Ordelaffi, a young man of well-balanced character, an enemy of Folcieri, as their Captain. Under him they assembled their forces, and came to Puliciano, close to Borgo S. Lorenzo (2), hoping to avail themselves of Monte Accenico which had been built by the Cardinal of the Ubaldini, M. Attaviano (3), with a triple circuit of walls. Here they and their friends increased their strength, thinking to take Puliciano and to come thence to the city. Folcieri went thither with a few horsemen. The Blacks followed with great caution, but, seeing that their enemies did not attack the Podestà (though he had few men with him), but cut down the bridges and fortified themselves, they took heart as their numbers increased. The Whites thought themselves as good as captured, and therefore retired in disorder; and those who were not quick to escape

remained [prisoners], for the vassals of the neighbouring Counts immediately ran to bar their passage, and captured and slew many of them.

Scarpetta, with several other of the leaders, fled into Monte Accenico. The army of the Whites and Ghibellines numbered 700 horsemen and 4000 foot-soldiers; and although the retreat was not an honourable one, it was more prudent than the advance. M. Donato Alberti was so slow that he was seized, as well as a valiant youth named Nerlo, son of M. Goccia Adimari (4), and two young men of the Scolari family. And Nanni Ruffoli was slain by Chirico di M. Pepo della Tosa. M. Donato, clad in a peasant's frock, was ignominiously brought on an ass to the Podestà, who, when he saw him, asked him: "Are you M. Donato Alberti?" He replied: "I am Donato (5). Would that there were here present thus Andrea of Cerreto, and Niccola Acciaioli, and Baldo d'Aguglione, and Jacopo of Certaldo, who have destroyed Florence" (6). Then he put him to torture with the rope, and fastened the cord to the bar (7), and left him thus hanging there. Then he caused the windows and doors of the palace to be opened, and had many citizens summoned under other pretexts, in order that they might see the insult and derision he was putting upon Donato. And the Podestà was so urgent that he obtained leave to cut off M. Donato's head; and this he did because war was profitable to him, and peace unprofitable (8). And so he treated all [the prisoners]. And this was not a just decision, but was contrary to the common laws (9), because when citizens who have been driven out attempt to return to their

homes they ought not to be condemned to death. It was contrary also to the usage of war, for they (*sic*) ought to have kept them prisoners.

And the fact that the White Guelf prisoners were put to death equally with the Ghibellines caused the Whites and Ghibellines to have perfect trust in one another; for until that day they had always doubted that the others were whole-hearted with them (10).

1. Folcieri (or Fulcieri) belonged to the family of the Paolucci Counts of Calvoli (or Calboli), a fortress in the valley of the Montone on the Adriatic side of the Apennines, in Romagna. He was Podestà of Florence during the whole of 1303, having been re-appointed for a second term (July to December). See *Purg.* xiv. 55-66.

2. Borgo S. Lorenzo is the principal place in Mugello. It is on the line of railway from Florence to Faenza.

3. The phrase "hoping to avail themselves" shows that the Ubaldini (to whom Monte Accenico belonged) were now less willing to assist the exiles than in 1302, since the use of this fortress was specially referred to in the deed of indemnity (II. 29, *n.* 1). However, as we see by the present chapter, the exiles did obtain the use of it, and it continued to form their base of operations till 1306.

Attaviano (=Ottaviano) degli Ubaldini (created Cardinal Deacon by Innocent IV. in 1244, died 1272) was the famous Ghibelline champion placed by Dante among the Epicureans in *Inf.* x. 120.

4. Mentioned in II. 25, but not by name.

5. *Cf.* II. 22, *n.* 3. No doubt the extraordinary barbarity with which Donato Alberti was now treated was due to the fact that he had been one of the draftsmen of the Ordinances of Justice (I. 12).

6. See II. 23; I. 19; I. 8.

7. Lit. the reel, *i.e.* a bar of that form to which the cord by which the prisoner was suspended was attached (*cf.* I. 19, *n.* 3). After the torture M. Donato was left hanging by the cord, instead of being taken down.

8. *I.e.* he wanted the Florentines to be at strife, that he might fish in troubled waters.

9. *I.e.* generally recognised principles of law.

10. Del Lungo takes it that it was the Ghibellines who had doubted the sincerity of the Whites; but the sentence is worded ambiguously so that it may be taken either way, and probably the mistrust had been mutual.

CHAPTER XXXI

Reflections on the division of the Guelf party.

O M. DONATO, how did fortune turn contrary to thee! For first they seized thy son, and thou didst ransom him for 3000 *lire* (1); and thee they have beheaded! Who has done this to thee? The Guelfs whom thou lovedst so much, and [in support of] whom thou didst utter in every speech of thine a tirade (2) against the Ghibellines. How could the name of Guelf be taken from thee by the false chatter of the vulgar? How came it that thou wast put to death among the Ghibellines by Guelfs? Who deprived of the name of Guelfs, Baldinaccio Adimari and Baschiera Tosinghi, whose fathers did so much for the Guelf party? Who had authority within a short time to take away and to give in such wise that Ghibellines were called Guelfs (3), and the Guelfs of most authority were called Ghibellines? Who had such a privilege? It was Rosso della Tosa (4) and his followers; Rosso who for the needs of the Party did little or rather nothing in comparison with the fathers of those whose name [of Guelfs] was taken from them. Herein therefore a wise man, a most ardent Guelf, Corazza Ubaldini of Signa (5), seeing that men were being made Ghibellines by force (6), spoke well when he

said: "The men who are and wish to be Ghibellines are so many, that to make more of them by force is not good."

1. See II. 28.
2. Lit. a column of writing (*colonello*=*colonnino*).
3. See II. 23, n. 3.
4. Cf. II. 26 (at the beginning).
5. Cf. II. 11, n. 1.
6. *I.e.* the White Guelfs, whom the persecution of the Blacks forced to make common cause with the Ghibellines (cf. II. 30).

CHAPTER XXXII

The Blacks in league with the Marquis of Ferrara attempt to seize Bologna, but are foiled by the Whites who had taken refuge there (April 1303). The Bolognese form a league against the Marquis, which is joined by the Whites of Florence (June 1303).

THE audacity of the Blacks grew to such a height that they agreed with the Marquis of Ferrara (1) to seize Bologna, marching thither with 600 horsemen and 6000 foot, while one of the two factions within [that city], both of which were Guelf, was to attack the other on Easter Day (2). Those of the Whites who had sought refuge in Bologna bravely armed themselves and set their troops in array. The Blacks were afraid, and did not attack [them]. The Marquis abandoned his preparations, and the Blacks withdrew. For this cause the condition of the Whites improved in Bologna, and thenceforth they were welcomed there, while the Blacks were

counted as enemies. The Bolognese made a league with the people of Romagna, saying that the Marquis had tried to betray them, and that if he had succeeded he would have thrown Romagna into confusion. This league comprised Forlì, Faenza, Bernardino of Polenta (3), the White party of Florence, the Pistoians, Count Federigo of Montefeltro (4) and the Pisans. In the month of June 1303, the said confederates raised a joint force (5) of 500 horsemen, and appointed M. Salinguerra of Ferrara Captain (6).

1. This was Azzo VIII. of Este. See *De Vulg. El.*, i. 12: 38, *n.*

2. April 7. The condition of Bologna at this time resembled that of Florence. The Ghibelline party (that of the Lambertazzi) had been driven out, and the Guelf party (that of the Geremei) had split into two factions, one supporting the Marquis of Ferrara, who wanted to gain possession of Bologna, the other opposing him. The Marquis's faction was to attack the other; but the plot was discovered on April 4, and many of the citizens of that faction were banished, and their houses and towers demolished.

3. Son of Guido (*Vecchio*, or *Minore*) of Polenta, Lord of Ravenna, who died in 1310. Bernardino was brother to Francesca of Rimini (*Inf.* v.), and uncle of Guido Novello of Polenta, who was Lord of Ravenna during the closing years of Dante's life.

4. See next chapter.

5. *Taglia*. Each of the confederates was bound to furnish a certain number of men.

6. Salinguerra Torelli belonged to a noble Ghibelline family of Ferrara which had been banished in 1240, after a long struggle with the house of Este.

CHAPTER XXXIII

Indecisive fighting between the Whites and Blacks in the valley of the Chiana and the upper valley of the Arno (Summer of 1303).

THE Whites marched from Monte Accenico until they were close upon La Lastra (1), burning what they found. The Aretines reconquered Castiglione [Aretino] and Monte a San Savino, and laid waste Laterina, which was held by the Blacks (2), who could not succour it because they were with the Lucchese round Pistoja (3); but when [the Blacks] heard of this they left the Lucchese to guard Florence, and set out with the Marquis's cavalry to Montevarchi (4) in order to succour Laterina.

The Aretines united with the Whites and their friends from Romagna and some Pisan mercenaries, and marched to Castiglione degli Ubertini (5); and it was believed that a battle was imminent. But the Blacks retired, and attacked Castiglione Aretino; and they lost some of their infantry; but afterwards they put Montalcino (6) and Laterina into a state of defence.

The Whites numbered 1200 horsemen and very many foot-soldiers (7), and they displayed great energy in seeking battle. But they were deceived by certain traitors, who took money from their enemies and prevented the battle from being fought, alleging that the Pisans were not disposed to risk the success of the war, in which victory could certainly be won.

Uguccione of Faggiuola was [Podestà] in Arezzo, as has been mentioned (8), but on account of some suspicious behaviour he was removed from his office, which was given to Count Federigo, son of the good Count Guido of Montefeltro, whose fair fame has spread throughout the world (9). Count Federigo came to Arezzo, accompanied by Ciappettino Ubertini, and took up the government.

1. La Lastra is only about two miles from Florence on the Bologna road.

2. Castiglione Aretino and San Savino are in the valley of the Chiana, south of Arezzo; Laterina, in the upper valley of the Arno (on the right bank), north-west of Arezzo. These places had fallen into the hands of the Florentines after the battle of Campaldino (*cf.* I. 10).

3. See II. 27, near the end, with which the present passage connects itself.

4. The Marquis is Moro ello Malaspina (see II. 27, *n.* 7). Montevarchi is on the left bank of the Arno, west of Laterina.

5. On the right bank of the Arno between Montevarchi and Laterina.

6. Montalcino belonged to the Sienese, who were in alliance with the Blacks.

7. *I.e.* the army which marched to Castiglione degli Ubertini, as stated in the paragraph before. Dino now continues his explanation of why the anticipated battle did not take place, after having stated what the Blacks did when they had retreated from Montevarchi.

8. II. 28.

9. *Cf.* *Conv.* iv. 28: 60-65 and *Inf.* xxvii. 78.

CHAPTER XXXIV

Corso Donati and the Magnates intrigue with the populace against the government of the Popolani, and procure the appointment of a commission to inquire into the administration. Recall of exiles placed under bounds (Summer of 1303).

THE Blacks returned to Florence, and discord between them arose shortly after, because M. Rosso della Tosa, M. Pazzino de' Pazzi, and M. Geri Spini, with their following among the wealthy traders (1), held the government and the honours of the city. M. Corso Donati, who thought himself worthier than they—he was a knight of the utmost ability in all things he desired to carry out—deeming that he was not receiving his share [in the administration] sought to humble them and to abolish the Priors' office [as then existing] (2), and to exalt himself and his followers. And he began to sow discord, and, under colour of justice and compassion, began to speak after this fashion: "Poor men (3) are being afflicted and spoiled of their substance through the taxes and the rates, and some persons are filling their purses thereby. Let inquiry be made where such a large sum of money has gone, since so much cannot have been spent in the war." And this he demanded with great urgency before the Priors and in the Councils. The common people (3) listened willingly to him, believing that his language was sincere; and in any case they were desirous that this matter should be inquired into. The other party knew not what to answer,

since wrath and pride prevented them. And [those who demanded the inquiry] wrought so effectually, with the aid of the officials who were with them, that an inquiry was ordered concerning the acts of oppression, violence, and robbery [which had been committed], and foreign doctors of law were appointed as auditors (4). After this the outcry diminished (5), and the *popolani* who were in power, in order to obtain favour, recalled from banishment, on the 1st of August 1303, the exiles under bounds who had not broken their bounds.

1. *Col seguito del popolo grasso.*

2. *I.e.* under the legislation of 1282 (I. 4) and the Ordinances of Justice (I. 11; I. 18), by which the Magnates had been excluded from the government of the city.

3. *I.e.* the smaller traders and the populace.

4. By enactments, dated July 24 and 27, 1303, it was provided that a commission of six citizens (three Magnates and three *popolani*) should be appointed with the most ample powers to investigate, as from November 1, 1301, the entire administration of the Government, and all cases of robbery, extortion, and peculation; and they were to be assisted by a foreign doctor of law, to act as auditor of the accounts and take part in the investigation. This person was one M. Ghisenzio, of Gubbio. Dino's statement that more than one auditor was appointed seems therefore to be erroneous.

5. *Poi s'ammollarono le parole.* Though the proceedings of the commission of inquiry were very protracted, the Act by which it had been set up remained pretty nearly a dead letter so far as concerned its ostensible object, expressed in very pious language in the preamble, namely, the redressing of the wrongs suffered by widows, orphans, wards, and other weak and impotent folk. But, considering that the chief motive of Corso Donati and the Magnates in setting the inquiry on foot was to bring odium on the government of the *popolani*, this result is not surprising. Corso's own interests, however, were not overlooked, for compensation was awarded him for the damage he had suffered by the sentence of outlawry passed on him in 1301 (see I. 24, n. 6).

CHAPTER XXXV

The end of Boniface VIII. (September 7 to October 11, 1303).

ON Saturday, the 7th of September 1303, Sciarra della Colonna (1) entered Alagna, a town in the Roman territory (2), with many troops, and with them of Ceccano (3), and with a knight who was there on behalf of the king of France, bearing the king's banner and that of the Patrimony, that is, of the Keys (4); and they broke open the sacristy and the treasury of the Pope and took much treasure from him. The Pope, abandoned by his attendants, remained a prisoner. It was said that the Cardinal M. Francesco Orsini was there in person with many Roman citizens (5), and it was held that the attack had been concerted with the king of France because the Pope was striving to humble him (6); and the war of the Flemings against him, wherein many Frenchmen perished (7), was said to have been of the Pope's contriving. The king of France for this cause assembled in Paris many doctors and bachelors of divinity belonging to the Friars Minor, the Preachers, and other Orders, and here he caused the Pope to be pronounced a heretic; and then he caused the Pope to be admonished (8), accusing him of many horrible sins. The Pope was a prisoner in Alagna, and without making any defence or excuse was brought to Rome, where he was wounded in the head; and after some days he died mad (9). Many were content and glad at his death, for his rule was harsh and he stirred up wars, undoing many

people, and gathering very much treasure. The Whites and Ghibellines especially rejoiced at his death, because he was their hearty foe; but the Blacks were greatly disquieted by it.

1. Jacopo, called Sciarra, Colonna was nephew of Cardinal Jacopo Colonna and brother of Cardinal Pietro Colonna, who had been deprived of their dignity and persecuted by Boniface VIII. (*cf.* I. 21, *n.* 1).

2. Alagna, or Anagni, is about thirty-five miles south-east of Rome. It was the birthplace of Boniface VIII (*cf.* *Par.* xxx. 148).

3. By "them of Ceccano" (a village about fifteen miles south-east of Anagni) are meant the sons of John of Ceccano, whose father had long been kept prisoner by Boniface.

4. The "knight" was William of Nogaret, a trusted official of Philip IV. of France. The reason why he displayed the "banner of the Keys" was to show that he was acting "for the defence of the Church" against the heretical Pope (see Renan, *Études sur la politique religieuse du règne de Philippe le bel*, pp. 31, 36. In this work a detailed account of the career of William of Nogaret and of the attack on Boniface will be found). Musciatto Franzesi (see II. 4, *n.* 2) was associated with William of Nogaret in the expedition.

5. Cardinal Napoleone Orsini was in Anagni at the time, and supported William of Nogaret. The Orsini, as well as the Colonna, were now in disgrace with the Pope.

6. At the time when Sciarra Colonna and William of Nogaret seized Boniface he was on the point of issuing a bull excommunicating Philip IV. and absolving his subjects from their allegiance.

7. The allusion is to the defeat of the French by the Flemings at the great battle of Courtrai in 1302, described by G. Villani (viii. 56).

8. The assembly was held at the Louvre on March 12, 1303, and the "admonition" probably refers to the summons which William of Nogaret addressed to Boniface requiring him to call together a general council which should pronounce on the accusations brought against him by the French king. A second assembly was held at the Louvre on June 13, after Nogaret's departure for Italy, at which the matter was further discussed.

9. Two days after Boniface had been made prisoner the people of Anagni, who had joined in the attack on Boniface, in spite of many benefits he had conferred on them, suddenly, on the summons of Cardinal Fieschi, turned round and put the forces of Sciarra Colonna and Nogaret to flight and released the Pope. Meantime a force of knights who had set out from Rome to deliver him arrived at Anagni and escorted him back. He lived till October 11; his death being doubtless caused or accelerated by the outrage to which he had been subjected (*cf.* Villani, viii. 63; *Purg.* xx. 86-90).

CHAPTER XXXVI

Military operations in the upper valley of the Arno (Autumn of 1303).

IN the said month of September the Whites and Ghibellines of Florence united under M. Tolosato degli Uberti (1), a noble knight of Florence and a very skilful warrior. They marched to Arezzo with Pisan mercenaries. The Sienese granted them passage, because the citizens of Siena were good neighbours to both parties; and whenever they perceived the Whites to be strong, they banished them; but the sentence of banishment was defective, so that it did no harm (2). They gave help to the Blacks in their military expeditions and behaved [towards them] like brothers. And accordingly there was (among other sayings concerning the wars in Tuscany) an adage about them which said, "The she-wolf plays the harlot," for by the she-wolf is meant Siena (3).

The Whites and Ghibellines of Florence, the Romagnoles, the Pisans, and all their other friends assembled at Arezzo, so that by the 1st of November they were prepared for the campaign.

The Blacks marched to Fighine, and the Whites came down to Ganghereto. The Aretines came to Laterina, and fortified the approaches so that it might not be revictualled (4). [But] the fortress was lost [to the Whites] because of hunger and discord among the Aretines; for their leaders secretly took bribes and allowed it to be provisioned.

1. See II. 29, *n.* 4.

2. *I.e.* it was not intended to be enforced.

3. See II. 28, *n.* 8, 9.

4. The Blacks were apparently on their way to relieve Laterina, which was in danger of falling into the Aretines' hands (see II. 33). Fighine, now called Figline, is on the left bank of the Arno, about half-way between Florence and Laterina. Ganghereto was on the right bank, about half-way between Fighine and Laterina. The expression "came down" refers to the descent from Arezzo into the Arno valley.

BOOK III

CHAPTER I

Election of Pope Benedict XI. (Nicholas Boccasini),
October 21, 1303. His character and first acts
as Pope. He appoints the Cardinal of Prato
peacemaker in Tuscany (January 31, 1304).

OUR Lord God, who takes thought for all things, by willing to restore a good Pastor to the world, took thought for the necessity of Christians. Wherefore there was called to the Chair of S. Peter Pope Benedict, a native of Treviso, a friar preacher and Prior-General (1), a man with few relations and of humble birth, steadfast and virtuous, discreet and holy. The world was cheered with new light. He began by doing deeds of mercy; he pardoned the Colonna family (2) and reinstated them in their possessions. During the first fast [after his election] (3) he created two cardinals: one was an Englishman (4), the other was the Bishop of Spoleto, a native of the fortress of Prato (5), a friar preacher named M. Nicholas, of humble parentage, but of great learning; gracious and wise, but of a Ghibelline stock. On this account the Ghibellines and the Whites greatly rejoiced;

and they exerted themselves to such effect that Pope Benedict sent him into Tuscany as peacemaker.

1. Or, Master-general of the Order. He relinquished this office on his elevation to the Cardinalate in 1298. The next two traits noted by Dino in his description of Benedict are intended to mark the contrast between him and his predecessor. Two cardinals of Boniface's family were still living.

2. Sciarra Colonna (see II. 35) was excluded from the pardon.

3. *I.e.* the Advent Ember season.

4. The Englishman, William Marlesfield, had died four months previously, but the news of his death had not reached Rome.

5. Prato is eleven miles north-west of Florence. On his elevation to the Cardinalate, Nicholas of Prato was made Bishop of Ostia and Velletri; but was known as the Cardinal of Prato.

CHAPTER II

Position of affairs in Florence at the beginning of 1304. The Magnates split into two factions, one headed by M. Rosso della Tosa, who, to gain his own ends, allies himself with the wealthy traders (Popolo Grasso) in whose hands, in spite of the overthrow of the Whites, the control of the machinery of government remained: the other, headed by M. Corso Donati, who, to gain his own ends, allies himself with the smaller traders and populace (Popolo Minuto). This chapter is closely connected with II. 34, where the beginnings of the quarrel between Rosso and Corso are described.

BEFORE the coming of the Cardinal (I) a conspiracy was revealed, which had been planned by M. Rosso della Tosa, whose object in all that he did and

tried to do in the city was to bear rule in the manner of the Lords of Lombardy (2). And many gains did he forego, and many times did he make peace (3), in order to have men's minds ready to fulfil his desire. M. Corso Donati [on the contrary] did not refuse money; everybody, either from fear or under threats, gave him of their own. He did not ask for it, but he let it be seen that he wanted it.

The two enemies were looking about them (4). M. Rosso feared the execration of the Tuscans if he plotted against M. Corso (5); he feared the enemies without (6) and sought to cast them down before showing his hostility against M. Corso; and he feared, from the prestige that [M. Corso] had in the [Guelf] party, that there might be trouble with the populace. He held to the wealthy traders, for they were his tongs and seized the hot iron [for him]. M. Corso, by reason of that haughty spirit of his, did not heed and would not condescend to small matters; and on account of his disdain he did not possess the love of those citizens. So that, forsaking the wealthy traders, he conspired with the Magnates, pointing out how in many ways they were the prisoners and slaves of a set of bloated *popolani*, or rather, dogs, who lorded it over them and took the offices for themselves; and by speaking thus he drew together all the great citizens who felt themselves aggrieved, and they all made a conspiracy. M. Lottieri della Tosa, Bishop of Florence, and M. Baldo, his nephew, joined the conspiracy, because his kinsman, M. Rossellino, was holding for himself one of the Bishop's fortresses with the vassals, while he had not dared to complain of it so long as

Pope Boniface was alive (7). And the Rossi, the Bardi, the Lucardesi, the Cavalcanti, the Bostichi, the Giandonati, almost all the Tornaquinci, the Manieri, and some of the Adimari joined it: there were also many [of the smaller] *popolani* (8) with them. And in all, including Magnates and *popolani*, there were thirty-two conspirators. And they said, in reference to the corn come from Apulia, whereof a fixed quantity a head was given to the people, "The [smaller] *popolani* are burdened; their property is taken from them through the heavy taxes; and then they are compelled to eat mats," which (it was said) were cut up into the corn so as to eke out the measure.

The wealthy traders began to be afraid: M. Corso's friends grew bolder, but not so much so [as might have been expected] because [his enemies] contradicted him in the councils and assemblies. The Bordoni, who were bold and arrogant *popolani*, harassed him greatly and several times they gave him the lie, heedless of the preponderance of their adversaries and of what the consequences of their action might be. They drew much gain from the Commonwealth, and praise turned their heads (9). However, the followers of M. Rosso did not allow them [seriously] to molest [the Donati] (10).

Within a month they (11) put the corn on sale to the public at 12 soldi [a bushel]; they made a rate (12) [to raise the money], and they levied 1200 horsemen from the citizens at a salary of fifty florins each (13); and showed no mercy (14). And then they sent soldiers, and built a fort close to Monte Accenico (15) and stationed men there to guard it.

1. The Cardinal of Prato arrived on March 10 (III. 4).

2. He wanted to rule in Florence as (for instance) the Scala family did in Verona, the Malatesta in Rimini, the Visconti in Milan. "Lombardy" is here used in a wide sense.

3. "In these troubled times," says Del Lungo, "sentences ordering compensation for damage done, for fines inflicted, and the like, were frequent. Rosso della Tosa, for his own private ends, refused to take advantage of such benefits, and even reconciled himself to the persons against whom sentence had passed in his favour." Corso Donati, as Dino tells us in the next sentence, took the directly opposite course.

4. *Si guardavano a' fianchi*, i.e. were looking all round them to see what supporters they could muster, and against what enemies they must guard themselves. The similar expression "*ponetevi mente . . . a' fianchi*" occurs in *Conv.* iv. 6: 180.

5. M. Corso being regarded as the first man in the Guelf party. By the "Tuscans" are meant the other Guelf cities in Tuscany.

6. *I.e.* the White exiles and their allies.

7. Because Pope Boniface supported the Blacks, among whom was Rossellino della Tosa (I. 21), whereas Baldo della Tosa (see I. 22) and his uncle, the Bishop, were Whites. With regard to Baldo's presence in Florence at this time, we must understand that he had been among those recalled from banishment the year before (see II. 34, at the end). And the same observation holds good of most of the other Whites who in this Book are referred to as being in Florence. The number of those who escaped exile was very small.

8. Contrary to his usual practice Dino here and just afterwards uses the word *popolani* to denote the *popolo minuto*, not the *popolo grasso*.

9. The term "praise" here denotes the influential position the Bordoni had acquired with the government. They seem to have been a turbulent family (see II. 17).

10. It will be remembered that Rosso della Tosa was a Magnate, and only in appearance a supporter of the *popolani*, and a certain *esprit de corps* would prevent him, at least for the present, from allowing the *popolano* family of the Bordoni to go too far against Corso Donati.

11. *I.e.* the followers of M. Rosso, the *popolani* who were in control of the government.

12. The rate (*cf.* II. 34) was made on the basis of a valua-

tion of real property, for the purpose of raising the money needed for the purchase of corn to prevent a famine. Villani states (viii. 68) that the market price of corn had risen to over 26 soldi (half a florin, or about five shillings of our money) a bushel at this time. The government therefore were selling it at less than half-price.

13. See I. 10, n. 10.

14. This statement applies to the three measures referred to in the earlier part of the sentence. The government "showed no mercy" (1) in selling the corn instead of giving it away; (2) in raising the money to purchase the corn by a specially unpopular method; (3) in choosing a time when the citizens were suffering from want of food to raise a paid military force.

15. See II. 30, n. 3.

CHAPTER III

Fight in the city between the factions of Rosso della Tosa and Corso Donati (Feb. 4, 1304). The Lucchese called in to restore peace. The Ordinances of Justice put in force against the Tornaquinci (April 1304).

SINCE the conspirators who were with M. Corso continued to use defiant language, the other party sent for the Lucchese, who thought by means of conciliatory words to take from him the strongholds that he held (1); and [the government], having set him a time within which to surrender them, passed sentence upon him in case of his refusing to hand them over to the Lucchese [when they should have arrived] (2).

M. Corso, not choosing to allow himself to be overpowered, summoned his friends, and gathered together many exiles (3), and Neri of Lucardo (4), a brave warrior, came to his aid. He [himself] came

armed into the Piazza on horseback, and fought fiercely against the Palace of the Signory with crossbows and with fire.

The other party, at whose head was M. Rosso della Tosa, together with the greater part of his kinsmen, and the Pazzi, Frescobaldi, Gherardini, Spini, and the people and many *popolani* (5), came to the defence of the palace and brought about a great fight, wherein M. Lotteringo Gherardini was slain by an arrow (6), which was a great misfortune, for he was an able man.

M. Rosso della Tosa and his followers elected the new Signory, and installed them in the palace by night, without sound of trumpet or other honours. Barricades were set up throughout the city, and for about a month [the citizens] remained under arms.

The Lucchese, who had come into Florence to make peace, received great authority from the Commonwealth (7). The Magnates to a great extent disclosed themselves, and expressed their desire that the laws against Magnates should be abolished. The number of the Priors was doubled (8); yet, none the less, the Magnates' party remained full of pride and presumption.

It happened in those days that Testa Tornaquinci and a son of Bingeri, his kinsman, wounded a *popolano*, their neighbour, in the Old Market, and left him for dead, and none durst succour him for fear of them. But the *popolani*, who had become reassured, were filled with wrath, and went armed to the abode of the Tornaquinci with the Gonfalon of Justice, set fire to their palace, and burned and destroyed it on account of their presumption.

1. See I. 27, *n.* 5.

2. In Dec. 1303 the government had been authorised to summon the Lucchese to keep order in the city; but they were not sent for until the civil war described in this chapter had broken out. In the meantime they had been trying to induce Corso to hand over the strongholds to them.

3. *Sbanditi*, *i.e.* exiles under sentence of outlawry (see II. 23, *n.* 1), not *confinati*.

4. In the valley of the Elsa, a river which flows north-west and falls into the Arno near Empoli.

5. As the "people" in Dino means the *popolani*, the term *popolani* may possibly here be used in the sense of *popolo minuto* as in the previous chapter. The *popolo minuto* did indeed side with Corso Donati, but the populace is proverbially fickle, and some of them may very likely have been found in the opposite camp at this juncture.

6. He did not die till the 10th, six days later. His tomb is still to be seen in the cloister of S. Stefano, with an inscription stating that he died "in defence of the Florentine people."

7. The ample powers conferred on the Lucchese government in the previous December were confirmed on Feb. 16.

8. That is to say, the Signory which came into office on Feb. 16 consisted of fourteen members, including the Gonfalonier. The next Signory, who came into office on April 16, was of the same number also.

CHAPTER IV

The Cardinal of Prato on his arrival in Florence receives authority to effect a general pacification. He succeeds in healing some disputes among the Black Magnates, and takes measures for reconciling the Blacks with the White exiles, but his efforts are thwarted by the Blacks (March to May 1304).

THE Cardinal Nicholas of Prato, whom the Whites and Ghibellines of Florence had secretly asked Pope Benedict to send as Legate in Tuscany, arrived

in Florence on the 10th of March 1303 (1), and very great honour was paid him by the people of Florence; they carried olive branches, and there was great rejoicing. Having stayed some days in Florence, and finding the citizens very much divided, he asked the people for authority to enable him to compel the citizens (2) to make peace, which was granted him until the 1st of May 1304, and was afterwards prolonged for a year. And he effected several reconciliations among the citizens within [the city]; but afterwards the people became cold, and many cavilling objections were put forward. The Bishop of Florence favoured the peace, because it brought with it justice and wealth; and at the request of the Cardinal he became reconciled to M. Rosso his kinsman (3). The Cardinal re-established the Gonfalons of the Companies: M. Corso's friends had a share in these appointments (4), and he himself was elected a Captain of the party (5). Every one was favourable to the Cardinal, who, in hope [of making peace], so appeased them with soft words that they allowed him to elect delegates. These were M. Ubertino dello Strozza and Ser Bono of Ognano for the party within, and M. Lapo Riconero and Ser Petracco di Ser Parenzo of Ancisa for the party without [the city] (6).

On the 26th of April 1304, the people being assembled in the Piazza of S. Maria Novella in the presence of the Signory, many reconciliations were brought about, and the parties kissed one another on the mouth as a sign that peace was made; and contracts of reconciliation were drawn up: and they imposed penalties on any who should violate the peace; and with olive branches in their hands

they reconciled the Gherardini to the Amieri (7). And so much did the peace appear to please every one that although a great rain came on that day, no one went away, nor did they seem to feel it. The bonfires were large, the church bells rang, and every one rejoiced; but at the palace of the Gianfigliuzzi, where great bonfires were wont to be made on occasions of fighting, nothing was done that evening; and good people talked much about this, saying that it was not seemly behaviour on an occasion of peace. The Companies of the people went about holding high festival in the name of the Cardinal, with the banners which they had received from him in the Piazza of Santa Croce.

M. Rosso della Tosa continued in great wrath, because it seemed to him that the peace had gone too far beyond what he wished. And therefore he thought to hasten on the carrying out of his design with the rest of his party (8), because they left him to do as he pleased, and showed themselves friendly towards him. And they did it all in order to gain Pistoja, about which they had great misgivings, seeing that their adversaries held it, and M. Tolosato degli Uberti was there (9). And meanwhile the return of the horsemen and foot-soldiers of the Whites to Monte Accenico from succouring Forlì (10) made the Guelfs who were within [the city] begin to speak with guile and to thwart the peace; and after [doing] many other things, they called upon the Buondelmonti to become reconciled to the Uberti (about which matter many councils were held) in order to delay the peace, for that reconciliation was a thing impossible (11).

On the 6th of May 1304, the Priors commis-

sioned the Cardinal and four men selected by the Pope to carry out the universal pacification, that is to say, M. Martino della Torre of Milan, M. Antonio of Fostierato of Lodi, M. Antonio de' Brusciati of Brescia (12), and M. Guidotto de' Bugni of Bergamo.

1. 1304 N.S. (see III. 1, at the end).

2. *I.e.* all the citizens, whether in exile or not. The Cardinal's aim was to make peace (*a*) between Blacks and Blacks (the factions of Rosso della Tosa and Corso Donati); (*b*) between Blacks and Whites; (*c*) between Guelfs and Ghibellines. The phrase "universal pacification" (*pace universale*) which occurs at the end of this chapter includes all these reconciliations (*cf.* Villani, viii. 69).

3. See III. 2.

4. *Viz.* the appointments in connection with the reorganised companies (see II. 22, *n.* 4), now nineteen in number.

5. *I.e.* one of the Captains of the Guelf party (see II. 5, *n.* 7).

6. See I. 12 (at the beginning); II. 25, *n.* 19. Observe that each party was represented by a doctor of law and a notary.

7. The enmity between these families must have been specially notorious for Dino to give such prominence to the reconciliation.

8. *I.e.* with the followers of Corso Donati as well as his own. He was strongly opposed to any peace with the Whites and Ghibellines, and desired to profit by the lull in the storm to unite the whole Black party in an attempt to wrest Pistoja out of the hands of the Whites (*cf.* II. 27).

9. See, as to Tolosato degli Uberti, II. 29, *n.* 4; 36.

10. Forlì (see II. 28) had been threatened by the Guelf forces under the command of Tebaldo Brusciati, whom Pope Benedict had appointed Count of Romagna. The fact of the White exiles having taken part in this campaign would alarm and exasperate the Blacks, and make them less disposed than ever to make peace.

11. Because of the origin of the feud between the Buondelmonti and the Uberti (see I. 2) which had now lasted nearly a hundred years.

12. It should be "of Novara." The Pope nominated these four persons alternatively to act as Podestà, but all of them in succession declined to accept the office. As to Antonio of Fostierato, see III. 26, *n.* 9.

CHAPTER V

In order to delay the carrying out of the pacification in Florence, the Blacks of the following of Rosso della Tosa persuade the Cardinal to visit Pistoja and make peace there. Ill success of his mission. The people of Prato, who had welcomed him on his way to Pistoja, refuse to allow him to enter their city on his return (May 1304).

THOSE who were in opposition to the Pope's will, no longer wishing to endure the burden of the Cardinal (1) nor to allow the peace to take deeper root, accomplished so much with false words that they induced the Cardinal to leave Florence by saying to him: "Messere, before you proceed any further in carrying out the peace, make us certain that Pistoja will obey (2); for if *we* make peace and Pistoja remains in our adversaries' hands, we shall be duped." And they did not say this because they wished for peace, even if Pistoja were secured, but in order to prolong the negotiations for the peace. And so greatly did they move him with plausible words, that on the 8th of May 1304 he left Florence, and, going by the way of Campi, lodged at a beautiful country house of Rinuccio di Senno Rinucci.

The next day he rode to Prato, where he was born and where he had never been since. And here he was received with much honour and great dignity: olive-branches were carried; knights bore banners and a standard of taffeta; the people and

the women decked themselves out; the streets were arched over; there was dancing and music; and they shouted, "Long live the Lord [Cardinal]." But they soon changed this welcome into contumely, just as the Jews did to Christ, as will be related below.

On that same day he rode on to Pistoja, and talked with the chief men and rulers of the city; and with him rode M. Geri Spini, who had prepared his outfit, thinking that he would be appointed one of the Magistrates (3) of the city. They were received by M. Tolosato degli Uberti and the people with great honour, and a limited authority (4) was granted him by the people, but he was not to hand over the city to others. Therefore, seeing that those who held the city were very wary, he lost hope of securing it; and so he returned towards Prato, which he thought he should be able to enter by the strength of his kinsmen and his friends; but he could not (5).

1. *I.e.* the exercise of his authority as peacemaker. The "opponents of the Pope's will" were Rosso della Tosa and his faction. See preceding chapter.

2. *I.e.* will submit to the pacification.

3. *I.e.* he reckoned on being made Podestà or Captain of the People (*cf.* I. 25, *n.* 1). Geri Spini was one of the leaders among the Blacks (II. 26).

4. See below, III. 13.

5. While the Cardinal was at Pistoja, the Blacks at Florence of Rosso della Tosa's faction had stirred up the people of Prato against him, and his relations and adherents had been driven out of that city, as stated in the next chapter (see Villani, viii. 69).

CHAPTER VI

The Cardinal returns to Florence and proclaims a crusade against Prato. The Florentine army marches against Prato, but makes peace with the inhabitants. Serious discord in Florence between the peace party (Magnates and populace) and the war party (Rosso della Tosa and his adherents) (May 1304).

HEARING what had been plotted against him in Prato, the Cardinal at once departed and returned to Florence; and he declared war against the inhabitants of Prato, and excommunicated them and proclaimed a crusade against them, offering remission of sins to any one who should do them any harm. His kinsmen and friends were punished (1) and driven from Prato.

The Podestà of Florence, with the mounted militia (2) and soldiers in the pay of the Commonwealth, invaded the territory of Prato and took up their position in the dry bed of the river Bisenzio at Olmo a Mezzano, where they remained until after Nones. There came out certain from Prato to treat for peace, apologizing to the Cardinal, and offering to do what he wished; and so they escaped the fury [of their assailants]. For there were many in the army who would willingly have pillaged their territory and attempted to conquer the city; those, I mean, who were of the Cardinal's mind.

The other leaders of the Black party (3) and their followers were uttering many words full of discord. And even while the horsemen were drawn up in position, the war [against Prato] was nearly at an end, so great was the discord that had

arisen among the citizens [in Florence] (4); and if the discord had proceeded further, the Magnates and the populace (5), to whom the pacification was acceptable, and who were friends to the Cardinal, would have had the upper hand, to judge by the wishes expressed. They of the house of the Cavalcanti also showed themselves very favourably disposed towards [the Cardinal's supporters] (6).

The army departed and came back to Campi, where they remained all that day. The next day they returned to Florence, because the Cardinal allowed himself to be misled by words, thinking to do his best for peace (7). But his kinsmen, who had been driven away with ignominy, did not return to Prato, not trusting themselves [there]; and afterwards they were outlawed.

1. *Furono disfatti* (lit. were undone). *Disfare* is here probably used (as in I. 12, I. 15) in the technical sense of "to demolish the houses and lay waste the property" of any one.

2. See III. 2; I. 10, *n.* 10.

3. Viz. those who were not "of the Cardinal's mind," that is to say, Rosso della Tosa and his following.

4. The meaning is, that in the excited condition of Florence it would in any case have been necessary to recall the troops and end the war against Prato.

5. *Popolo*, here used as equivalent to *popolo minuto*. The "Magnates and populace" were the chief elements in the faction headed by Corso Donati (III. 2). The populace were probably sincere in wishing the pacification to proceed, but Corso and the Magnates only made a show of desiring it in order to ingratiate themselves with the Cardinal and procure his support against Rosso della Tosa and the *popolani*, who were trying to thwart his efforts to make peace.

6. The Cavalcanti were one of the most powerful of the families of Florence. They have been already mentioned as members of Corso's "conspiracy" (III. 2). Some of them were Whites (see I. 22, II. 25), and these, at any rate, would be sincere in supporting the Cardinal.

7. Dino seems to insinuate that the Cardinal ought to have insisted on the prosecution of the war against Prato,

and was over-persuaded by his false friends, Rosso della Tosa and his party, to abandon the crusade in the interests of peace. But as Rosso della Tosa's party, who controlled the government, had themselves stirred up Prato to resist the Cardinal, it was not likely that they would have prosecuted the war with effect, even had it been possible for them to attempt it (*cf.* note 4 to this chapter), since the army itself was divided in its wishes, as stated above in the text.

CHAPTER VII

Abortive conference between representatives of the Whites and Ghibelline exiles and of the Blacks. The Cardinal leaves Florence (June 1304).

THE Cardinal applied himself to hasten the [negotiations for] the peace, and to carry it into execution. And in order to settle the differences, he resolved to send for some of the leaders of the exiles, and he chose fourteen of them. They came to Florence by permission [of the government] and under safe-conduct, and stayed in Oltrarno in the houses of the Mozzi, where they put up barricades and stationed guards so that they might not be attacked. The names of some of them are: M. [Piggello] dei Conti, of Gangalandi, Lapo di M. Azzolino degli Uberti, Baschiera di M. Bindo della Tosa, Baldinaccio Adimari, Giovanni de' Cerchi, Naldo di M. Lottino Gherardini, and several others. And the names of some of the [representatives of] the Black party who were in Florence [are]: M. Corso Donati, M. Rosso della Tosa, M. Pazzino de' Pazzi, M. Geri Spini, M. Maruccio Cavalcanti, M. Betto Brunelleschi, and several others (1).

When the representatives of the White party came to Florence they were greatly honoured by

the common people. Many men and women of old Ghibelline families kissed the coat of arms of the Uberti, and Lapo di M. Azzolino was carefully guarded by the Magnates who were their friends, because those of his house had many deadly feuds with many Guelf *popolani* (2).

Baschiera della Tosa was also much honoured, and he honoured M. Rosso in word and in behaviour (3). And the people were filled with great hope, because the Whites and Ghibellines determined to let themselves be guided by the Blacks, and to consent to their demands, so that they might have no excuse to draw back from the peace. But the Blacks had no wish for peace, and so put them off with talk that the Whites (4) were advised to repair to the houses of the Cavalcanti, and there to gather their friends in strength, and not to leave their city; and many wise men said that if they could have done this, they would have been conquerors. But [though] they sent messengers to the Cavalcanti on the Cardinal's behalf and on their own, requesting them [to receive them], the Cavalcanti after taking counsel about it agreed not to receive them. This counsel turned out ill for them, according to the common opinion, for great damage came upon them and their houses through fire and other causes, as will be told hereafter.

The Whites, when the Cavalcanti would not receive them and when they observed their adversaries' suspicious mien and the words they used, [consulted their friends and] were advised to depart; and this they did on the 8th of June 1304. The Cardinal remained. Those to whom his presence was unwelcome made a show of attacking

him; and one family, called the Quaratesi, who lived near the Mozzi and the palace where the Cardinal was staying, made as though they would shoot him (5). Therefore, when he complained of this, he was advised to leave the city, and so, being in fear, he departed on the 9th of June, leaving the city in evil plight; and he went to Perugia where the Pope was.

1. The number of representatives on each side was probably twelve, not fourteen (*cf.* G. Villani, viii. 69).

2. A striking example of the instinct of the Magnates to hang together in their hostility to the *popolani*.

3. *I.e.* Baschiera (see II. 24) paid to his aged kinsman Rosso (see below, III. 38) all outward marks of respect.

4. Observe the significant omission of their Ghibelline colleagues.

5. *Cf.* I. 21, n. 10.

CHAPTER VIII

The Blacks, both of Rosso della Tosa's and Corso Donati's factions, attack the Cavalcanti, and set the city on fire. Enormous destruction of property. The Cavalcanti driven out of the city (June 1304).

THE good citizens became very angry and lost hope of peace. The Cavalcanti and many others complained, and so greatly did men's minds become inflamed that the people armed themselves and began to attack one another (1). The Della Tosa and the Medici came armed into the Old Market, shooting with their cross-bows, [going thence] towards the Corso degli Adimari and down through Calimala (2), and they attacked and

overthrew a barricade in the Corso which was guarded by people who had more mind for vengeance than for peace.

M. Rossellino della Tosa came with his troop to the houses of the Sassetti, in order to set fire to them; the Cavalcanti and others came up to their assistance; and in this collision Nerone Cavalcanti encountered M. Rossellino, and he lowered his lance against him and struck it against his breast, so that he threw him from his horse.

The leaders of the Black party had prepared artificial fire, believing that there must certainly be fighting. And they came to an understanding with one, Ser Neri Abati, Prior of S. Piero Scheraggio (3), a wicked and dissolute man, his kinsmen's enemy (4), and ordered him to set the first fire alight. And so on the 10th of June 1304 he set fire to his kinsmen's houses in Orto San Michele (5). From the Old Market fire was shot into Calimala, and it spread so greatly through not being checked that, added to the first fire, it burnt many houses and palaces and shops.

In Orto San Michele there was a large loggia with an oratory of Our Lady, in which there were many votive images of wax, and when in addition to the heat of the air these caught fire, all the houses which were round that spot were burnt, besides the warehouses of Calimala, and all the shops which were round the Old Market as far as the New Market and the houses of the Cavalcanti, and [the houses] in Vacchereccia and Porta Santa Maria as far as the Old Bridge; for it is said that more than 1900 dwellings were burnt; and no remedy could be applied.

The thieves openly plunged into the fire to rob and carry away what they could get, and nothing was said to them. And whoever saw his property being carried off durst not demand it back, because the city was in utter confusion.

The Cavalcanti lost heart and life that day when they saw their houses and palaces burning, and the shops which, on account of the high rents paid by reason of the limited space, kept them in affluence.

Many citizens, fearing the fire, removed their goods to another place where they thought they would be safe from the fire, but it extended so far that many lost their goods by their efforts to save them, and were ruined.

To the end that the truth about such a crime may be known, and for what reason the said fire was made, and where:—The leaders of the Black party, in order to drive away the Cavalcanti from the place (whom they feared because they were rich and powerful), prepared the said fire at Ognissanti (6); and it was composed in such a way that when any of it fell to the ground it left a blue colour. This fire the said Ser Neri Abati brought away in a pot and put it in his kinsmen's houses; and M. Rosso della Tosa and others shot it into Calimala.

Sinibaldo, son of M. Corso Donati, came with a large quantity of the said fire put up like a lighted torch to place it in the houses of the Cavalcanti in the New Market, while Boccaccio Adimari with his followers [came] by the Corso degli Adimari as far as Orto San Michele. The Cavalcanti advanced against them, drove them back into the Corso, and took from them the barricade which

they had made. Then they set fire to the houses of the Macci in the Corte delle Badesse (7).

The Podestà of the city came into the New Market with his retinue and with many hired soldiers; but he gave no aid nor did anything to check the conflagration. They watched the fire, remaining on horseback and causing hindrance by blocking up the space; for they impeded the foot-soldiers and passers-by.

The Cavalcanti and many others watched the fire, and had not courage enough to go against their enemies after it was extinguished; whereas they might have conquered them and remained masters. However, M. Maruccio Cavalcanti and M. Rinieri Lucardesi advised them to take vessels filled with fire (8), and go to burn the houses of the enemies who had burnt theirs. This advice was not followed; although, if they had followed it (seeing the other party was making no resistance) they would have been victorious. But sad and grieving they betook themselves to their kinsmen's houses, while their enemies took courage and drove them from the city. Some of them went to Ostina, others to Le Stinche (9) to their estates, and many to Siena, because they had hopes that the Sienese would reconcile them [to their enemies]. And so the time passed without their being reconciled; and they were reputed cowards by every one.

1. The Cavalcanti by favouring the policy of reconciliation with the exiles to which both Corso Donati and Rosso della Tosa were openly or secretly adverse, and by their relations with the White party (see III. 6, *n.* 5, 6, and III. 7), had managed to unite both Corso and Rosso against them. But, as Del Lungo points out (I. 564), their real guilt in the eyes of their enemies was that they were too

numerous and too powerful in the city. The account given by Villani (viii. 71) of this fresh outbreak and of the burning of the city should be compared with Dino's.

2. *I.e.* the armed force assembled in the Old Market (Mercato Vecchio), now represented by the Piazza Vittorio Emanuele II., and then divided, some going along the Corso degli Adimari, now represented by the Via Calzaiuoli, others along the Calimala (or Calimara, now Via di Calimara), which ran N. and S. parallel to the Corso degli Adimari. The origin of the name Calimala or Calimara is uncertain. The "Corso" mentioned just below, where the barricade was, ran westward out of the Old Market, and is not to be confounded with the Corso degli Adimari.

3. The church of S. Piero Scheraggio (see Villani, iii. 2), in which the Councils of the Commonwealth often met, occupied part of the site of the existing Uffizi palace.

4. His kinsmen were Ghibellines (II. 25), and he was a Black Gueff.

5. Orto S. Michele was a piazza which derived its name from a church (destroyed before Dino's time) dedicated to S. Michael, and originally built on the site of a garden (Orto). The piazza was close to the Old Market, and Calimala ran along its eastern side.

6. Outside the city.

7. A piazza near Orto S. Michele.

8. *Lumiere*. These were a kind of iron baskets carried on poles and filled with burning fuel.

9. Ostina was a fortress in the upper valley of the Arno; Le Stinche was a fortress between the valleys of the Greve and the Pesa, a short distance south of Florence. The Cavalcanti were subsequently reinstated (see III. 40, head-note).

CHAPTER IX

Visit of the Black chiefs to the Pope at Perugia.
Death of the Pope (June to July 1304).

THE citizens in Florence were left ruined by the calamitous fire, and were dismayed because they durst not complain of those who had kindled it, for these were the men that were tyrannously

holding the government; however the rulers [themselves] also lost very many of their goods.

The chiefs among the rulers, knowing for certain that infamous charges would be brought against them before the Holy Father, determined to go to Perugia, where the Court was (1).

Those who went there [were] M. Corso Donati, M. Rosso della Tosa, M. Pazzino de' Pazzi, M. Geri Spini and M. Betto Brunelleschi, with certain Lucchese and Sienese. They thought that by plausible words, by money, and through the power of friends they would be able to wipe out the insult done to the Cardinal-Legate and Peacemaker in Tuscany, as well as the great infamy they had incurred through the fire they had most ruthlessly kindled in the city. They arrived at Court, where they began to sow some of the seed they had brought.

On the 22nd of July 1304 (2), Pope Benedict XI. died in Perugia of poison placed in some fresh figs which had been sent to him.

1. See Villani, viii. 72.

2. It should be the 7th of July.

CHAPTER X

In the absence of the Black leaders at Perugia, the White exiles and their allies attempt to capture Florence by surprise, but through the rashness and mismanagement of Baschiera della Tosa the attack is beaten off (July 1304).

WHILE the said [persons] (1) were staying at Perugia, a bold plan was formed by the Florentine

exiles, which was, secretly to summon all those who were of like mind to assemble on a fixed day in arms at a certain place; and so secretly did they contrive the plot, that those who had remained in Florence heard nothing of it. And having made their arrangements, they suddenly appeared at La Lastra, two miles distant from Florence, with 1200 men-at-arms (2) on horseback, in white cloaks; and the Bolognese, Romagnoles, Aretines, and other friends (3) were there on horseback and on foot.

The excitement throughout the city was great. The Blacks were very much afraid of their adversaries, and began to speak humble words. And many hid themselves in the monasteries, and many clad themselves as friars for fear of their enemies, for they had no other defence, seeing they were taken unawares.

One night while the Whites and Ghibellines were at La Lastra, many of their friends in the city went to urge them to come quickly. It was S. Mary Magdalen's Day, the 21st of July (4); and the heat was great. And the troops who should have been there, were not yet all come; for the first who came had made their appearance two days before [the time fixed].

M. Tolosato degli Uberti had not yet arrived with the Pistoians (5), because it was not the day appointed. The Cavalcanti, the Gherardini, the Lucardesi, the Scolari from the Val di Pesa had not yet come down [from their castles]. But now that [the exiles] saw that they were discovered, Baschiera, who was acting as captain and, like a young man, was swayed more by passion than by

reason, finding himself with good troops and being much urged [to advance] thought to gain the merit of the victory, and went down to the city with the horsemen.

And this they ought not to have done, for the night was more their friend than the day, both on account of the heat of the day, and because their friends (6) would have come out of the city to them by night, and because they broke the appointment made with their friends, who did not reveal themselves [as such] because it was not the hour fixed.

They came by San Gallo, and in the "Cafaggio" of the Bishop (7) they drew up in array, close to San Marco, with white banners unfurled, with garlands of olive, and with drawn swords, crying "Peace," without doing violence or robbery to any. It was very beautiful to behold them standing in array, with the sign of peace (8). The heat was great, so that it seemed as if the air were on fire. Their skirmishers on foot and on horseback pressed on close to the city, and came to the gate of the Spadai (9), [since] Baschiera thought he would have friends there, and would enter it without opposition; and therefore they did not come prepared, nor with their axes and weapons to force the gate. The barricades of the suburb were contested against them; yet they broke them down, wounding and slaying many Gangalandesi (10) who were there on guard. They arrived at the gate, and many entered the city by the wicket.

Those [Blacks] within the city who had given them promises (11) did not hold to their agree-

ment—(such as the Pazzi, the Magalotti, and M. Lambertuccio Frescobaldi, who were angry with their own party, some on account of outrages and affronts endured, some on account of the fire kindled in the city, and other wrongs done to them),—but on the contrary they opposed [the exiles] in order to show themselves not guilty (12); and they made greater efforts in attacking [the exiles] than the rest [of the Blacks]: they came to S. Reparata (13), shooting with cross-bows furnished with gaffles (14).

Yet nothing would have availed had not a palace at the side of the gate of the city been set alight. Those, therefore, who had already entered the city, fearing they were betrayed, turned back; and carrying away the wicket of the gate, they reached the main squadron, which did not advance. And meanwhile the fire was spreading exceedingly.

Halting thus in the position he occupied, Baschiera perceived that those who ought to have favoured him were opposing him, and therefore he turned the horsemen back and retreated; and their hope and joy was changed to weeping; for their vanquished adversaries became vanquishers, and took courage like lions and pursued them, skirmishing, yet with great caution. The foot-soldiers, overcome by the heat of the sun, flung themselves into the vineyards and the houses to hide themselves, and many died from exhaustion.

Baschiera rushed into the monastery of San Domenico, and took out by force two of his nieces, who were very rich, and carried them off with him (15). And therefore God punished him.

Many [of the Black] nobles remained at the house of Carlettino de' Pazzi to gather their forces and inflict loss on their enemies; and they sent skirmishers after them, but did not pursue them any more (16).

A short distance from the city [the retreating exiles] encountered M. Tolosato degli Uberti, who was coming with the Pistoians to meet them on the day named. He tried to make them go back and could not; therefore, with great sorrow he returned to Pistoja, and well he knew that Baschiera's youthful rashness had lost him the city.

The Blacks slew many of the exiles who were found in hiding, and put to death many poor sick persons also, whom they dragged from the hospitals. Very many Bolognese and Aretines were taken, and they hanged them all. But the next day those who were crafty raised a false report, saying that M. Corso Donati and M. Cante de' Gabrielli of Gubbio had taken Arezzo by treachery; on which account their enemies (17) were so dismayed that they lost their energy and durst not stir.

1. *I.e.* the Black leaders who, as stated in the preceding chapter, had gone to Perugia.

2. See I. 10, *n.* 4.

3. *I.e.* other members of the league mentioned in II.32. *Cf.* Villani, viii. 72, who attributes the scheme to the Cardinal of Prato. The reader is strongly advised to compare this chapter of Dino with Villani's narrative.

4. The right date is July 20, S. Margaret's Day. S. Mary Magdalen's Day is not the 21st, but the 22nd of July.

5. See III. 4 and 5.

6. *I.e.* their friends in the city mentioned above, viz. Whites

and Ghibellines who had either not been exiled or had been recalled.

7. San Gallo (referred to just below as the "suburb") lay on the north-east side of Florence, between the "second circle" of walls of the city (*cf.* II. 17, *n.* 8), which was still existing, but partly ruinous, and the third circle, which, though begun in 1284, was still unfinished, and consequently afforded no protection to S. Gallo. The "Cafaggio" was an estate belonging to the bishop, and was situate between the churches of S. Marco and of the Annunziata. The name Cafaggio is derived from *Cafagium* or *Cafadium*, a word of Lombardic origin, and said to mean either property enclosed by hedges or ditches, or the principal house on an estate.

8. *Cf.* Dante, *Epistola*, i. 26 (the authenticity of this Epistle is disputed).

9. *I.e.* of the sword-makers. The name originally belonged to a gate in the first circle of walls, but was popularly applied to the corresponding gate in the second circle. The correct name was Porta della Via Nuova (*cf.* II. 17, *n.* 8).

10. These were a body of the Contado militia (see I. 21, *n.* 8, and II. 15, *n.* 5) from Gangalandi, a village in the Arno valley, a short distance west of Florence.

11. These malcontent Blacks must be carefully distinguished from the "friends" of the exiles mentioned above in this chapter (*cf.* *n.* 6).

12. *I.e.* to purge themselves of the guilt of supporting the White exiles.

13. An ancient parish church, afterwards absorbed into the existing cathedral, which was begun in 1298.

14. A gaffe (*tornio*) was a kind of windlass used for the purpose of bending the bow. Cross-bows furnished with this appliance were of course much more formidable weapons than the smaller ones worked by hand or foot.

15. As a means of making profitable alliances, two rich nieces to give in marriage would be a valuable asset to Baschiera.

16. *I.e.* there was no effective pursuit of the retreating Whites. The "skirmishers" were undisciplined retainers of certain Magnates (Del Lungo, i. 572, 599.) *Cf.* next chapter.

17. *I.e.* the Whites and Ghibellines within and without the city.

CHAPTER XI

Dino's reflections on the failure of the Whites to seize the city.

AND thus the regained city was lost by grievous error; and many said that if the exiles had come by any other gate they would have won the city. For [the Blacks] had none to defend them except some young men who would not have advanced within reach of danger as Gherarduccio di M. Buondelmonte did, who pursued [the exiles] until one of them turned back to await him, thrust his lance against him and laid him on the ground.

The exiles' plan was wise and vigorous; but their advance was rash because it was too sudden and was made before the appointed day.

The Aretines and Bolognese carried away some of the wood of the wicket (1); which the Blacks considered to be a great shame done to them.

Emergencies often put to the proof the men who are great not in their character but in their own talk: and this was seen on the day when the Whites came to the city; for many of the citizens changed their tone, their dress, and their ways. Those very men who were wont to speak most proudly against the exiles changed their language and said in the piazzas and elsewhere how worthy a thing it was that the exiles should return to their homes. And it was fear rather than desire or a sense of justice that made them say this. Many also took refuge in religious houses, not from humility, but from abject

and miserable cowardice, believing that the city would be lost. But when the Whites were gone, they resumed their former iniquitous, passionate, and lying words.

1. *I.e.* the wicket of the Porta degli Spadai. G. Villani (viii. 72) says that the Aretines made off with the bolt of the wicket and put it as a trophy in their principal church of S. Donato.

CHAPTER XII

Election of Pope Clement V. (June 5, 1305). His subserviency to King Philip IV. of France.

THE divine justice which oftentimes punishes secretly and takes away good pastors from wicked peoples who are unworthy of them, and gives them that which they deserve for their wickedness, took from them Pope Benedict. The cardinals, by the will of the king of France and the exertions of the Colonna, elected [as Pope] in June 1305 M. Ramondo dal Gotto (1), Archbishop of Bordeaux in Gascony, who took the name of Clement V. He departed not from beyond the mountains nor did he come to Rome, but was consecrated at Lyons on the Rhone. It was reported that at his consecration the place where he was fell down, that the crown fell from his head, and that the king of France would not let him depart thence (2). He created several ultramontane cardinals at the king's request, and made grants of tithes, and [did] other things [for the king], but [when] called upon to proclaim Pope Boniface a heretic he never would do it.

1. The name should be Bertrand de Got.
2. During the procession after the coronation (Nov. 14th) a wall on which a number of spectators were sitting fell just as the new Pope was passing. He was thrown from his horse and his crown fell off his head. Charles of Valois was injured, and the Duke of Brittany, Gaillard de Got (one of the Pope's brothers), Cardinal Matteo Rosso Orsini (who had crowned the Pope), and twelve other persons died of the injuries they received. Another brother of the Pope was killed some days later in an affray after a banquet given in honour of the Pope's first pontifical mass.

CHAPTER XIII

The Blacks of Florence in alliance with the Luccese besiege Pistoja, May 1305.

THE Cardinal Nicholas of Prato, who had strongly supported his (Pope Clement's) election, stood high in his favour. And, having been legate in Tuscany, as has been said (1), he had received authority from the Pistoians to appoint their Magistrates (2) for four years, to the end that he might have authority, in concluding the peace, to carry out what was demanded of Pistoja (3). For the Black party desired that the exiled Guelfs should return to Pistoja, and they said, "We will not make peace unless the Government of Pistoja be reformed, for if the pacification were carried out in Florence [only] the Ghibellines would keep possession of Pistoja, since M. Tolosato is lord of it; and thus we should be duped." And it was said that Pistoja had been given up to the Church (4). But the Cardinal's promise proved of no avail (5), because he was driven out of Florence, as has been related.

The Blacks, having lost all hope of gaining Pistoja [by agreement], determined to seize it by force: and, with the aid of the Lucchese, they went and laid siege to the city. They fortified themselves there, and surrounded the city with palisades and constructed many wooden towers, which they strongly guarded.

The city lay in the plain; it was small, but well walled and embattled; [it was furnished] with strongholds and fortified gates and with great moats filled with water, so that it could not be taken by assault; but [the Florentines and Lucchese] set to work to starve it out, because it could not receive succour. The Pisans, who were the Pistoians' friends, helped them with money, but not with men; [and] the Bolognese were not very friendly to them (6).

1. III. 4.

2. *I.e.* the Podestà and Captain of the People.

3. *I.e.* as a guarantee that Pistoja, which was in the hands of the Whites and Ghibellines, should recall her Black exiles, just as Florence, which was in the hands of the Blacks, would recall her White and Ghibelline exiles, if the pacification were carried into effect. See III. 5, with which the present chapter is closely connected. The Blacks' contention was plausible, but it must not be forgotten that they were all the time doing their best to thwart the Cardinal's efforts to make peace.

4. Implying that the Whites and Ghibellines as hostile to the Church must not be allowed to retain their supremacy there.

5. The Cardinal's promise was his undertaking, given to the Whites and Ghibellines in Pistoja, to make peace between them and the Black Guelfs in Florence.

6. Pisa was consistently Ghibelline. The White exiles who had found refuge in Bologna (see II. 32) were driven out from there in March 1306, less than a year after the beginning of the siege of Pistoja (see III. 17); though a Bolognese contingent had taken part in Baschiera della Tosa's attack on Florence (III. 10).

CHAPTER XIV

The siege of Pistoja, 1305-1306.

THE Blacks elected for their Captain of War Robert, Duke of Calabria, the eldest son (1) of King Charles of Apulia (2), who came to Florence with 300 horsemen; and together with the Lucchese they remained a long time besieging Pistoja, because the Pistoians, who were brave men, often sallied forth to exchange blows with their enemies, and performed great acts of prowess. They slew many men of the Contado-militia of Florence and Lucca; and held the city with few soldiers, because, on account of poverty, many had gone out of it. And not thinking to be besieged, they had not provided themselves with supplies; and after the siege was begun they could not; therefore hunger was assailing them. The officials who were in charge of the supplies wisely distributed them in a secret manner. The women and the men who were of little use [in fighting] would pass stealthily through the camp by night, and go for supplies to La Sambuca and to other places and other fortresses in the direction of Bologna, and brought them into Pistoja without difficulty. When the Florentines found this out they strengthened themselves on that side in such a manner that little could be brought in that way; however, for money, and by stealth some supplies were introduced, until the ditch was finished (3) and the wooden towers were made: and after that no more could be brought in; for any one who brought provisions was seized and had his nose cut

off; and they cut off the feet of some. And this caused such terror that no one durst bring in supplies any more.

The lords and governors of the city would not abandon it, for they were men who were confident that they could defend themselves. The Pisans aided them with money, but not with men. M. Tolosato Uberti and Agnolo di M. Guglielmino, the Magistrates (4), owing to scarcity of supplies, sent out all the poor, the children, the widows, and nearly all the other women of low estate.

Ah! how cruel a thing was this for the minds of the citizens to endure! To see their women led to the gates of the city, and placed in the hands of their enemies, and shut out! And any woman who had no powerful kinsmen without, or was not protected on account of her gentle birth, was outraged by the enemy. And the exiles from Pistoja (5) recognised the wives and children of their enemies, and outraged numbers of them; but the Duke protected many of them.

The new Pope Clement V., at the request of the Cardinal Nicholas of Prato, commanded the Duke Robert and the Florentines to raise the siege of Pistoja. The Duke obeyed and departed (6): [but] the Florentines remained and elected as their Captain M. Bino de' Gabrielli of Gubbio. He had no pity on the citizens of Pistoja, who within the city kept down their tears and did not show their griefs, because they saw that they must do this in order not to die. They vented themselves against their adversaries; whenever they seized one of them they cruelly slew him. But the most to be pitied were those who had been mutilated in the

camp, for the enemy put them down with their feet cut off at the foot of the walls, in order that their fathers, brothers, or sons might see them. And these could not receive or help them, because the Signory (7) did not allow it lest the others should be demoralised thereby; nor did they suffer them to be seen by their kinsmen and friends from the walls above. And thus died the good Pistojan citizens who had been mutilated by the enemy and driven towards their distressed and afflicted city.

Sodom and Gomorrah, and the other cities which were overwhelmed in a moment and their inhabitants slain, had a far better fate than the Pistojans dying in such bitter sufferings. How did the wrath of God assail them! How many, and what sins could they have [committed] to merit such sudden judgment? The besiegers outside sustained much hurt owing to the bad weather, the bad ground (8), and their great expenses; and they burdened their citizens heavily, and spoiled the Ghibellines and Whites of money to such an extent as to ruin many of them. And in order to obtain money they devised a very ingenious measure, which was a tax levied on the citizens called the "Saw" (*Sega*). They levied so much a head a day on the Ghibellines and Whites; on some three *lire*, on some two *lire*, and on some one *lira*, according to their estimate of what [each man] could bear: and thus he who was placed under bounds was taxed just as he who was in the city. And on all fathers having sons able to bear arms they laid a certain tax, if the latter did not present themselves in the army within twenty days. The city sent them (9) there by *Sesti* (10), and by turns of twenty days. And

the Florentines and Lucchese went so far as to ruin many of the militiamen of their *contadi* by keeping them [on service] without pay; for they were poor, and they were obliged to remain under arms at the siege of Pistoja.

The governors of Pistoja, who knew the true state of the supplies, always kept it concealed, and issued supplies to the strangers who were under arms in the service of the city, and to the other men who were of use [as combatants] judiciously, according as they had need: for they saw themselves within reach of death by hunger. Those who knew the scarcity of supplies were hard put to it; and their plan was to hold on till the last, and then tell the people the state of the case, whereupon all should arm, and throw themselves in desperation on the enemy, sword in hand, [for then], "either we shall die, having nothing to gain or lose (11), or perchance their hearts will fail them, and they will hide themselves and take refuge in flight or other cowardly measures." And so they determined to do when they should see themselves coming to an end of the supplies; but for all that they did not abandon the hope of escape.

This and the next chapter should be compared with Villani, viii. 82.

1. *I.e.* eldest surviving son.
2. See I. 7, n. 6.
3. A ditch cut by the invaders all round the city.
4. *I.e.* Podestà and Captain of the People. Agnolo belonged to the Ghibelline family of the Pazzi of Valdarno.
5. *I.e.* the Blacks who had been banished from Pistoja, and now formed part of the besieging forces.
6. The Duke left the siege in October, but his Marshal, Diego de la Rat, a Catalan, remained in command of his troops, and in command-in-chief of the besieging forces

The Lucchese were under the command of the Marquis Moro ello Malaspina.

7. *I.e.* the Magistrates (above, *n.* 4).

8. The ground is said to be "bad" because the numerous streams (see I. 26) would cause floods in rainy weather. The next clause refers in particular to the Florentines, as does the next paragraph.

9. *I.e.* the city militia.

10. *I.e.* so many from each *Sesto*.

11. Lit. "we shall die for nothing."

CHAPTER XV

The Pistoians procure the appointment of Cardinal Napoleone Orsini as Papal Legate in Tuscany, with a view to saving them from falling into the hands of their enemies. Hearing of this the Florentine government opens negotiations for the surrender of Pistoja on favourable terms. The city is surrendered (April 10, 1306), but the terms are violated by the Florentines.

THE Pistoians signified their misery to the Cardinal of Prato and to other secret friends of theirs without who were stirring on their behalf. And they succeeded so far that at Court M. Napoleone Orsini, a Cardinal (1), was appointed Legate in Tuscany and in the Patriarchate of Aquileja. And this was done to succour Pistoja, as being a city of the Church (2). This Cardinal set out at once, and arrived in Lombardy in a few days.

The glorious God, who smites and chastises sinners yet does not confound them altogether, was moved to pity, and sent this thought into the heart of the Florentines: "This lord is coming, and when he has arrived he will say, 'This city

belongs to the Church'; and he will wish to enter it, and we shall come to strife with the Church'' (3). They considered, therefore, how to take measures [against this].

Since things are more feared at a distance than near at hand, and men fancy many things—just as when a stronghold or fortress is being built there are many who from divers considerations fear it, and after it has been built and completed, their minds are reassured and they do not fear it at all—thus the Florentines feared the Cardinal at a distance; but when he was near they heeded him little, although they might reasonably have feared [him] both on account of the greatness of the Church, of his own dignity, of his powerful position in Rome, and of the great friendship the despots and the Commonwealths bore towards him. And so much did they fear his coming that they determined to try to come to terms in this manner: They had a wise and good monk of Santo Spirito (4) whom they sent to Pistoja, to M. . . . de' Vergellesi (5), one of the chief citizens, [and] a great friend of his. And in talking with him, the monk made him many particular and general promises on behalf of the Signory of Florence, offering to him that the city should remain free and untouched in its beauty (6), and [that] the citizens should be unmolested in their persons and should retain their fortresses (7).

When the knight understood this, he made it known to the Elders (8), who, hearing the monk and learning what authority he bore (9), concluded the agreement; not without the will of God, who disposes things, great and small, and whose will it was not wholly to destroy that city. O

merciful Clemency, how didst Thou lead them into utmost extremity! For they had only provisions left to live on for one day, and then they must needs have revealed to the citizens the death by hunger [awaiting them]. For this [agreement] be Thou, most holy Majesty, for ever praised! For the bread which well-to-do (10) citizens were eating, pigs would have disdained!

The agreement having been made before the Cardinal's arrival, the gate was opened on the 10th of April 1306. And there was a certain citizen who, on account of the hunger he had suffered, ate so much that he burst.

The Blacks of Florence seized the city, and did not observe their agreement, for so greatly did the fear of being obliged to give it up to the Whites press upon them, that immediately, without any interval, they threw down the walls, which were very fine.

The Cardinal Legate, on hearing the news from Pistoja, was exceedingly vexed, because he believed that he was in a position to have applied a remedy [to the trouble]. He went to Bologna, and took up his abode there.

1. He belonged to one of the most powerful families in Rome, was a nephew of Pope Nicholas III., and had been made Cardinal by Nicholas IV. in 1288. He died at Avignon in 1347 (*cf.* II. 35, *n.* 5).

2. See III. 13.

3. The difficulty was that though they were Guelfs, *i.e.* of the party of the Church, the Church was intervening for the protection of a city which was in the hands of the Whites to whom the Blacks denied the name of Guelfs, and whom they regarded as Ghibellines.

4. An Augustinian monastery.

5. M. Lippo (= Filippo) Vergellesi, the father of Selvaggia, to whom Cino of Pistoja paid poetic homage.
6. *I.e.* the walls and buildings were not to be demolished.
7. *I.e.* the fortresses in the Contado.
8. See I. 25, *n.* 2.
9. *I.e.* the authority to treat on behalf of the Signory of Florence (see I. 26).
10. Lit. "good" (*buoni*). Cf. I. 8, *n.* 5.

CHAPTER XVI

This chapter forms a digression, and is intended to point out how Azzo VIII., Marquis of Ferrara, the ally of the Black Guelfs (see II. 32) was weakened by the rebellion of Modena and Reggio against his tyranny, which rebellion was brought about by Giberto (or Ghiberto) of Correggio, the Lord of Parma (January 1306).

PARMA, Reggio, and Modena had rebelled against the Marquis of Ferrara, whom, because of the excessive tyranny he practised against them, God would no longer suffer: for when he was most exalted, he fell. For he had taken to wife the daughter of King Charles of Apulia, and in order that he might condescend to give her to him, he bought her, beyond the common custom (1), and made over to her Modena and Reggio as dowry: for which cause his brothers and the noble citizens scorned to become the vassals of another; and to this there was added the hostility of a powerful knight of Parma, called M. Ghiberto, whom the Marquis was seeking to drive away (2) by treachery. But the knight gave great encouragement to the citizens of those two cities to

rebel, and by means of troops and arms he freed them from servitude.

1. *I.e.* the mercenary character of the transaction was more notorious than usual (see *Purg.* xx. 79, 80).

2. *I.e.* from Parma.

CHAPTER XVII

The Cardinal Legate Napoleone Orsini is driven out of Bologna, 1306. In 1307 he gathers the forces of the White and Ghibelline exiles and their allies at Arezzo. After a futile campaign against Florence the exiles disperse.

WHILST the Legate was in Bologna, the Bolognese revolted and drove out their enemies (1). He thought to make peace between them. [But] the Florentines wrought so effectually by money and encouragement that they (the Bolognese) laid the blame of a plot and of treason on the Legate (2), and drove him ignominiously and shamefully from Bologna; and one of his chaplains was slain. He went to Romagna, intending to enter Forlì, [but] the Florentines prevented him from doing so. He went to Arezzo (3), and sought by letters and embassies to appease them, but he could not.

While the Cardinal was at Arezzo he collected many troops and strengthened himself there, because he heard that the Blacks of Florence would come thither in force. There came to his aid the Marquis of the March (4) with many noblemen from thence, many White Guelfs and Ghibellines of Florence, many horsemen from

Rome and Pisa, and many ecclesiastics of Lombardy (5), and it was computed that in all there were 2400 picked horsemen.

The Blacks of Florence went against them, but in great mistrust; they did not, however, come near Arezzo. They took the road towards Siena, then they turned aside across a mountain and entered the territory of Arezzo (6), where they destroyed many strongholds of the Ubertini. They did not descend to the plain, as the passes might have been contested against them; and no battle was fought, because the Blacks were exceedingly afraid of risking an engagement. Their enemies urged the Cardinal to join battle, pointing out that the advantage was greatly on his side and victory certain. The Cardinal would never consent to this, nor would he allow his troops to go to seize the passes or cut off the Blacks' supplies on the retreat (7); and so the Blacks returned to Florence without any danger or injury.

The Cardinal was greatly blamed for having allowed them to get away safely, and it was said by many that he had done it for money or because of a promise made to him by them that they would obey and honour him; or else that M. Corso Donati had promised him 4000 florins on the understanding that he (the Cardinal) should hand over the city to him (M. Corso); while it was also said that the Cardinal had come that way with his troops in order to be able to draw off the Blacks from their movement [against Arezzo] and [so] to get M. Corso's money without handing the city over to him (8). Those who had come to the Cardinal's aid (9) departed disconsolate, for they

saw that there was nothing more to be done ; and they had spent much without any profit, in the belief that they should reconquer their city. And they never came together any more.

1. The "revolt" of Bologna, *i.e.* the adherence of its government to the cause of the Black Guelfs, and the consequent expulsion of the White exiles of Florence (see II. 32, *n.* 2 ; III. 13, *n.* 6), had taken place in March 1306, before the arrival of the Cardinal. He was driven out of Bologna on May 22, 1306.

2. *I.e.* they accused him of plotting to overthrow the Guelf government of Bologna.

3. In the early part of the following year (1307).

4. "Marquis of the March of Ancona" was the title (originally belonging to the feudal lord of that region) borne by the governor appointed by the Pope.

5. These were ecclesiastical dignitaries who were also feudal lords ; and it is to be understood that they brought their forces with them. Lombardy is used in a loose sense as equivalent to Northern Italy.

6. *I.e.* they first marched along the Arno valley towards Arezzo, then turned to the right up the valley of the Ambra towards Siena, then to the left across the mountains of Palazzolo (the "mountain" of Dino's text) into the Aretine territory. The "plain" mentioned just afterwards is the valley of the Chiana at the head of which Arezzo is situated.

7. An important link in the chain of events is here omitted by Dino, though he alludes to it below. The Cardinal, instead of attacking the Florentine army, as he was being urged to do, marched with his own troops up the Casentino (see I. 9, *n.* 2), and made as though he were going to cross the mountains and drop down on Florence. The effect of this was that the Florentine army, which was besieging the Aretine fortress of Gargosa or Gargonza, was obliged to beat a hasty retreat and return to protect Florence itself. G. Villani's account of the campaign (viii. 89) should be compared with Dino's, which, on account of its conciseness, is difficult to understand.

8. Here again the conciseness of the narrative makes it obscure. Dino alludes to two reports which professed to account for the Cardinal's allowing the Florentine army to return uninjured to Florence : (*a*) it was said that the Cardinal had allowed the army to return either in con-

sideration of a bribe or of a promise that the government would submit to his mediation; (*b*) it was said that the Cardinal had made an agreement with Corso Donati to this effect: Corso was to pay down 4000 florins, and the Cardinal, on entering the city, was to hand over the government to Corso, and to crush the rival party of Rosso della Tosa and the *popolani*. But the Cardinal, it was said, had first taken Corso's money, and then, by his march into the Casentino, brought back the Florentine army to the city, thus making it impossible for him to fulfil his part of the bargain with Corso. The words "had come that way with his troops" refer to the Cardinal's march up the Casentino (see preceding note).

9. The White and Ghibelline exiles from Florence are specially referred to.

CHAPTER XVIII

Cardinal Napoleone Orsini, after protracted and futile negotiations with the Florentine government, is deprived of his office of Legate. The Florentine envoys to the Cardinal stir up strife at Arezzo (1307-1308).

THE Blacks scoffed at the Cardinal and sought to dishonour him in many ways [while] making a show of wishing to obey him. And after their return (1) to Florence they sent to the place where he was M. Betto Brunelleschi and M. Geri Spini, as ambassadors, who made him turn and twist as they pleased, and drew favours from him, [so that] they seemed to be the rulers of his court. They also (2) caused him to send a certain friar Ubertino to the Signory; but so many expedients and pretexts were invented and put forward from moment to moment that [those who were negotiating on the Cardinal's behalf] waited for [the appoint-

ment of] the next Signory which they hoped would be more favourably disposed towards them.

Some said that the Legate held the Blacks to be upright men; and that he confidently told his friends there would be peace. Never was a woman enticed by panders and then dishonoured as he was by those two knights; and of the younger (3) it was said that he pursued the work with the most cunning, putting the Cardinal off with words, [and] prolonging the negotiations for peace, over which they spent a long time because of the ambiguous language he used. At length, on account of the discredit brought on the Cardinal at Court (4), he was removed from the Legation, and went with little honour to Rome.

Wise men perceived that the ambassadors were staying at Arezzo in order to cause dissension among the Aretines. And Uguccone of Faggiuola, together with the Magalotti and many Magnates (5), sowed such discord in Arezzo that the Ghibellines in power were living in the position of enemies (6). But yet afterwards they became quiet.

1. *I.e.* after the return of the army from the expedition against Arezzo (see preceding chapter).

2. *Anco.* This is the reading adopted in Del Lungo's larger edition. In the smaller edition he reads *tanto*, which could only be rendered by a long paraphrase.

3. *I.e.* Betto Brunelleschi (see III. 39).

4. *I.e.* by the agents of the Blacks. The "Court," it will be remembered, was now in France. It was definitely fixed at Avignon in 1309 (see III. 23, *n.* 5).

5. *I.e.* Florentine Magnates of the Black faction. The Magalotti are enumerated among them in II. 26. Uguccone, who had been driven from Arezzo in 1303 (*cf.* II. 28), had returned in this year, 1308.

6. These were the Ghibellines of the "Dry" faction, then controlling the government, and they were presumably

contemplating violent measures against their rivals, the "Green" faction, to which Uguccione had attached himself, and which was in league with the Blacks of Florence.

CHAPTER XIX

Corso Donati rallies the Magnates round him, and prepares for an attempt to wrest the government out of the hands of the Popolani by force (1308).

LIKE as the worm is bred in a sound apple, so all created things which are to come to an end must have within them a cause which brings them to their end (1). Once more through avarice and envy (2) great dissension arose among the Black Guelfs of Florence. This was because M. Corso Donati, deeming that he had done more work [than the rest] in the reconquest of the city (3), thought that he was receiving but a small share, or almost none, of its honours and emoluments, because M. Rosso della Tosa, M. Pazzino de' Pazzi, M. Betto Brunelleschi, and M. Geri Spini with their followers among the *popolani* seized the honours, served their friends, gave authoritative opinions, conferred favours; and made him of no account. Thus they caused great wrath in the minds [of M. Corso and his faction], which grew until it became open hatred.

M. Pazzino de' Pazzi caused M. Corso Donati to be arrested one day on account of money he owed him. Many insulting words were spoken on both sides, on account of [M. Rosso and his followers] wanting to govern without him; because

M. Corso was so ambitious and so active that they were afraid of him and did not believe it possible to give him a share which should content him. Wherefore M. Corso gathered round him adherents of many sorts. He had with him a great part of the Magnates, because they hated the *popolani* for the rigorous Ordinances of Justice made against them, which he promised to annul (4). He gathered to his side many of those who hoped through him to become so great that they would remain in control of the government, and many [he gained] with fair words which he coloured with great skill. And he was wont to say throughout the city: "Those fellows are appropriating all the honours, while the rest of us who are nobly born and powerful are in the position of aliens: those fellows have the Catalan troops who follow them (5), they have the false *popolani* [on their side], and they divide among themselves the treasure of which we, as being greater, should be masters." And he likewise turned aside many of his adversaries and brought them over to his own mind. Among these were the Medici and Bordononi (6), who used to be hostile to him, and supporters of M. Rosso della Tosa.

When he had banded together his conspirators once more (7) they began to speak more haughtily in the Piazza and in the Councils, and if any one opposed them they assumed a hostile mien towards him. And so greatly was the fire kindled, that, by agreement with the [other] conspirators, the Medici and the Bordononi and others appointed to do it, assaulted Scambrilla on purpose to kill him, and they gave him several wounds in the face.

Their adversaries therefore held that this was done as an affront to them. They visited him often and talked a great deal [about the affair], and when he was cured they granted him foot-soldiers at the expense of the Commonwealth, and encouraged him to take a signal revenge. This Scambrilla was a man of powerful frame; he was powerful also because of the friends whose follower he was (8). He was not a man of high station, for he had been a mercenary (9).

The hatred [still] increasing through the proud words which passed between those of the conspiracy and the others, friends and forces began to be summoned from all directions. The Bordoni had great support from Carmignano, Pistoja, the *Monte di Sotto* (10) and from Tajo di M. Ridolfo, a great man at Prato, and the men of his house and those who were of his mind; so that he lent aid to the conspirators.

M. Corso had vehemently stirred up the Lucchese (11) by disclosing the wicked deeds of his adversaries and the methods they employed, which, whether real or fictitious, he well knew how to colour. After his return to Florence (12) he arranged that on a day named all the conspirators should go in arms to the Palace of the Signory, and say that they absolutely insisted that Florence should have a different government (13): and with these words they should come to blows.

1. *Convienne che cagione sia in esse che al lor fine termini.* The "sound apple" in this case was the supremacy of the Black Guelfs in Florence, which, as Dino believed, would be brought to an end by the "worm" of discord.

2. *Cf.* Villani, viii. 96; *Inf.* vi. 74.

3. *I.e.* in the overthrow of the Whites.

4. In December 1306 an additional officer, who was to be a foreigner, had been appointed to ensure that provisions of the Ordinances of Justice should be more effectually carried out. His title was Executor of the Ordinances of Justice.

5. *Scherigli*, the name given to the Catalan troops commanded by Diego de la Rat (King Charles's marshal) which had been retained in the pay of the Commonwealth of Florence after the capture of Pistoja (see III. 14, n. 6).

6. See III. 2, n. 9.

7. See III. 2, 3.

8. *I.e.* Rosso della Tosa and the leaders among that party.

9. *I.e.* in the service of some other state.

10. Carmignano is in the valley of the Ombrone between Florence and Pistoja. The Monte di Sotto (literally, the mountain below) is the name of a chain of hills on the southern side of that valley.

11. A body of foot-soldiers from the Contado of Lucca, at that time in the service of the Florentine government.

12. From Treviso, where he had served as Podestà for the first six months of this year, 1308.

13. *I.e.* not a new constitution, but that the control of the existing government should pass out of the hands of the *popolani*.

CHAPTER XX

The government of Florence anticipate Corso Donati's rebellion, attack him with their forces while he is unprepared, and put him and his men to flight (October 6, 1308).

M. Rosso and his followers heard of the calls to arms, the words that were being spoken, and the warlike preparations (1); with their minds full of wrath they inflamed themselves so much by talking that they could not be kept from an outbreak; and one Sunday morning they went to the Priors, who assembled the Council (2), called out their forces

(3), and caused M. Corso and his sons and the Bordoni to be cited. The citation and the proclamation of the charge against them (4) were made at once, and they were condemned forthwith: and on the same day the forces of the Commonwealth went to the houses of M. Corso. He strengthened himself at the Piazza di S. Piero Maggiore (5), by putting up barricades and gathering many foot-soldiers. The Bordoni also vigorously hastened thither with a numerous following, and with pennons on which their arms were displayed.

M. Corso was grievously disabled by the gout, and could not bear arms. But with his tongue he encouraged his friends, praising and cheering those who bore themselves valiantly. His troops were few, for it was not [yet] the day fixed (6).

The assailants were many, because all the Gonfalons of the people were there, with the hired soldiers and Catalans at the barricades; and with cross-bows, stones and fire. M. Corso's few foot-soldiers defended themselves vigorously with lances, cross-bows and stones, waiting for those in the conspiracy to come to their assistance. These were the Bardi, the Rossi, the Frescobaldi, and nearly all the Sesto of Oltrarno; the Tornaquinci and the Buondelmonti, save M. Gherardo. But none of them moved or made any demonstration. M. Corso, seeing he could not defend himself, determined to depart. The barricades were broken down; his friends fled through the houses, and many who were on his side pretended to belong to the others.

M. Rosso, M. Pazzino, M. Geri, Pinaccio, and many others fought vigorously on foot and on

horseback. Piero and M. Guglielmino Spini (a young new-made knight, armed after the Catalan fashion), Boccaccio Adimari also and his sons, and some of his kinsmen followed hard after the fugitives, and caught up Gherardo Bordoni at La Croce a Gorgo (7). They attacked him; he fell on his face; they dismounted and slew him, and Boccaccio's son cut off his hand and carried it home. Some blamed him for this; but he said he did it because Gherardo had wrought against him and his at the request of M. Tedice Adimari, their kinsman, and the brother-in-law of the said Gherardo (8). Gherardo's brothers escaped, and his father took refuge in the houses of the Tornaquinci, for he was old.

Villani, viii. 96 should be compared with this chapter.

1. *I.e.* the preparations made by Corso Donati mentioned in the preceding chapter.

2. *I.e.* the General Council of the Podestà.

3. *I.e.* the Companies forming the Civic militia (see II. 22, n. 4).

4. The charge was that of treason against the "people," *i.e.* the *popolano* government, and confederacy with Ugucione of Faggiuola and the Ghibellines (Villani, viii. 96). Ugucione, Corso's son-in-law, was in fact now on his way to Florence.

5. See II. 18, n. 6, 8.

6. See preceding chapter, near the end.

7. *I.e.* the Cross by the Eddy. The place was on the right bank of the Arno, east of the city (*cf.* III. 41).

8. There was a family feud among the Adimari. Boccaccio belonged to the Cavicciuli branch, who were Blacks; most of the other members of the family, including Tedice, were Whites (*cf.* Villani, viii. 39, 96).

CHAPTER XXI

The death of M. Corso Donati (October 6, 1308).

M. CORSO, infirm through gout, was fleeing towards the abbey of S. Salvi (1), where in time past he had done, and caused to be done, many evil things. The Catalans took him prisoner, and recognised him; but when they were going to take him away with them he defended himself with fair words, like a prudent knight. Meanwhile a young brother-in-law of the Marshal (2) came up. Urged by others to slay him, he would not do it; but when he returned [to the city] he was sent back (3), and the second time he pierced M. Corso's throat with a Catalan lance and gave him another wound in the side; and M. Corso fell to the ground. Some monks carried him away to the abbey, and there he died on . . . (4) and was buried.

The people began to be calm, and his grievous death was much talked of in various ways, according to the friendship or enmity [felt for him]; but to tell the truth, his life was dangerous and his death reprehensible (5). He was a knight of great ambition and renown, an aristocrat by birth and behaviour, of very great personal beauty even till his old age; he had a fine figure and delicate features, and a fair complexion. He was a pleasing, clever, and accomplished speaker; always busying himself in great matters; familiar and intimate with great lords and with noblemen, possessing powerful friends; and famous throughout all Italy. He was the enemy of democracies (6) and of the *popolani*; was

beloved by his retainers ; was full of wicked designs, unprincipled and astute.

He was slain in such vile fashion by a foreign mercenary, and his kinsmen knew well who slew him ; therefore the man was immediately sent away by his friends. Those who caused M. Corso to be slain were, it was commonly said, M. Rosso della Tosa and M. Pazzino de' Pazzi ; and some blessed them, and others did the contrary. Many believed that the said two knights slew him ; but I, wishing to search out the truth, have sought diligently and found the truth to be as I have stated (7).

1. The abbey of S. Salvi, a short distance from Florence on the eastern side, belonged to the monks of the Order of Vallombrosa.

2. See III. 19, *n.* 5.

3. According to what we read at the end of the chapter, by Rosso della Tosa and Pazzino de' Pazzi, to whom must be added Betto Brunelleschi (III. 39). The various accounts of Corso Donati's death differ in detail, as is only natural (*cf.* Villani, viii. 96 ; *Purg.* xxiv. 82-88).

4. The MSS. have a wrong date. See head-note.

5. *I.e.* though his life was a menace to the public tranquillity, those who brought about his death were to blame for their action.

6. *Popoli*, *i.e.* of the government of States by the wealthy traders (*cf.* I. 4, *n.* 2).

7. *Viz.* that Rosso and Pazzino caused Corso Donati to be killed though they did not kill him themselves.

CHAPTER XXII

A summary reference to the interdicts and excommunications issued by the Holy See against the Florentines since 1302. Death of Lottieri della Tosa, Bishop of Florence (April 1309). Intrigues of the Blacks in connection with the appointment of his successor.

THE holy Church of Rome, who is the mother of Christians when wicked pastors do not cause her to err, having sunk into abjectness through the diminished reverence of the faithful, had cited the Florentines; and after having commenced proceedings of excommunication, had given sentence against them, and had excommunicated the officials (1) and laid the city under interdict, and deprived the laity of the ministrations of religion (2). The Florentines sent ambassadors to the Pope (3). Bishop Lottieri della Tosa died. Another, a man of low birth (4), was appointed through simony; he was an eager supporter of the Guelf party and in high favour among the people, but not a man of holy life. The Pope was much blamed for this and very wrongly, because, according to the philosopher (5), evil pastors are sometimes allowed by God for the sins of the people. Great interest was made with the Court by means of promises and money; one had the votes (6), another (7) the money, but Antonio d'Orso got the bishopric. The canons had elected one of their number as bishop; M. Rosso and the other Blacks favoured him because he was of their mind, and they thought they should lead him as

they pleased. He went to Court and spent much money, and did not get the bishopric.

1. *I.e.* the Podestà, the Captain, and their officials. They are mentioned specially because they were foreigners: the members of the Signory and other officers would be included in the general excommunication of the citizens of Florence.

2. Dino here refers comprehensively to interdicts laid on the city (*a*) by the Cardinal of Acquasparta in 1302 after his futile attempt at a pacification (see II. 23, *n.* 2); (*b*) by the Cardinal of Prato in 1304 (see III. 7); (*c*) by Cardinal Napoleone Orsini in 1307 (see III. 18); (*d*) by other nuncios of the Holy See.

3. *I.e.* on several occasions since 1306, in order to obtain absolution from the Holy See. The bull of absolution was granted by Clement V. in September 1309.

4. The bishops of Florence had usually been Magnates. The person now appointed was Antonio d'Orso, Bishop of Fiesole.

5. Not Aristotle, but Job. "Who maketh a hypocrite to reign, because of the sins of the people" (*Job* xxxiv. 30, Vulgate).

6. *I.e.* the votes of the Cathedral Chapter (see below), who had the right of election subject to the Pope's power of setting it aside and making an appointment himself.

7. *I.e.* the Papal Court.

CHAPTER XXIII

The oppression of the Church by King Philip IV. of France causes the Pope and Cardinals to procure the election of Henry of Luxemburg as Emperor (27th November 1308).

THE Empire being vacant by the death of Frederick II. (1), and the adherents of the Imperial party being kept under heavy burdens (2), and, in Tuscany and Sicily, almost brought to naught, governments having been changed, and the fame and memory of the Empire being well-nigh extinct, the Emperor

of Heaven (3) made provision [for this extremity] and put into the mind of the Pope and of his Cardinals to perceive how that the arms of Holy Church were so enfeebled that her faithful people scarce obeyed her (4). The King of France, puffed up with pride because he had been the author of the death of Pope Boniface, and believing that his power would be dreaded by all, caused Cardinals to be chosen as he pleased, through fear [of his displeasure]; demanded that the bones of Pope Boniface should be burned and Boniface himself sentenced as a heretic; detained the Pope almost by force (5); harassed and persecuted the Jews in order to take away their money; accused the Templars of heresy, threatening them [with suppression]; and laid low the honours of Holy Church, so that by reason of many innovations present to men's minds (6) the Church was not obeyed: and having no arm nor defender, the Pope and Cardinals thought to raise up an Emperor, a man who should be just, wise and powerful, a son of Holy Church, a lover of the Faith. And they applied themselves to seek one who might be worthy of so great an honour; and they found one who had long dwelt at Court (7), a wise man, of noble blood, just and famous, of great probity, brave in arms and of noble race, a man of great ability and of well-tempered character, namely, Henry, Count of Luxemburg, in the Valley of the Rhine, in Germany. He was forty years of age, of middle height, a fine speaker, of good figure, slightly squint-eyed. This Count had been at Court to procure a great archbishopric in Germany for one of his brothers, and, having obtained the said benefice, took his departure. This arch-

bishopric carried one of the seven votes of the Empire (8). By the will of God the other votes were in agreement [with that one], and Henry was elected Emperor; but, owing to the long vacancy of the Empire, he deemed it well nigh a matter of no account that he could be king (9).

1. *I.e.* technically vacant, for Frederick II., who had died in 1250, was the last Emperor who had been crowned at Rome (see I. 13, n. 2, and *Conv.* iv. 3: 40). But the *de facto* vacancy was caused by the death of Albert of Austria, who had been murdered by his nephew on May 1, 1308. The struggle between the Blacks and the Whites was now over, and the only hope remaining to the defeated Whites was that they might be reinstated in Florence by the power of the new Emperor. Dino was confident that this would be achieved, and therefore he now turns his attention away from Florence; and from this point till the end of Chap. XXXVI. occupies himself with the doings of the new Emperor, Henry VII., down to his coronation at Rome, which was to be the prelude to his chastisement of the Black Guelfs, the rulers of Florence.

2. *Sotto gravi pesi.* The same words that Dante uses (*Inf.* vi. 71) in reference to the oppression of the Whites by the Blacks.

3. A similar expression is used by Dante in *Inf.* i. 124; *Par.* xxv. 41; and the same expression in *Conv.* iii. 12: 116.

4. *I.e.* her true people, the White Guelfs, had well nigh become Ghibellines (*cf.* II. 30, 31), for they thought that the Empire should be the arm of the Church, and not the French power, with which the Black Guelfs seemed so much bound up.

5. *I.e.* during the first years of the Pope's reign, until the definite establishment of the Papal Court at Avignon (see III. 18, n. 4), which was outside the dominions of the French king and belonged to the Count of Provence, namely, Charles II., King of Naples, who died on May 3, 1309, shortly after the Pope had fixed his residence at Avignon, and was succeeded by his son, Robert, Duke of Calabria (III. 14, at the beginning).

6. *Per molte cose rinnovate nelle menti degli uomini.* The phrase is difficult. Del Lungo explains it thus: "He means to say, that this condition of affairs . . . had changed many ideas and feelings in men's minds, and

weakened the ancient and traditional reverence for the Church."

7. He had been present at Clement's coronation (III. 12, n. 2), and also at the consecration of his own brother to the Archbishopric of Trier (see below in this chapter), which was performed by the Pope at Poitiers on March 11, 1308.

8. *I.e.* the Archbishop of Trier was one of the seven electors. The election of Henry was brought about to a great extent through the exertions of another of the ecclesiastical electors, the Archbishop of Mainz, who had been Clement's physician and had received this preferment as a reward for his services. The French king's candidate was Charles of Valois.

9. *Quasi si reputò niente a potere esser re*, i.e. King of the Romans, the title of the Emperor-elect before his coronation as Emperor. The prestige of the Empire had sunk so low since the death of Frederick II. that Henry recked little of the possibility of his being elected.

CHAPTER XXIV

The Emperor comes into Italy, and after making peace between Guelfs and Ghibellines in various cities approaches Milan (end of 1310).

THE Cardinal of Prato (1), who had strongly supported Henry's election, thinking [thereby] to aid his friends (2) and to chastise his enemies and adversaries, abandoned all other hopes as being of little value, and applied himself to the exaltation of this man, whose election took place on the 16th of July 1309, and his confirmation by sealed letters in the same year (3). He, having been elected and confirmed, crossed the mountains, for he had sworn and promised to come to be crowned in the following August (4), and, like a loyal lord, he intended to keep his oath. In his first council (5) he was opposed by the Florentines, because at

their request the Archbishop of Mainz (6) advised him not to cross [the Alps], for that it was enough for him to be king of Germany; representing to him the great risk and peril of passing into Italy.

Almighty God, who is the guard and guide of princes, willed that his coming should be for the casting down and chastisement of the tyrants throughout Lombardy and Tuscany (7), until every tyranny should be extinguished. The Emperor firmly resolved to keep his promise, being a prince who set great store by his pledged faith; and with a few knights he crossed the mountains through the territory of the Count of Savoy (8) unarmed, because the country was safe; so that he arrived at Asti by the time he had sworn. And there he assembled troops, and took up arms and encouraged his knights; and he came down, descending from city to city, making peace as though he had been an angel of God, and receiving fealty, until he came close to Milan. But he was much hindered by King Robert, who was in Lombardy (9).

1. See III. 1.

2. *I.e.* the White Guelfs and the Ghibellines.

3. Henry's election took place on 27th November 1308 at Frankfort. The election was confirmed by a bull of Pope Clement V., dated 26th July 1309.

4. *I.e.* to come into Italy in August 1310 in order afterwards to receive from the Church the imperial crown. The time appointed for the coronation in the bull of confirmation was 2nd February 1312, but it was subsequently postponed (*cf.* III. 36). Henry set out for Italy in the autumn of 1310; he crossed Mont Cenis, and arrived at Susa on 23rd October.

5. *I.e.* the first council which he held in Germany to consider the question of his passing into Italy.

6. See III. 23, *n.* 8.

7. By the "tyrants" are meant the chiefs of the Guelf party.

8. Amadeus V. His wife (Mary) and Henry's wife (Margaret) were daughters of John, Duke of Brabant.

9. See III. 23, *n.* 5. Robert had been crowned "King of Sicily and Apulia" (see I. 7, *n.* 6) by the Pope at Avignon in June 1309, and had passed through North Italy on his return from Provence just before Henry's arrival. Robert and his queen had reached Florence on 10th September 1310. Henry's stay at Asti lasted from 10th November till 12th December in the same year.

CHAPTER XXV

The Emperor on his way through Lombardy arrives at Milan, the Guelf leaders having failed to induce him to go to Pavia instead (December 1310).

THE Emperor having arrived at a crossing of two ways, of which one led to Milan, the other to Pavia, a noble knight, called M. Maffeo Visconti (1) of Milan, raised his hand and said: "Sire, this hand can give thee Milan and take it away: come to Milan, where my friends are, seeing that none can take it from us; if thou goest to Pavia, thou lovest Milan" (2). M. Maffeo had been for several years outlawed from Milan; and was Captain of nearly all Lombardy (3); he was clever and astute rather than faithful. The Captain and Lord of Milan at that time was M. Guidotto della Torre, a faithful prince, but not so clever. The Della Torre were noblemen and of ancient lineage; and as their arms they bore a tower in the half of the shield on the right side, and on the other side two griffins (4) crossed; and they were enemies of the Visconti.

The Emperor sent one of his Marshals to

Milan, a member of the Della Torre family (5), who spoke many friendly words with M. Guidotto, showing forth to him the Emperor's good will. But all the same M. Guidotto was suspicious of his coming, fearing to lose the lordship [of the city]; yet he did not think it expedient to make war in his defence. He had all his mercenaries dressed in a white uniform with a bright red stripe (6); he caused many bridges at a distance from the city to be destroyed. The Emperor, undisturbed in mind, followed the counsel of M. Maffeo Visconti, and directed his way towards Milan, leaving Pavia on the right hand.

Count Filippone, the lord of Pavia (7), declared with a great show of good will that he was waiting to pay him honour in Pavia. [But] the Emperor, keeping on his way towards Milan, crossed the Ticino by fording it, and rode through the [Milanese] territory without opposition.

The Milanese came to meet him. M. Guidotto, seeing all the people going to meet him, set out also himself; and when he was come near him, he cast down his staff (8), dismounted, and kissed his foot; and like a man bewitched he did just the contrary of what he intended.

1. Maffeo, or Matteo Visconti, was the leader of the Ghibellines in Milan, and had been driven from that city by the rival Guelf family of Della Torre in 1302.

2. The Guelf leaders in Lombardy, who, as well as many Ghibellines, had visited Henry at Asti, were anxious to prevent him from going to Milan, fearing that he would deprive Guido (or, as our historian calls him, Guidotto) della Torre of the lordship of that city.

3. *I.e.* head of nearly all the Ghibellines of Lombardy.

4. Or rather, lilies.

5. Several members of the Della Torre family were in the

Emperor's camp, and had been reconciled by him to Matteo Visconti.

6. The Guelf colours. Guido della Torre had refused to disband the mercenaries in his pay, and to give up "the palace of the Commonwealth," where he resided, for the Emperor's use.

7. He was Count of Langosco, and father-in-law to Guido della Torre.

8. *I.e.* his staff of office. It was, however, the Podestà of Milan who went before Guido della Torre, that cast down the staff.

CHAPTER XXVI

The Emperor's coronation and court at Milan (Dec. 1310 to Jan. 1311).

[THE Emperor] was received in Milan by the people with great rejoicing, and reconciled M. Guidotto and M. Maffeo, together with their followers, and he did many other noble actions, and [held] several "parliaments" (1). He also sent several letters to Germany, having had news that his son had been crowned King of Bohemia, and had recently taken a wife (2), of which he was very glad.

By ancient custom the Emperor had to receive the first crown at Monza (3). For love of the Milanese, and in order not to turn back, he took the iron crown, he and his wife, at Milan, in the Church of S. Ambrose, on the morning of the Nativity, the 25th day of December 1310. This crown was of thin iron, in the form of laurel leaves, burnished and bright as a sword, and [set] with many large pearls and other stones.

He kept a great and splendid court at Milan, and the Empress gave many gifts to his knights on the morning of the 1st of January 1310 (4). The Guelf or the Ghibelline party he would not hear

mentioned. False report accused him wrongly : the Ghibellines said : "He will see none but Guelfs ;" the Guelfs said : "He receives none but Ghibellines ;" and so they feared one another. The Guelfs went to him no longer, but the Ghibellines often visited him, because they had greater need of him, [and] they deemed that for the burdens they had borne for the Empire, they ought to be in greater favour with him ; but the Emperor's will was most just, for each he loved, each he honoured as his own man (5).

The Cremonese came hither to do fealty in "parliament" (6) with a sincere mind ; hither [came] the Genoese also and gave him gifts (7), and for love of them he ate at a great feast from a golden bowl. The Count Filippone was at court ; M. Manfredi di Beccheria (8), M. Antonio of Foscieraco (9), lord of Lodi, and other lords and barons of Lombardy stood before him. His life consisted not in playing or in fowling, or amusements, but in continual councils, appointing his Vicars in the cities (10), and making peace between those who were at strife.

1. See below, *n.* 6.

2. John, the Emperor's eldest son, married Elizabeth, daughter of Wenceslas IV., who had been King of Bohemia from 1278 till 1305.

3. By the "first crown" Dino means the first crown received in Italy. Strictly speaking, the "first crown" should refer to the coronation at Aachen with the silver crown. Henry had been crowned there on January 6, 1309. The "iron crown" was by custom bestowed at Milan (not at Monza, though ambassadors from there tried to persuade Henry to the contrary). This crown (which is still shown in the Cathedral of Monza) had been pawned by the Della Torre family in 1273, and was not forthcoming for Henry's coronation. A new one was therefore made, which Dino describes in this chapter.

4. 1311 N.S. No less than 170 knights were made on this occasion, to each of whom a charger and three garments were given. The latter, very probably, were bestowed by the Empress.

5. *I.e.* as vassals of the Emperor, whose rule extends over the whole world (*cf.* Dante, *Epist.* v. 99 *ff.*; vi. 1-25).

6. The official record of this proceeding (Bonaini, *Acta Henrici VII.* i. 117) shows what Dino means by a "parliament." On Jan. 4, 1311, the "discreet man" Ribaldo *de Avenariis*, attended at Milan in "a certain chamber where the aforesaid king (*i.e.* the Emperor, King of the Romans) abode" (see III. 29, *n.* 5), and on behalf of himself and the Commonwealth of Cremona swore fealty to the Emperor as immediate lord of the Commonwealth and its men, and kissed his feet in the presence of the Archbishop of Trier, the Emperor's brother Waleran, the Count of Savoy, and other persons.

7. Observe that the Genoese did not swear fealty to the Emperor, having been expressly forbidden to do so by their government. The same remark applies to the Venetians, who also sent gifts to him.

8. Manfredi di Beccheria was the head of the Ghibellines of Pavia, as Filippone, Count of Langosco (see preceding chapter, *n.* 7), was of the Guelfs.

9. This name should be Fisiraga. The person in question is called M. Antonio of Fostierato in III. 4. He was the head of the Guelfs in Lodi.

10. *I.e.* superseding the Guelf or Ghibelline Podestà by governors representing himself.

CHAPTER XXVII

Renewal of discord between the Della Torre and Visconti families: and between members of the Della Torre family. Riot in Milan, which is quelled by the Emperor's Marshal. Flight of the Della Torre. Beginning of the supremacy of the Visconti (January to April 1311).

THE Milanese had decreed that a gift of money should be made to the Emperor, and in reference to the collection of it there were recriminations in the

council between those within the city and the returned exiles (1). M. Guido had two sons, who began to repent of all that their father had done (2), and they listened to the words of the complainers in their party. The Emperor conceived the idea of withdrawing some of the most powerful men of both parties and taking them with him (3); and of placing others under bounds. The sons of M. Mosca (4) (one of whom was Archbishop [of Milan]), who were cousins of M. Guidotto, had become enemies [of the latter] through rivalry [for power], for which reason he had kept them in prison; but the Emperor had procured their release (5) and had effected a reconciliation. But M. Guidotto's sons did not keep the peace; and one day, having summoned their friends for the purpose, they began the feud again, and [the opponents] abused one another at a council in language which became so violent that [M. Guidotto's sons] took up arms and barricaded themselves in the Guasto of the Della Torre family (6). There was a great riot: the Emperor's Marshal (7) went to the place as well as M. Galeazzo, son of Maffeo Visconti; and M. Maffeo went to the Emperor. The Marshal attacked the barricade with sixty horsemen, broke it down, and put the defenders to flight. M. Guidotto was ill with gout; he was carried elsewhere: it was said that he had escaped into the Dauphin's territory (8). His sons fled to a fortress of theirs near Como, and twenty miles distant from Milan. All their stuff was plundered. And so the rejoicing underwent a change; but not the Emperor's love, for he wished to pardon them, but they did not trust themselves to him. And then M. Maffeo

Visconti began to rise, and the Della Torre and their friends to sink. The suspicion increased more than the hatred (9). The Emperor committed the city to the care of M. Maffeo, and left there as his vicar M. Niccolò Salimbene (10) of Siena, a knight prudent and vigorous, adorned with courteous manners, stately, and open-handed.

Villani's account (ix. 11) should be compared with this chapter. There is a good deal of obscurity as to the circumstances which led to the expulsion of the family of Della Torre from Milan.

1. "Those within the city" are the Della Torre, the "returned exiles," the Visconti, who had been reinstated by the Emperor.

2. *I.e.* his not having resisted the Emperor by force of arms (see III. 25).

3. *I.e.* under colour of their forming part of the Emperor's retinue on his journey to Rome for his coronation.

4. Mosca (=fly) is a nickname. The real name of this person was Corrado della Torre. He was first cousin to Guido (Guidotto).

5. The Archbishop (Cassone della Torre) had been released by Guidotto before the Emperor's arrival.

6. *I.e.* at the houses of the Della Torre family. These houses had been destroyed in days gone by, and the site had become known as the Guasto (*i.e.* devastated spot): a name by which the place continued to be called after the houses had been rebuilt.

7. Henry of Flanders.

8. *I.e.* the dominions of the Count of Vienne, who bore the title of Dauphin (Dolphin), originally a surname of one of his predecessors. The territory was purchased by Philip VI. of France in 1349, who ceded it to Charles, eldest son of John, Duke of Normandy, his grandson, who took the title of Dauphin, which afterwards became the established designation of the eldest son of the King of France. Guido della Torre reappears below (III. 31).

9. "The hatred had been great before, and could not become much greater; but it had been, as it were, put to sleep by the peace that had been made. But now the opponents resumed their former attitude of enmity (suspicion, or mistrust)." — *Del Lungo*.

10. More properly, Bonsignore.

CHAPTER XXVIII

Cremona, incited by the Florentines, rebels against the Emperor, and drives out his Vicar. The Emperor goes to Cremona, and the citizens again make their submission (1311, . . . May).

THE Enemy, who never sleeps but is always sowing and reaping, sent discord into the hearts of the nobles of Cremona so that they were disobedient (1); and two brothers, sons of the Marquis Cavalcabò, who were lords of the city, and M. Sovramonte degli Amati, an able knight (who had been, as it were, their adversary by reason of rivalry for power), came to an agreement in this matter (2); and they received letters from the Florentines and incitements to treason. [And so the Cremonese] raised a clamour against the Emperor, and drove out his Vicar. The Emperor, when he heard this, being a high-souled man, did not lose his temper, but cited them to appear: they did not obey, and broke their faith and their oath to him. The Florentines at once sent an ambassador thither, so as not to let the fire go out, and he offered them the help of troops and money, which the Cremonese accepted; and they strengthened the city.

The Emperor rode towards Cremona. The ambassadors from thence fell at his feet, saying that they could not endure the burdens laid upon them, that they were poor, and that they would obey him, [but] without a Vicar. As the Emperor did not reply, they were instructed by secret letters that if they wished for pardon, they should send

many of their citizens of good standing to him to beg for mercy, because the Emperor desired respect. They sent many of them barefoot, with nothing on their heads, wearing only their shirts, with their leather girdles round their necks: and they came before him to beg for mercy. He did not speak to them; but they continued begging for pardon, he still riding on towards the city. When he arrived he found the gate open, and went into it: and here he stood still, put his hand to his sword, drew it, and received them under it (3). The great and powerful men who were guilty, and the noble Florentine knight, M. Rinieri Buondelmonti, who was Podestà there, departed before the Emperor came. This Podestà had been sent thither to support them against the Emperor. The Emperor caused all the powerful citizens remaining there to be seized, and M. Sovramonte also, who, either from reasoning too well or from being overconfident (4), had not fled: and he caused all those who had gone to him to beg for money to be seized, and kept them in prison. He reformed the city (5); he relieved them from their sentence (6), and sent the prisoners to Riminingo (7).

1. *I.e.* to the Emperor, to whom they had sworn fealty (III. 26, n. 6).

2. Cremona was a Guelf city, the party being divided there into two factions, the Magnates under the Cavalcabò, the *popolani* under Sovramonte Amati. The two factions now coalesced in order to throw off the supremacy of the Emperor.

3. These were solemn ceremonial acts signifying the absolute right of the Emperor to punish the rebellious city as he might think fit (*cf.* next chapter, n. 5).

4. Either he reasoned that, having been less guilty than the Cavalcabò, he would be less severely punished than

they, or else he felt so confident in the Emperor's merciful disposition that he thought he should not be punished at all.

5. *I.e.* he reinstated the Ghibelline exiles.
6. *I.e.* restored the privileges forfeited by their rebellion.
7. A fortress in the neighbourhood of Cremona.

CHAPTER XXIX

The city of Brescia rebels against the Emperor, who besieges it. After a long siege the city surrenders to him (1311, . . . October).

THE Brescians had carried out the Emperor's commands and received his Vicar; M. Tibaldo Bruciati and M. Maffeo di Maggio were each the head of a party there; and while he was sojourning at Cremona, M. Maffeo, who had held the city of Brescia before, in order to obey him resigned the government to his pleasure (1). M. Tibaldo (who had received benefits from the Emperor, for whereas formerly he had been wandering through Lombardy in wretchedness and poverty with his followers, he had now been reinstated by him) betrayed him. For when the Emperor sent from Cremona for the knights who were to come to obey him (2), [M. Tibaldo] sent all those of M. Maffeo's party who had obeyed (3). When [the Emperor] became aware of this, he sent for certain by name (4), but they did not come. He had them summoned [to appear] within a given time, under a penalty, and still they did not come. The Emperor, perceiving their wickedness, came forth from his chamber (5) with a few [of his Court] at his side, and having had his sword girt on him, he set his face towards

Brescia, placed his hand on his sword, half drew it from the sheath, and cursed the city of Brescia.

And he appointed a new Vicar in Cremona (6).

On the 12th of May 1311, the Emperor rode to Brescia with his troops and with a great part of the Lombards, and counts and lords (7). And he laid siege to it, because he had been thus advised ; for [he had been informed] it could not hold out, because the inhabitants were unprovided with supplies, and they were at the end of their corn, and “when the Brescians see the camp set up, they will surrender at once ; but if thou leavest the city alone, all Lombardy is lost, and all thy opponents will make their nest there. But this will be a victory to strike terror into all the rest” (8). He prepared for the siege ; he sent for masons and carpenters, prepared engines of war and covered mines (9), and showed many clear signs of fighting. The city was very strong and inhabited by brave people, and on the hilly side of it there was a fort, and the slope was precipitous (10) : the garrison could not be deprived of access to this fort. The city was difficult to take by assault. [The Emperor] took up his position here (11) one day, thinking to assault the city on the side towards Germany, because if that part of it were taken the city would be conquered.

M. Tibaldo, intending to bring succour, went to that part, and through the justice of God his horse stumbled and fell. He was seized and led to the Emperor, who rejoiced greatly at his capture ; and having caused him to be tried, he had him drawn round the city on an ox’s hide, and then beheaded, and his body quartered ; and the others who were taken he caused to be hanged.

In like manner those within behaved cruelly to those without ; when they seized one of them, they placed him on the battlements, in order that he might be seen ; and there they flayed him, and showed great wickedness. And if any of those within were taken, they were hanged by those without. And thus, with engines of war and cross-bows, both within and without they fought hard against one another. The city could not be so closely invested that spies did not enter it, sent by the Florentines, who encouraged them with letters and sent money.

One day M. Galerano (12), the Emperor's brother, a fine man and of lofty stature, was riding round the city to observe it, without a helmet on his head [and] wearing a bright red doublet ; he was hit on the neck by an arrow, so that he only lived a few days. They robed him after the manner of princes, and he was carried to Verona, where he was honoured with burial.

Many counts, knights, and barons, Germans and Lombards, died at Brescia. Very many fell sick there, because the siege lasted until the 18th of September.

On the 18th of September 1311 (13) (because the position of the camp was inconvenient, the heat great, the supplies brought from a distance, and the knights delicately nurtured ; and within the city very many of the people were dying of hunger and hardship, owing to the watch they were obliged to keep and to their great anxieties), through the mediation of three Cardinals who had been sent from the Pope to the Emperor—who were Messer of Ostia, Messer of Albano, and Messer dal Fiesco (14)—an agree-

ment was effected between the Emperor and the Brescians that they should give up the city to him, their goods and their persons being spared. And they surrendered to the said Cardinals.

The Emperor entered the city, and kept the terms that had been made with them. He caused the walls to be destroyed, and placed some of the Brescians under bounds; and he left the siege with far fewer of his knights, for they had died there, while many had turned back sick.

1. The Maggi were the heads of the Ghibelline party; the Bruciati, or Brusati, of the Guelf party. Under the rule of the Maggi, Tibaldo and the rest of his party had been in exile; but the Emperor, in accordance with his design to make peace in all the Italian cities, had reinstated the Guelfs in Brescia, deprived the Ghibellines of the government, and placed both parties alike under the rule of his own Vicar.

2. *I.e.* when the Emperor made from Cremona the same demand on Brescia for reinforcements that he had made on other cities in Lombardy.

3. The meaning of this is, that Tibaldo Bruciati contrived that the only knights sent to the Emperor should be those who were followers of Maffeo Maggi (*i.e.* Ghibellines), and had with their leader already submitted to the Emperor (as stated in the first sentence of the chapter). The consequence was that the city of Brescia remained at the mercy of Tibaldo and the Guelfs.

4. *I.e.* certain of the followers of Tibaldo.

5. The word "chamber" was used in a special sense of the imperial residence (*cf.* III. 26, *n.* 6). As to the ceremonial acts here mentioned *cf.* previous chapter, *n.* 3.

6. The new Vicar was Galeazzo, son of Maffeo Visconti (*cf.* III. 27, near the end).

7. *I.e.* in addition to his German troops the Emperor was followed by the forces of many cities in Lombardy and by various Italian Magnates.

8. *Cf.* the VIIth Epistle of Dante, who there urges Henry to hasten to Tuscany.

9. *Cave e coverta*, lit. excavations and coverings. The exact nature of the works is uncertain.

10. The reference is to the high ground at the north-east corner of the city.

11. *I.e.* on the north-east side; which Dino immediately afterwards calls "the side towards Germany."

12. The Italian form of Waleran.

13. This sentence is clumsily put together. The parenthesis which follows contains a statement, first from the point of view of the besiegers, next from that of the besieged, of the causes which led them to desire to bring the struggle to a close.

14. Messer of Ostia was the Cardinal of Prato (III. 1, *n.* 5); Messer of Albano was Leonardo Patrasso of Guercino, Bishop of Albano, uncle of Boniface VIII.; Messer dal Fiesco was Luca Fieschi, of the family of the Counts of Lavagna (*cf.* II. 35, *n.* 9). These and two other Cardinals, Arnaut Fauger, Bishop of Sabina (a Gascon), and Francesco Orsini (mentioned above, II. 35), had been deputed by the Pope to officiate at the Emperor's coronation, and to bear him company to Rome, that he might have an angelic escort, like the young Tobias, as Clement expresses himself in the Bull appointing them (*Bonaini*, i. 187).

CHAPTER XXX

The Emperor proceeds to Pavia, and to Genoa, where he is received with great honour, and the lordship of the city is conferred on him. Death of the Empress (October to December 1311).

THE Emperor departed from Brescia and went on to Pavia, on account of a quarrel which had arisen between those of the House of Beccheria and M. Riccardino, son of Count Filippone (1), because the Bishop of Pavia had died, and each wished for the new appointment (2). And so great was the strife that those of the House of Beccheria slew four of their adversaries. The Vicar (3), together with M. Riccardino, fought with those of the House of Beccheria so that they drove them out of the city, and took from them their fortresses outside it.

Thinking he had lost much time [already], the Emperor rode towards Genoa, which was held by M. Branca d'Oria (4), where he arrived on the 21st of October 1311, and M. Branca d'Oria (4) received him honourably and swore obedience to him.

M. Obizzino Spinola, the leader of the other faction (who had been outlawed), came to meet him, and honoured him with much reverence. Wise men thought that it was the quarrel between the two factions that caused so much honour to be paid him, because they acted as they did out of rivalry. But the Genoese are by nature very haughty and proud, and quarrelsome among themselves, so much so that the old King Charles was never able to make peace among them (5). And, on account of their pride, it was never believed that they would even give the Emperor passage, much less receive him as their lord (6). "For the citizens" [it was said] "are resentful, their coast is mountainous; the Germans are free with the women, the Genoese are jealous of them: there will be fighting."

[But] God, who rules and governs princes and peoples, instructed them, and they bowed their wills, prudently, like noble men, and honoured the Emperor, and kept him in their city several months. During this time Death, who spares none nor [delays his coming] for long, by the will of God parted from the world the noble Empress, a lady of the highest renown for a life virtuous even to sanctity, a servant of Christ's poor. She was buried with great honour on the 12th of November in the principal church of Genoa (7).

1. See III. 25, *n.* 7; III. 26, *n.* 8.

2. *I.e.* each side wanted the new Bishop to be a member

of their own family, or, at least, to be a man amenable to their influence.

3. *I.e.* the Vicar whom Henry had put there (see next chapter, *n.* 7).

4. For Branca d'Oria (whom Dante has rendered infamous in *Inferno* xxxiii. 137 *ff.*), the name of his son Barnabas d'Oria should be substituted here and below. This man, and his rival, Obizzino Spinola, mentioned just below, were both Ghibellines.

5. Dino here insinuates that factious rivalry was no new thing in Genoa, and would therefore not be enough to account for the honour paid by both parties to the Emperor; moreover, this independent spirit of the Genoese would naturally, as in the time of Charles I. of Anjou, revolt against submission to any external authority. He is leading up to the statement in the next paragraph, that the submission of the city was due to the direct interposition of God.

6. On November 1, 1311, Henry was appointed Lord of Genoa for twenty years, with the right of appointing a vicar to rule there.

7. The Empress (see III. 24, *n.* 8) died on December 14, and was buried in the Church of S. Francesco di Castelletto, which was demolished at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER XXXI

Ghiberto of Correggio, bribed by the Florentines, rebels against the Emperor and overthrows his authority in Parma, Reggio, and Cremona. The Emperor's work of pacification in Lombardy undone (October 1311 to January 1312).

THE Florentines showed themselves altogether hostile towards him (the Emperor) by bringing about the rebellion of the cities of Lombardy. By money and by promises in letters they corrupted M. Ghiberto, lord of Parma (1), and gave him 15,000 florins in order that he might betray

the Emperor and raise the city in revolt against him.

Ah ! how much evil did this knight set himself to do, who had received great favours from him (the Emperor) in so short a time. For the Emperor had given him the fine fortress of San Donnino ; and another fortress which was on the river Po, the Emperor had taken from the Cremonese and given to him (2). And he had given the fair city of Reggio into his charge (3), believing him to be a faithful and loyal knight. This man, in arms, in the Piazza of Parma, cried "Death to the Emperor !" and drove out his Vicar from the city, and welcomed the enemy (4). He sheltered himself under false words, saying that he did not do it for money, but because the Emperor had reinstated the Marquis Pallavicino in Cremona, whom M. Ghiberto held as his enemy.

The Florentines oppressed their poor citizens, taking their money from them to spend it on such merchandise as this. And they wrought so effectually that M. Ghiberto reinstated the Emperor's enemies in Cremona ; for he maintained them and gave them support on the bank of the Po ; and one day in order to help [them and] the Brescians (5), he marched with them at the head of about 100 horsemen, against M. Galeazzo, who was in charge of Cremona (6), and they entered that city, and so many joined their side that few were left who were faithful to the Emperor, and these had to evacuate the city. M. Guidotto della Torre (6) rode thither with knights gathered from Tuscany. They fortified the city with ditches and palisades.

Count Filippone, with wrathful mind, was opposing the Emperor (7), and was aiming at a matrimonial connection, a conspiracy, and a league with M. Ghiberto (8). The exiles from Brescia (9) united with him: for what the Emperor's clemency had pardoned, God had not pardoned, inasmuch as M. Tibaldo Bruciati's party, after having received pardon from the Emperor, had tried once more to take the city from him; and therefore the other party, receiving succour sooner (10), had driven him, with their weapons in their hands, from Brescia and the Contado.

Ah! how greatly did wickedness multiply among the Lombards within a short time—the wickedness of slaying one another, and breaking the oath they had sworn! (11).

1. Already mentioned in III. 16. He was one of the knights made by Henry at his coronation at Milan (III. 26).

2. This fortress was Guastalla. It had been taken from the Cremonese by Ghiberto in 1307, recaptured by them in 1311, and restored to Ghiberto by the Emperor as an hereditary fief after the submission of Cremona (III. 28) in that same year. On the other hand, the statement that the Emperor bestowed Borgo San Donnino on Ghiberto is incorrect.

3. *I.e.* he had made Ghiberto Imperial Vicar there.

4. The rebellion of Parma, and the expulsion of the Vicar whom Henry had placed there, occurred on Dec. 6, 1311.

5. The words "the Emperor's enemies" refer specially to the fugitives from Cremona (see III. 28). They occupied strong positions on the left bank of the Po at Casalmaggiore and Viandana. The former of these places is about twenty-two miles and the latter about thirty miles S.E. of Cremona, which is also on the left bank of the river. The Brescians (who are also included in the words "the Emperor's enemies") are the faction of Tibaldo Bruciati, who had been driven from the city in the circumstances stated farther on in this chapter.

6. See III. 27. Guido della Torre died in this same

year at Cremona, while engaged in his opposition to the Emperor.

7. After the Emperor's failure to make peace in Pavia, which was touched on in III. 30 (*q.v.*), Filippone, Count of Langosco, and his faction had rebelled against the Imperial Vicar, Philip of Savoy (who had replaced Fiamengo di Lando, the Vicar mentioned in that passage).

8. Filippone did, in fact, in 1312 marry, as his third wife, Helen, daughter of Ghiberto of Correggio.

9. *I.e.* the faction of Tibaldo Bruciati (*cf.* above, *n.* 5).

10. The faction of the Maggi, now headed by Federigo Maggi, Bishop of Brescia, anticipating the revolt of their rivals, had gathered round them the Ghibelline forces of the neighbourhood.

11. *I.e.* they had sworn fealty to the Emperor, and pledged themselves to live at peace together under the rule of his Vicars.

CHAPTER XXXII

Dino describes the intrigues of the Florentines to thwart the Emperor, and starting with the year 1312 (the point which his narrative has now reached), works backwards to 1311 and 1310, describing particularly the dealings of the Florentine Government with Cardinal Pelagrù in 1310.

THE Florentines who were in Florence (1), full of apprehension and fear, busied themselves about nothing else but corrupting the rulers of different places with promises and with money which they drew from the miserable citizens, who allowed it to be taken from them little by little in order to preserve [their] liberty (2). Much of it they spent in wicked works. Their lives were wholly taken up by such-like proceedings.

The Signory appointed secret agents (3): among these was one Friar Bartolomeo, son

of a money-changer, an astute man, who had sojourned in England, and in his youth had received a good education, and was of subtle wit. They sent him to Court to work on the Pope and the Cardinals. And with letters borne by M. Baldo Fini of Fighine they worked on the King of France, to whom the Cardinal of Ostia (4) said: "What wondrous impudence is this of the Florentines, who with their ten nits are saucy enough to set all the princes agog!"

To the Pope they sent two ambassadors, who were M. Pino de' Rossi and M. Gherardo Bostichi, two able knights (5); much money was extracted from them, and much of it was wasted, and they did not get anything they wanted from the Pope.

The Cardinal Pelagrù, a native of Gascony, nephew of the Pope, was sent as Legate to Bologna, because on the death of the Marquis of Ferrara (6) the city was held by a bastard son of his, who, being unable to retain it, bargained with the Venetians and sold it to them. The Venetians came there and took and held it by force. M. Francesco of Este, brother of the Marquis, together with the Bolognese and M. Orso degli Orsini of Rome, joined forces with the Church. The Cardinal went to Ferrara, and was not obeyed by the Venetians. He therefore instituted process of excommunication against them and condemned them; he proclaimed a crusade against them; and many people from various places went against them for the sake of the pardon (7) and to receive the pay. The Venetians held a fortress in Ferrara, which the Marquis had made very strong in the manner of a keep (8); the Venetians (9) came

thither by water and were discomfited, and very many of them were taken prisoners and slain. This was a disaster for them, for they were defeated very disgracefully, because the nobles who were there abandoned them (10).

Cardinal Pelagrù came to Florence, and was received with very great honour. The Carroccio (11) and the lancers (12) went to meet him as far as the hospital of San Gallo (13); the clergy went in procession, and the great *popolani* of that party (14) went on foot and on horseback to do him honour.

He arrived in Florence, and the Florentines consulted much with him, and took care to inform him how they were practising with the Pope so that he might delay the Emperor's coming (15); and they begged him to keep the Pope up to the mark; and so he promised to do. They gave him money, which he willingly accepted, and therewith paid the expenses of his legation; and having come to an understanding with them, he left Florence.

The Cardinal [then] went to the Emperor; but as the latter knew of the parleyings the Cardinal had had with the Florentines, he did not show him much good will. He returned to the Pope, and the Pope, when the Cardinal had urged him in accordance with the Florentines' request, kept them in expectation, so that he extracted large sums of money from them. Now the motive of the Florentines' action was to wear the Emperor out.

1. *I.e.* the Black Guelfs, who had control of the government, as distinguished from the exiles.

2. The point of view of these "miserable citizens" was the exact contrary of that of Dante set forth in *Epist.* v. 102 and vi. 30 and 92. In the latter passage, addressing the "most infamous Florentines within the city," he says: "Where ye think to defend the corridor of false liberty, there shall ye fall into the dungeons of true slavery."

3. *I.e.* unofficial agents, to be distinguished from the "ambassadors" mentioned afterwards.

4. *I.e.* the Cardinal of Prato (as in III. 29). The anecdote and the intrigues of the Florentines which gave rise to it are probably to be referred to the first half of 1311.

5. The date of this Embassy was Nov. 1310. See III. 33.

6. See II. 32, *n.* 1; III. 16. Azzo VIII. died January 31, 1308. Dino, before proceeding to speak of the visit of this Legate to Florence in August 1310, here refers to the original cause of his having been sent into Italy. The "bastard son" of the Marquis here mentioned was named Fresco, to whose legitimate son Folco the Marquis had bequeathed the lordship of Ferrara.

7. *Cf.* III. 6, near the beginning.

8. *Aguisa d'uno cassero*. The "*cassero*" was the strongest and most elevated part of a castle, and in the form of a rectangular or round tower. The name of this fortress was Castel Tedaldo; it was at the head of a bridge across the Po, and was destroyed in 1598. Dino's words appear to mean that the "keep" had been added to it by Azzo VIII.

9. *I.e.* reinforcements from Venice which came up the Po.

10. This statement as to the misbehaviour of the Venetian nobles appears to be unfounded. The defeat of the Venetians by the allied forces under the Cardinal Legate occurred on August 28, 1309.

11. The Carroccio was a chariot on four wheels drawn by a pair of oxen and bearing the standard of the Commonwealth, and was in ancient times taken into battle and guarded by the bravest of the *popolani*. Its use in war had been given up at the time of which Dino is writing (see Villani, vi. 75).

12. *Armeggiatori* (see I. 7, *n.* 7).

13. See III. 10, *n.* 7.

14. *I.e.* the Black Guelfs.

15. Bear in mind that Dino has now worked back to August 1310, before the Emperor had set out for Italy (see III. 24).

CHAPTER XXXIII

Deaths of the Cardinal of Albano, the Bishop of Liège, M. Pino de' Rossi, and M. Gherardo Bostichi (1311, 1312).

OF three cardinals whom the Pope had sent to the Emperor while he was besieging Brescia, one died, namely, the Cardinal of Albano, who came to Lucca sick and died there (1). The Bishop of Liège, a great friend of the Emperor, also died while in his service (2). He had given the Bishop Reggiolo, which is between Reggio and Mantua, but the Mantuans afterwards took it from the man to whom it had been entrusted (3).

The two Florentine ambassadors who were at court (4) died there, M. Pino de' Rossi dying first; and in recognition of his exertions, two of his kinsmen and relations were knighted by the people (5), and much money was given them out of what was being taken from the Ghibellines and the Whites: for although the Whites retained some marks of the Guelf party (6), they were treated by them (the Blacks) as bitter enemies. Afterwards died M. Gherardo, but his kinsmen were honoured neither by knighthood nor by money, because he had not been so faithful as the other.

1. See III. 29, *n.* 14. The Cardinal of Albano died on December 6, 1311.

2. This bishop was one of the Emperor's chief barons. He was taken prisoner in May 1312 at Rome in a battle between the Emperor's forces and those of King Robert of Naples, and as he was being carried off was wounded by a Catalan, and died soon after (see Villani, ix. 43, and below, III. 36, *n.* 9).

3. *I.e.* by the Bishop.
4. See III. 32, *n.* 5. Pino de' Rossi died in March 1311, his colleague probably later in the same year.
5. *I.e.* by the Commonwealth (see I. 8, *n.* 6).
6. *Cf.* II. 30, 31.

CHAPTER XXXIV

Political condition of Tuscany during the Emperor's advance. Guelf league against him. He sends ambassadors into Tuscany (1311, 1310).

THE Florentines, blinded by their presumption, put themselves in opposition to the Emperor, not like prudent but like presumptuous warriors, being in league with the Bolognese, the Sienese, the Lucchese, the Volterrans, the citizens of Prato, the Colligiani (1), and with the other fortresses (*sic*) belonging to their party. The Pistoians, poor and exhausted, afflicted and ruined by war, did not hold with them altogether, not because they were not of one mind [with them], but because [the Florentines] had been wont to appoint Podestà there with such high salaries that they could not support the payments (2). They would therefore not have been able to pay their quota (3), since they were paying 48,000 florins a year to the Marshal and his men (4). And they kept this force with them so that the Florentines might not come into the city. The Lucchese always kept ambassadors at the Emperor's court, and sometimes they said that they would obey him if he would grant them letters [declaring] that they might retain as their own the lands they held which belonged to the Empire (5), and that

he would not reinstate their exiles (6). The Emperor made no agreement with them nor with others; but he sent M. Louis of Savoy (7) and other ambassadors into Tuscany, who were honourably received by the Lucchese and presented with pieces of taffeta and other things. The citizens of Prato and all the other cities presented him with splendid gifts, excusing themselves [from swearing fealty to him on the ground that] they were in league with the Florentines.

Siena played the harlot (8), for throughout this war she did not bar the enemy's passage, nor yet altogether depart from the will of the Florentines. The Bolognese held firmly to the Florentines against the Emperor, because they greatly feared him; they fortified themselves strongly, and set up palisades round the city. It was said that they had no defence against him because the Church had given him passage (9); however, since it seemed to him that that was a difficult way by which to enter Tuscany, he did not go by it.

It was said that the Marquises Malespini wanted to make him come through Lunigiana (10), and had the roads prepared, and widened in the narrow places. If he had gone by that way, he would have entered amongst faithless vassals; but God instructed him.

1. See I. 9, n. 5. The league here spoken of had begun to be discussed in November 1310, when the Emperor had just entered Italy, and was formed early in 1311 (Bonaini, ii. 3, 4, 17).

2. After the surrender of Pistoja (III. 15) the offices of Captain and Podestà were filled one by a Florentine, the other by a Lucchese.

3. *Taglia*, i.e. their contribution towards the support of the forces of the league (cf. II. 32, n. 5).

4. In 1309 the Pistoians had surrendered their city to King Robert of Naples, who appointed a Vicar to rule in his name. Diego de la Rat continued to hold the office of Marshal that he had held under King Robert's father, Charles the Lame (see III. 19, *n.* 5).

5. *I.e.* estates and fortresses which had formerly been held by vassals of the Empire but over which the Commonwealth had extended its jurisdiction (see I. 1, *n.* 5).

6. *I.e.* the Ghibelline exiles, in accordance with the Emperor's policy of pacification.

7. Louis of Savoy was nephew of the Emperor's brother-in-law, Amedeus V. (see III. 24, *n.* 8). The embassy in question was sent in the summer of 1310.

8. *Cf.* II. 23, *n.* 9.

9. *I.e.* they could not have resisted him without rebelling against the Church, under whose supremacy Romagna was. King Robert was the Pope's Vicar in Romagna.

10. Dino, in preparation for the resumption in the next chapter of his narrative of the Emperor's journey to Rome, here goes back to consider Henry's position after the end of the siege of Brescia (see III. 29), and intimates that he hesitated between entering Tuscany by the road from Bologna to Florence and entering it by the valley of the Magra or Macra, which was known as Lunigiana and was under the dominion of the family of Malaspina (or, as Dino calls them, Malespini), some of whom were Guelfs and others Ghibellines. In the end Henry took a third alternative and went (as we have seen) by Pavia to Genoa (III. 30), and, as we shall see at the beginning of the next chapter, from Genoa to Pisa by sea.

CHAPTER XXXV

The Emperor arrives at Pisa and is received there with great rejoicing (March 6, 1312). The Florentines refuse to send ambassadors to him there. Account of the Florentines' reception of the Emperor's ambassador, Louis of Savoy, in 1310.

THE Emperor went to Genoa in order to get to Pisa, a city devoted heart and soul to the imperial

cause, which hoped more from his coming than any other city, which had sent him 70,000 florins when he was in Lombardy, and had promised him 70,000 when he should arrive in Tuscany, thinking to recover her fortresses (1) and to rule over her adversaries. This [is the city] which presented him with the splendid sword as a token of love; which rejoiced and was glad at his prosperity; which was often threatened on his account; which has always been an open door (2) for him and for the new princes who have come into Tuscany by sea or by land to assist their party (3); which is carefully watched by Florentines, when [its citizens] rejoice over the prosperity of the Empire.

The Emperor arrived at Pisa on the 6th of March 1311 (4) with 30 galleys, where he was received with great rejoicing and gladness, and honoured as their lord. The Florentines did not send ambassadors thither because the citizens were not at peace [with him]; once they had chosen ambassadors to send to him and then they did not send them (5), trusting more to simony and to corrupting the Court of Rome than to making terms with him.

M. Louis of Savoy [who had been] sent as ambassador into Tuscany by the Emperor, came to Florence (6), and was little honoured by the noble citizens, who did the contrary of what they ought. He demanded that an ambassador should be sent to do honour and promise obedience to the Emperor as their lord. Their answer, given by M. Betto Brunelleschi on behalf of the Signory, was "that never to any lord had the Florentines lowered their horns" (7). And they sent no

ambassador to him (8), though they would have obtained the most favourable terms from him, because the Guelfs of Tuscany were the greatest obstacle he met with.

When the ambassador departed (9) he returned to Pisa. And the Florentines caused a fort to be built at Arezzo and began the war again there (10). They showed themselves altogether hostile to the Emperor, saying that he was a cruel tyrant, that he joined himself to the Ghibellines and would not look at the Guelfs. And in their official documents they used the words "for the honour of Holy Church and the death of the King of Germany" (11). They removed the Eagles from their gates and from any places where they were carved or painted, imposing punishment on any who should paint them, or should not obliterate them when painted.

1. Fortresses surrendered to Florence and Lucca in 1285 by Count Ugolino della Gherardesca (then ruler of Pisa), after the defeat of the Pisans by the Genoese at the battle of La Meloria in 1284, and the subsequent alliance between the Genoese and the League of Guelf cities in Tuscany against Pisa (*cf. Inf.* xxxiii. 85, 86 *n.*).

2. *Diritta porta*.

3. Dino here passes from the Emperor Henry VII. in particular to refer to his predecessors. "New princes" seems to mean "princes from foreign lands."

4. 1312 N.S.

5. Dino makes a rapid transition back to 1310, and he seems to be referring to the refusal of the Florentine government in that year to send ambassadors, after having already appointed them, to Henry at Lausanne before he crossed the Alps, as stated by Villani, ix. 7; since they seem to have had ambassadors at his court at the end of that year. See Bonaini, ii. 6, 7; and *Bullettino della Società Dantesca Italiana*, x. 136 *n.*

6. See preceding chapter, *n.* 7. Louis arrived at Florence on July 3, 1310.

7. See Dante, *Epist.* vii. 155-157. Cf. Villani, viii. 120.

8. *I.e.* before his arrival in Italy. See *n.* 5 to this chapter.

9. *I.e.* Louis of Savoy (above *n.* 6 to this chapter).

10. The allusion is to the refusal of the Florentines, at the bidding of Louis of Savoy and his colleagues in the embassy, to raise the siege of Arezzo, on which they were engaged in June and July 1310 (see Villani, viii. 118-120). When at length, at the end of July, the army returned to Florence they left a garrison in a fort they had built near Arezzo (as stated by Dino), who "made much war" against the city.

11. Dino now returns to the year 1312. The following quotation from a letter written on Aug. 10 in that year by the Florentine government to King Robert (Bonaini, ii. 136) illustrates what Dino here says of their language in their "public documents" (*bandi*). They entreat the king to deign "to come with the army you have repeatedly promised to Rome without delay, for the exaltation of yourself and your posterity, the safety of all who are devoted to you, and the confusion and death of the King of Germany, his favourers and accomplices, the inveterate rebels against and persecutors of the Holy Church of God."

CHAPTER XXXVI

The Emperor proceeds to Rome, and, in consequence of the undisguised and persistent opposition of the Florentines, abandons his attitude of impartiality and identifies himself with the Ghibellines. His coronation (1312).

THE Emperor, mocked by the Florentines, departed from Pisa and went to Rome, where he arrived on the 7th of May 1312, and was honourably received as lord (1) and put into the Senator's place (2). Hearing of the wrongs which the Guelfs of Tuscany had done him, and finding that the

Ghibellines who attached themselves to him were well disposed, he changed his purpose and attached himself to them ; turning towards them [alone] the love and kindness he had at first given to the Guelfs [also]. And he resolved to help them, and to reinstate them, but to hold the Guelfs and the Blacks as enemies and persecute them.

The Florentines had always kept ambassadors at the court of King Robert, begging him to attack the Emperor with his troops, promising and giving him much money (3).

King Robert, like a wise (4) prince and a friend of the Florentines, promised to help them (5) and did so ; while to the Emperor he made a pretence of urging and admonishing the Florentines to be obedient to him, as their lord. And when he heard that the Emperor was at Rome, he sent his brother M. John thither at once with 300 horsemen (6), feigning to send him for his (the Emperor's) defence and for the honour of his crown ; but King Robert sent him in order that he might come to an understanding with the Orsini, the Emperor's enemies, corrupt the Senate (7), and hinder his coronation ; and truly he (King Robert) knew what he was about.

Feigning great love to the Emperor, the king sent him his ambassadors to congratulate him on his coming, making him splendid offers, soliciting a matrimonial alliance (8), [and saying] that he was sending his brother to honour his coronation and to help him if needful.

The most wise Emperor answered him with his own mouth : "The King's offers are late, and M. John's coming is too early." The Emperor's

answer was wise, for he well understood the cause of his coming.

On the 1st of August 1312, Henry, Count of Luxemburg, Emperor and King of the Romans, was crowned at Rome in the church of San Giovanni Laterano by M. Nicholas, Cardinal of Prato, and by M. Luca dal Fiesco, Cardinal of Genoa, and by M. Arnaldo Pelagrù, a Gascon Cardinal, by licence and mandate of Pope Clement V. and of his Cardinals (9).

1. *I.e.* by the Colonna and the Ghibellines (*cf.* below, *n.* 9).

2. *I.e.* the Senator (see below, *n.* 7), Louis of Savoy (III. 34, *n.* 7; 35), surrendered his jurisdiction to the Emperor.

3. This applies not only to the present year, 1312, but to the years preceding.

4. He was surnamed "the Wise." Villani (xii. 10) says that "he was the wisest king that has been among Christians for the last 500 years, both as to natural wit and as to learning, a great master in theology, and a supreme philosopher."

5. There is probably a special reference here to King Robert's visit to Florence in Sept. 1310 (see III. 24, *n.* 9).

6. This is inaccurate. John of Anjou, Prince of Taranto, had been sent by King Robert to Rome with an army, at the instance of the Florentines (Bonaini, ii. 92), before the Emperor reached Pisa; and the Florentines also sent a paid contingent to support him.

7. This statement is puzzling, since the mediæval Senate of Rome, which had been set on foot in 1144 as the result of a rising of the people against the nobles, had ever since 1198 been reduced to a single Senator (or sometimes two), whose office resembled that of the Podestà in other Italian cities. A sort of *popolano* government, consisting of a body of thirteen "elders" and a captain, had been set up in 1305, but as a matter of fact the city had been in a state of utter confusion and anarchy for some years before Henry's coronation; and had been the scene of constant fighting between the Colonna and the Orsini factions.

8. It is impossible to reconcile Dino's statements in this sentence with the facts. So far from making a show of

friendship, King Robert's forces under Prince John were offering a vigorous resistance to Henry (see next note). In March 1312 Henry had sent ambassadors to Robert to continue negotiations already begun concerning a marriage between his daughter Beatrice and Robert's son Charles, Duke of Calabria, and to propose an arrangement in reference to Henry's coronation and the affairs of Lombardy and Tuscany. But these negotiations had no result, and Henry's ambassadors returned to him soon after his arrival at Rome. Perhaps some insulting message King Robert sent back by them may have been the foundation of Dino's anecdote.

9. The day of the coronation was June 29. The western and most populous part of the city, including St. Peter's, where the coronation should have been performed, was in the hands of the Orsini and the forces of Prince John, and was strongly fortified. Desperate but unavailing attempts were made by the Imperialists to dislodge their enemies, and at length, after the struggle had continued for about a month, it was settled that the ceremony should be held in St. John Lateran. The principal officiating prelate was the Cardinal of Sabina, Arnaut Fauger (see III. 29, n. 14), whom Dino confounds with Cardinal Arnaut Pelagrù, who was not present.

CHAPTER XXXVII

Dino, having brought his narrative to an end by the coronation of Henry VII. as Emperor, sets forth in this and the next four chapters the execution of God's judgments against the leaders of the Black faction.

How doth the justice of God cause His Majesty to be praised, when by new miracles He shows to humble folk that He is not unmindful of their wrongs! Great peace does it bring to the minds of those who receive wrongs from the powerful, when they see that God remembers them. And how openly God's acts of vengeance are known

when He has delayed and suffered long! But when He delays it is for heavier punishment; though many believe that He has forgotten.

There were four leaders in this faction of the Blacks (1), that is to say, M. Rosso della Tosa, M. Pazzino de' Pazzi, M. Betto Brunelleschi, and M. Geri Spini. Afterwards two more were added to them, that is to say, M. Tegghiajo Frescobaldi, and M. Gherardo Ventraia, a man of little sincerity (2).

These six knights compelled Folcieri, Podestà of Florence, to behead Masino Cavalcanti and one of the Gherardini (3). These caused the Priors and the other officials within and without [the city] to be elected as they pleased. These released and condemned whom they would, gave authoritative opinions (4), and rendered services and disservices as they chose.

1. *I.e.* after the death of Corso Donati.

2. See I. 22, n. 6.

3. See II. 29.

4. *Davano le risposte.* Cf. III. 19, where the same phrase is used in reference to the first four of these ringleaders of the Black faction.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

Character and death of M. Rosso della Tosa. Career of his sons.

M. ROSSO DELLA TOSA was an ambitious knight, the leader in the Florentines' quarrels, the enemy of the people, the friend of tyrants. This was he who sundered the entire Guelf party of Florence

into Whites and Blacks (1); this was he who kindled the discords among the citizens; this was he who by his activity, by making treaties and promises (2), held the rest under him. He was very loyal to the Black party, and persecuted the Whites. On him the surrounding cities of the Black party relied, and with him they made agreements.

This man—having long been awaited by God, seeing that he was more than seventy-five years old—was walking one day, [when] a dog ran between his feet and threw him down, so that he broke his knee, and a fistula formed in it; and while the doctors were torturing him, he died in convulsions (3). And he was buried with great honour, as was fitting for a great citizen.

He left two sons, Simone and Gottifredi, who were knighted by the party (4), and with them was knighted a young kinsman of theirs called Pinuccio, and much money was given them. And they were known as the “knights of the spinning-wheel,” because the money which was given them was taken from the poor women who spun at a spinning-wheel.

These two knights, his sons, attempting to live in great state in order to be honoured (for they thought that the deeds of their father demanded this), began to decay, while M. Pino began to prosper, and in a short time made himself great (5).

1. *I.e.* he was one of those who did most to cause and keep on foot the division of the Guelf party.

2. The “treaties” refer to his negotiations with other cities; the “promises,” to pledges given to members of his own faction in Florence.

3. He died in July 1309.

4. *I.e.* by the authority of the organisation known as the Guelf party in its narrower sense (see I. 3, n. 2). Gottifredi = Godfrey.

5. There is an interesting connection between Pino della Tosa and Dante, for it was he, together with Ostasio of Polenta, by whose influence the Cardinal Legate Beltrando of Poggetto was dissuaded from his infamous purpose of burning the bones of Dante in 1329 (Wicksteed's "Early Lives of Dante," p. 98; Ricci, *L'ultimo rifugio di Dante*, pp. 187-192; Zenatti, *Dante e Firenze*, p. 188). Pino della Tosa was in that year ambassador from Florence to Bologna.

CHAPTER XXXIX

Character of M. Betto Brunelleschi.

His death (March 1311).

M. BETTO BRUNELLESCHI and his house were of Ghibelline stock. He was rich, having many estates and much property; [but] he was held in great infamy by the people, because in times of dearth he locked up his grain and said: "Either I will have such a price for it, or it shall never be sold at all." He treated the Whites and Ghibellines very ill, and showed them no pity; and that for two reasons—first, in order that he might stand better with the ruling party; secondly, because he never hoped for mercy for such a fault as his (1). He was much employed in embassies, because he was a good speaker. He was on familiar terms with Pope Boniface, and very intimate with M. Napoleone Orsino, the Cardinal, when he was legate in Tuscany; and he put the Cardinal off with words (2), depriving him of all hope of making peace between the Whites and Blacks of Florence.

This knight was in great part the cause of M. Corso Donati's death (3); and he had so given himself up to evil that he cared neither for God nor for the world, [even] trying to become reconciled to the Donati by excusing himself and accusing others. One day when he was playing chess, two young men of the Donati, with others, their companions, came to him at his house, and wounded him in the head repeatedly, so that they left him for dead. But one of his sons wounded a son of Biccicocco (4) so that he only survived a few days. For some days M. Betto's condition was such that men thought he would escape; but after some days, frenzied, without repenting or making amends to God and to the world, and in great disfavour with many citizens, he died miserably. Many rejoiced at his death, for he was a very bad citizen.

1. *I.e.* deserting his party, that of the Whites (see II. 23).
2. See III. 18.
3. See III. 21, *n.* 3.
4. A member of the Donati family.

CHAPTER XL

M. Pazzino de' Pazzi murdered by Paffiera Cavalcanti (Jan. 1312). In consequence of this the Cavalcanti, who had been reinstated after their former banishment (see III. 8), are banished again.

M. PAZZINO DE' PAZZI, one of the four chief rulers of the city, tried to make peace with the Donati for himself and for M. Pino (1), although he (M.

Pino) had not been much to blame for the death of M. Corso ; because [though] he had been a great friend of M. Corso, he had not meddled in the strife (2).

Now the Cavalcanti, who were a powerful family and had amongst them about seventy men able to bear arms, deeply hated these six predominant knights (3), who had constrained the Podestà, Folcieri, to behead Masino Cavalcanti, but they endured it without making any sign.

One day Paffiera Cavalcanti, a high-spirited youth, hearing that M. Pazzino had gone on the dry bed of the Arno by Santa Croce (4) with a falcon and with one servant only, mounted his horse with certain companions, and they went to find him. When he saw them he began to flee toward the Arno : [Paffiera] followed him and thrust him through the back with a lance. He fell into the water, and they cut his veins, and fled towards Val di Sieve (5). And thus he died miserably.

The Pazzi and Donati armed themselves and ran to the palace (6) ; and with the Gonfalon of Justice and with some of the city militia (7) they rushed to the houses of the Cavalcanti in the New Market, and set fire to three of their palaces with fagots. Then they turned towards the house of M. Brunetto (8), believing he had caused this [deed] to be done.

M. Attaviano Cavalcanti was aided by the sons of M. Pino (9) and by others of his friends. They made barricades, and with horse and foot made themselves so strong that their opponents could do nothing ; for within the barricade were M. Gotti-

fredi and M. Simone della Tosa, Testa Tornaquinci, some of their kinsmen and some of the Scali, of the Agli, of the Lucardesi, and of many other families, who defended them bravely until they were compelled to disarm (10).

When the citizens had become quiet, the Pazzi accused the Cavalcanti, and forty-eight of them were condemned in property and person. M. Attaviano took refuge in a hospital, through the protection of the Rossi; afterwards he went away to Siena.

Several sons of M. Pazzino survived him, two of whom were knighted by the Commonwealth, as well as two of their kinsmen, and they were given 4000 florins and 40 bushels of corn.

1. Probably M. Pino de' Rossi, whose embassy to the Papal Court in 1310 is mentioned in III. 32, 33.

2. Lit. "he troubled himself about nothing else"—*i.e.* in spite of his friendship with M. Corso, he did not interfere in the struggle between M. Corso and his enemies. See III. 20, where the Rossi are mentioned among other of the "conspirators" who failed to come to M. Corso's help.

3. See III. 37.

4. In this year 1312 the third circle of the walls (*cf.* III. 10, *n.* 7) was still unfinished, and the church of Sta. Croce was still outside the city.

5. *I.e.* the valley of the Sieve, which falls into the Arno at Pontassieve, about 12 miles east of Florence.

6. *I.e.* the palace of the Signory. The Donati, who had been banished in 1308 (see III. 20), had been recalled in 1311 (*cf.* next chapter).

7. *Con parte del popolo.* *Popolo* is here equivalent to the "companies" composing the city militia (see II. 22, *n.* 4).

8. Del Lungo thinks that a M. Brunetto Brunelleschi is here meant.

9. Pino de' Rossi. It does not appear, says Del Lungo, that the Rossi were too well pleased with Pazzino's officious attempt to mediate between them and the Donati, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.

10. *I.e.* the Cavalcanti and their supporters were finally overpowered by their opponents.

CHAPTER XLI

Dino makes a brief general reference to the violent end of the leaders of the Black Guelfs, and a particular reference to the continued miserable existence of the last of them, M. Geri Spini (1312).

IN how small a space of ground, the place where justice is done and wicked doers are punished by an evil death, have five cruel citizens perished! (1) These were M. Corso Donati, M. Niccola de' Cerchi, M. Pazzino de' Pazzi, Gherardo Bordoni, and Simone, son of M. Corso Donati (2), while M. Rosso della Tosa and M. Betto Brunelleschi [also] came to a violent end, and they were punished for their errors.

M. Geri Spini has always lived much on his guard, since the Donati and their followers and the Bordoni have been recalled from banishment with great honour, [they] whose houses but a short while before had been destroyed by the Commonwealth, to their great shame and damage (3).

1. The "small space of ground" is the plain east of Florence on the right bank of the Arno, between the streams of Affrico and Mensola, where, in fact, these citizens did come to a violent end.

2. M. Niccola de' Cerchi belonged, of course, to the White party. He was brother to the first wife of Corso Donati (*cf.* I. 20, *n.* 3), and was murdered on Christmas Day 1301 by his nephew, Simone, son of Corso Donati. Simone was wounded by his uncle in the struggle, and died the same night (Villani, viii. 49).

3. See III. 20, and III. 40, *n.* 6.

CHAPTER XLII

Conclusion. The author proclaims the approaching chastisement of the wicked citizens by the Emperor (1312).

THUS is our city afflicted! Thus our citizens remain obstinate in evil-doing! And that which is done one day is blamed the next. Sages were wont to say, "The wise man does nought of which he may repent" (1). But in this city, and by these citizens, nothing is done so praiseworthy but it is reputed to be the contrary and is blamed. Men slay one another here; evil is not punished by law; but in proportion as the evil-doer has friends and can spend money he gets off scot-free from the crime he has committed.

Oh, unrighteous citizens, who have corrupted and defiled all the world with evil customs and false gains! (2). Ye are they who have put every evil habit into the world. Now the world begins to turn against you: the Emperor with his power will cause you to be seized and robbed by sea and land (3).

1. Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 28.

2. *I.e.* illicit gains (see I. I, n. 3).

3. Dante's *Epistola* vi. (102 ff.) is exactly in the same strain. The Emperor Henry VII. did indeed come against Florence in the autumn of this year 1312, but, after a month and half's siege, was beaten off: and on Aug. 24 of the following year he died.

APPENDIX I

Sketch of the life of Dino Compagni and of the literary history of his Chronicle.

DINO (in full, Aldobrandino or Ildebrandino) Compagni sprang from a substantial *popolano* family of merchants belonging to the wealthy guild of Por Santa Maria (see p. 268). He was born about the year 1257. He received a liberal education, knew Latin (or Grammar, as it was then called), and was familiar with the scholastic philosophy and with the Provençal and French languages. Like most men of cultivation at that time, he turned his attention to poetry. As Dino is put on a level with Guido Guinizelli, Guido Cavalcanti, Dante Alighieri, and Cino of Pistoja by Francesco of Barberino (1264-1348) in his commentary on his own *Documenti d'Amore*, it is probable that his compositions were numerous and held in high repute, though the five sonnets of his which have come down to us (one of which is referred to above, I. 20, n. 6) do not rise above mediocrity. A more meritorious effort is the poem on moral worth (*Canzone del Pregio*), printed in full at the end of Del Lungo's smaller edition of the Chronicle, in which Dino sets forth in successive stanzas the qualities which should adorn persons of every degree in the social scale, Emperor, King, Baron, Magistrate, Knight, &c. The poem is apparently unfinished and unrevised. There is also good reason for believing Dino to have been the author

of an allegorical poem in 309 stanzas called *L'intelligenza*, of which an analysis will be found in Gaspari's "History of Early Italian Literature," translated by Oelsner (Bell & Sons, 1901).

In 1280 Dino was enrolled in the guild of Por S. Maria as a master-trader, and between the years 1282 and 1299 was elected to serve as one of the four consuls of the guild no less than six times; which, considering the fact that no person who had filled that office (held for six months at a time) could be re-elected till the expiration of two years, affords proof of his capacity and of the high standing he occupied among his fellow-traders even from an early age. A still more striking proof of the influential position he had acquired among his fellow-citizens is furnished by what he himself tells us in the Chronicle (I. 4) of the part he took in 1282 in the establishment of the Priorate as the supreme authority in the Commonwealth.

From 1282 till 1301 Dino took a most active part in the political life of Florence, as is evident from the frequent references he makes in the Chronicle to his own sayings and doings in connection with public affairs, and on twenty-eight occasions during that period we find his name recorded as speaking in the councils ordinary and extraordinary of the Commonwealth. Had not the minutes of their proceedings between the years 1294 and 1301 been lost, this number would doubtless be much more considerable. Three times he was a member of the Signory, twice (in 1289 and 1301) as Prior (see I. 8; II. 5 ff.), and once (in 1293) as Gonfalonier of Justice (see I. 12).

But politics, literature, and trade did not absorb

the whole of Dino's energy. He was, as even a cursory perusal of the Chronicle shows, a man of sincere religion, and we are, therefore, not surprised to find him in the ranks of the *Compagnia di Madonna Maria d'Orto San Michele*, an association for devotional and charitable purposes, which spent its funds in the maintenance of religious services and in the relief of the poor. Dino held the office of a "Captain" of this society in 1298.

Considering the prominent part taken by Dino in public affairs as an adherent of the White party, it may seem strange that he should have escaped the sentence of banishment which so many of his companions in misfortune had to undergo. But so it was; for though early in 1302 he was threatened with the modified form of exile known as setting under bounds, he was able to claim the benefit of a law whereby no one who had filled the office of Prior could be proceeded against (except for murder or aggravated assault) till a year after he had quitted office. Accordingly Dino appeared before the Podestà, M. Cante de' Gabrielli, on May 7, 1302, and claimed his privilege; and does not seem to have been molested any more. But though Dino escaped banishment and confiscation of his goods, he was doomed to political extinction. Never again after November 7, 1301, when the last White Signory handed over the government to their Black successors (see Chronicle, II. 19) was Dino member of a Signory; never again was his voice heard in the Councils. He continued to lead the uneventful life of a Florentine merchant at his house by the Arno (the site of which is now occupied by the Corsini palace) and at his shop

hard by the palace of the Signory. Nay, such was the virulence of party hatred, he was never again appointed a Consul of his guild. On December 15, 1316, he was admitted a member of the guild of wool-merchants, paying, as one of the principal merchants, the maximum fee of 50 *lire* (Bullettino della Società Dantesca Italiana, xiii. 4 n.). He died on February 26, 1324, and was buried in the Church of S. Trinità. He was twice married—first to a lady named Filippa, whose family is not known, and secondly to Francesca (Cecca), daughter of Puccio di Benvenuto of Forlì. By his first wife he had six children. His second marriage was childless.

The Chronicle, which was to give Dino an enduring place among the historians of Italy, was, as Del Lungo thinks, begun about the opening of the year 1311, and was certainly completed in the autumn of 1312. The death of the Emperor Henry VII. in the following year shattered at once and for ever the confident expectation of an imperial triumph over rebellious Florence, with the expression of which the Chronicle ends. The Black Guelfs might now work their will without hindrance, and we may well take it that Dino felt but little inclination to divulge his work, even if he could have done so with safety. Hence for a long time he, and afterwards his descendants, kept it concealed as “a species of dangerous contraband,” to use Del Lungo’s expression, and it passed into almost total oblivion. The only trace of it in the fourteenth century appears in the important commentary on the *Divina Commedia* known as that of the Anonimo Fiorentino, compiled probably towards the end of

that century, whose author, as Del Lungo proves, was acquainted with Dino's work and made use of it. The earliest MS. of the Chronicle which is known to exist dates from about 1475, and is in the Laurentian Library at Florence. It is known as the Ashburnham MS., from its having formed part of the library of the late Earl of Ashburnham, after whose death in 1878 the MS. was purchased by the Italian Government. The next oldest MS. dates from 1514, and is in the National Library at Florence. This, as well as a number of MSS. of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, are all derived from the Ashburnham MS. During the whole course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Chronicle remained unnoticed, and was not disinterred from its unmerited neglect till the time of the Senator Carlo di Tommaso Strozzi (1587-1670), one of the most learned men and one of the most diligent students of history in that age.

The Ashburnham MS. was then in the possession of the Senator Filippo Pandolfini (1575-1655), and Carlo Strozzi had a copy taken of it which he presented in 1637 to the reigning pontiff, Urban VIII. (Maffeo Barberini). Carlo Strozzi was employed by this Pope in a great work on the genealogy of the Barberini (published in 1640), in which for the first time Dino's name appeared in print as an authority on Florentine history. Had the Chronicle contained any allusion, however slight, to the progenitors of Pope Urban, there is little doubt that it would then and there have been published with all the prestige which papal favour could bestow.

From this time Dino became known as an historian not to be neglected, and manuscript copies of the Chronicle began and continued to multiply through the second half of the seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth century. Meantime the work remained unpublished, and though its publication was seriously contemplated by the learned Apostolo Zeno in 1716, and by Salvino Salvini two years later, it was not carried out till 1726, when the Chronicle was included by Muratori in vol. ix. of his *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*. It was reprinted by Domenico Maria Manni at Florence in 1728; and not again till 1818, when Rosini's edition of it appeared at Pisa. Since then numerous editions have been published, and the fame of Dino Compagni as an historian of the first importance became firmly established. In 1874, however, Dr. Scheffer-Boichorst of Berlin published, in a volume entitled *Florentiner Studien*, a dissertation wherein he claimed to prove that the Chronicle was a forgery; and in the following year, in a reply to a defence of its authenticity by C. Hegel, he still adhered to his position. Reading Scheffer-Boichorst's arguments in the light which more recent researches, especially those of Del Lungo, have thrown on the history of Florence in Dino's time, it is easy enough to recognise that Scheffer-Boichorst's thesis is vitiated by a radical misconception of the nature and scope of Dino's work, by a misunderstanding of particular passages in his text, and by an imperfect acquaintance with the documentary material that has since been more fully explored. It is palpable, moreover, that Scheffer-Boichorst condemned the authenticity of

the Chronicle to a great extent on the ground that it was not the kind of book he, Scheffer-Boichorst, considered that the genuine Dino would have written. Still, there was in Scheffer-Boichorst's polemic an appearance of erudition and acuteness which made a great impression, and for a time Dino's credit was seriously shaken. In 1879-1887 appeared Del Lungo's great work, *Dino Compagni e la sua Cronica*. This edition of the Chronicle, in which Dino's text and the history of Florence during his time are illustrated with an extraordinary wealth of original research, comprises an elaborate refutation of all the arguments put forward by Scheffer-Boichorst against the authenticity of the Chronicle. Scheffer-Boichorst, in fact, afterwards so far abandoned an untenable position as to admit that Dino could no longer, as he had formerly judged, be struck out of historical literature; but though he continued to deny that the existing Chronicle is anything more than a compendium containing some elements of a lost work by Dino, he never attempted a detailed reply to Del Lungo's exhaustive criticism of his theory, and the most recent authorities constantly cite the Chronicle, not only as authentic, but as one of the most important sources of information on the history of Florence during the period with which it is concerned. The words of Gaetano Salvemini (*Magnati e Popolani in Firenze*, p. 222, n. 3) may be quoted in conclusion: "We cannot help pointing out to the reader the wonderful precision of all Compagni's information. And to think that there was a time when people were capable of believing him to be a forger!"

APPENDIX II

The Florentine Constitution after 1282.

A. THE GUILDS.

SINCE after the establishment of the Priorate the Trade Guilds were the sole depositaries of political power in Florence, it is necessary to give some account of their organisation before speaking of the legislative and executive machinery of the State.

Each guild was governed by officers known as Consuls or *Capitadini*; and it should be noted that the word *Capitudine*, of which *Capitadini* is the plural, in its primary and strict sense meant the Consuls of a guild taken collectively; though it was afterwards applied to them individually. The *Capitadini* were elected by the members of the guilds, and the members of the guilds were the master-traders; the work-people (other than apprentices qualifying themselves to become masters in due time), though bound by the regulations of the guilds, which were of the most stringent and far-reaching character, were entirely excluded from all the privileges of the guild, and were in a position of quasi-slavery; only they were the slaves of the guild and not of any private person.

At the time of the institution of the Priorate there were seven guilds styled "greater," viz.: those of (1) the doctors of law (*giudici*) and notaries; (2) the dressers and dyers of foreign cloth, called the Merchants of Calimala, from the place where they traded (*cf.* III. 8, *n.* 2); (3) the

money-changers; (4) the wool-merchants (*Arte della lana*); (5) the merchants of Por (= Porta) S. Maria, who were engaged in the sale and purchase of cloth, silk, and other materials of clothing, besides all sorts of furniture—this guild was afterwards known as the Guild of Silk (*Arte della seta*), when the commerce in that article overshadowed that in all the other miscellaneous merchandises dealt in by the merchants of the guild; (6) the physicians and apothecaries; (7) the skinners. A few months after the institution of the Priorate, *i.e.* in the October of 1282, nine of the *lesser* guilds were reduced by amalgamation to five and added to the greater guilds, though they were not immediately put on an equal footing with the first seven (*e.g.* no Prior was chosen from among them till 1285). These five guilds were those of (1) the butchers; (2) the shoemakers; (3) the smiths; (4) the masons and carpenters; (5) the hosiers, hucksters, and (after 1291) the linen-drappers. Henceforth, therefore, the Greater Guilds numbered twelve.

Similarly, in 1287 the Lesser Guilds were reduced by amalgamations from sixteen to nine, and their political existence was recognised; but they were accorded very limited powers (*e.g.* their *Capitudini* only attended the Councils of the Commonwealth in exceptional cases), and, except during the time of the ascendancy of Giano della Bella from 1293 to 1295 (see I. 11-16), were debarred from all effective participation in public affairs during the whole period covered by Dino's work. The total number of guilds was therefore twenty-one, after the year 1287. It

may here be noted that the guild of the money-changers did not include bankers. Banking was carried on by merchants of other guilds, especially by those of Calimala; while the Gueft party organisation (see I. 3, *n.* 2) did a very large banking business. On the Guild of Doctors of Law and Notaries, see I. 12, *n.* 1.

B. THE PRIORS, OR SIGNORY.¹

The Priors were elected by the *Capitudini* of the Greater Guilds, together with certain "wise men" (*cf.* I. 11, *n.* 11) nominated by the outgoing Priors. The Priors, in conjunction with the *Capitudini* of the Greater Guilds, had the general direction of public affairs, and appointed almost all the officials of the Commonwealth. "Without the will of the Priors no Council, whether of 'Wise Men,' of the Captain, or of the Podestà, could be called together, no law could be proposed, no deliberation could be had. The Councils of the Wise Men, of the Captain, and of the Podestà were formed not by election but by nomination, and this nomination was made by the Priors in company with 'Wise Men' summoned for the purpose by the Priors themselves" (Salvemini, *Magnati e Popolani*, pp. 116, 117).

C. THE MAGISTRATES (*Rettori*) AND COUNCILS.

The two chief officials of the Commonwealth were the Podestà (Lat. *potestas*) and the Captain

¹ After 1293 the term Signory included the Gonfalonier of Justice (see I. 11) as well as the Priors.

of the People. Both these functionaries were obliged to be foreigners, and held office for six months; and they were collectively known as the Magistrates (*Rettori*; lit. rulers). The office of Podestà was established in the early years of the thirteenth century, that of Captain of the People in 1250, in opposition to the Podestà (see Villani, vi. 39). In Dino's time, however, the two Magistrates exercised co-ordinate authority, the Podestà being in some sort the head of the Magnates, while the Captain was the head of the *popolani*. In case of disputes between the two Magistrates, it was the Priors' duty to decide between them. The Podestà and Captain were judges both in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases the Podestà had appellate jurisdiction (see I. 4, n. 5).

The civil jurisdiction of the Captain was confined to fiscal cases. The Podestà had jurisdiction in all criminal cases; the Captain had a concurrent jurisdiction in certain criminal cases. Both Magistrates were assisted in the discharge of their judicial duties by a staff of doctors of law (*giudici*), who, like all the other members of their establishment or household (*famiglia*), were required to be foreigners (*cf.* I. 16, n. 4).

These Magistrates were also the heads of the army; the Captain commanding the militia of the citizens, the Podestà the forces of the nobles. The Podestà, however, often acted as Commander-in-Chief; and was, moreover, the chief official representative of the Commonwealth.

Furthermore, these Magistrates were entrusted with the duty of summoning (under the instructions

of the Signory) the legislative Councils of the State as follows. The Captain summoned and presided over (1) the Council of the Hundred Men, (2) the Special Council of the Captain, (3) the General Council of the Captain. The Podestà summoned and presided over (1) his Special Council of ninety members, (2) his General Council of three hundred members. Legislative measures had to pass these Councils in the above-stated order in those cases in which the consent of all the Councils was necessary (see Villari, p. 227). Extraordinary and temporary Councils of "Wise Men" were also very frequently summoned by the Signory (see I. 21, n. 6). The *Capitadini* of the Greater Guilds took part in the proceedings of the Councils of the Captain, and, on important occasions, in those of the Podestà also.

Finally, it is important to bear in mind that, as may be gathered from the above summary, the Florentine Commonwealth was essentially different from a democracy of modern times. The inhabitants of the outlying territory (*Contado*), as well as the smaller traders and populace of the city—what, in short, we should call the "working classes"—were entirely excluded from the rights of citizenship. "In fact," says Villari (p. 128), "even down to the last days of the republic, real citizenship, the possessors of which alone were eligible to political posts, was conceded to few; and even in 1494 the number of citizens hardly exceeded three thousand." It may be mentioned that the whole population of Florence in 1300 has been estimated at about 30,000 (Salvemini, *Magnati e Popolani*, p. 43).

TRANSLATORS' NOTE

This translation is the joint work of Miss Else C. M. Benecke and Mr. A. G. Ferrers Howell. The notes and appendices are by Mr. A. G. Ferrers Howell, and are in the main founded on Del Lungo's work, "Dino Compagni e la sua Cronica" (Florence, Successori Le Monnier, 1879-1887): much help has also been derived from Gaetano Salvemini's "Magnati e Popolani in Firenze" (Florence, Carnesecchi, 1899). The translation has been made from the text of Del Lungo's smaller edition, "La cronica di Dino Compagni, Edizione Scolastica" (Florence, Successori Le Monnier, 1902); except in one passage (see III. 18, n. 2), where the text of the larger edition has been followed.

The translators desire to express their sense of the great obligation they are under to the researches of Professor Del Lungo, and their gratitude to him for his permission freely to avail themselves of his invaluable labours.

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¹ The references in the case of the Minor Works are to Dr. Moore's "Oxford Dante," 3rd edition.

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
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